Ryan v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 30 July 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00 C 6075.,00 C 6075.
• Citation: Ryan v. U.S., 156 F.Supp.2d 900 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
• Parties: Timothy RYAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

156 F.Supp.2d 900

Timothy RYAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v.UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants.

No. 00 C 6075.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

July 30, 2001.

James T. Duda, W.D. Cummongs, Limited, Homewood, IL, for plaintiffs.

Jack Donatelli, AUSA, Lisa Marie Noller, United States Attorny's Office, Chicago, IL, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GOTTSCHALL, District Judge.

Background

Timothy and Debra Ryan, individually and as Guardians for Ann Marie Ryan, and Lucas and Laura Anderson, individually and as Guardians for Jeney Anderson(collectively, "the plaintiffs"), commenced this action against the United States of America, the United States Postal Service (USPS), and Leslie Tucker(collectively, "the defendants").Plaintiffs seek relief against the United States and the USPS under the Federal Tort Claims Act.¹Plaintiffs' claims are based on incidents allegedly occurring on June 15, 1998 and August 11, 1998.On those dates, Leslie Tucker, a letter carrier for the USPS, committed certain acts of sexual misconduct involving victims Ann Marie Ryan and Jeney Anderson while on his delivery route in the Village of Park Forest in Will County, Illinois.Mr. Tucker was subsequently charged and convicted of criminal violations in connection with these incidents.

Plaintiffs seek damages against the defendants, alleging that the United States was "negligent in one or more of the following ways: 1.) that the Defendant failed to properly investigate the background of the Defendant, Leslie Tucker so as to insure safety for all parties on the letter carrier's route, 2.) that the Defendant upon information and belief of the Plaintiffs failed to properly investigate the background and prior service history of the Defendant, Leslie Tucker. 3.) that the Defendant failed to properly protect all residents on the postal route."(Compl.¶ 3).The United States has moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) of the FTCA bars the plaintiffs' claims.For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is granted.

Analysis

The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide its merits.Gibson v. City of Chicago,910 F.2d 1510, 1520(7th Cir.1990).A court should dismiss a claim only if "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations of the complaint."Cook v. Winfrey,141 F.3d 322, 327(7th Cir.1998)(citations omitted).The court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.Colfax Corp. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth.,79 F.3d 631, 632(7th Cir.1996).

The Federal Tort Claims Act acts as a limited waiver on the government's sovereign immunity.The FTCA gives district courts exclusive jurisdiction over:

claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).There are certain exceptions to the FTCA, one of which is the "assault and battery" exception.This exception prevents the United States from being held liable for "any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights ..."28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).In support of its motion to dismiss, the United States contends that plaintiffs' claims are barred by the "assault and battery" exception of the FTCA because the cause of action arose out of the assault and battery inflicted upon Ann Marie Ryan and Jeney Anderson by Leslie Tucker.Specifically, the United States makes two main contentions.First, the United States argues that plaintiffs' negligence claim is really a respondeat superior claim in disguise, and is therefore barred by § 2680(h).Second, the United States argues that it owed no other affirmative duty, independent of the employment relationship, to protect the plaintiffs.

In response, plaintiffs maintain that the negligence cause of action did not arise out of the assault and battery and is not barred by § 2680(h).Plaintiffs argue that their negligent hiring, supervision, and retention claims are not based on respondeat superior, and that the United States' negligence in hiring Mr. Tucker is an entirely separate tort from the assault and battery committed by Mr. Tucker.In addition, plaintiffs contend that the United States did, in fact, owe an independent affirmative duty to them.

Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention

The United States' first argument is that plaintiffs' claims are really just respondeat superior claims in which the underlying tort was Tucker's assault and battery.The United States argues that plaintiffs are simply attempting to disguise the claims as negligent hiring, supervision, and retention so as to avoid the assault and battery exception of the FTCA.The first issue the court must address is whether a claim against the United States for the negligent hiring, supervision, or retention of a federal employee "aris[es] out of" an assault and battery (and is therefore barred by § 2680(h)) where the plaintiff's injury is caused by an assault and battery committed by the federal employee.

To answer this question, the court first examines two Supreme Courtcases dealing with the issue, beginning with United States v. Shearer,473 U.S. 52, 105 S.Ct. 3039, 87 L.Ed.2d 38(1985).In Shearer, an army private was slain by another private and the mother of the deceased brought suit against the government for negligent supervision, claiming that although the Army knew that the private who killed her son was dangerous, it failed to restrain him and warn others.Shearer,473 U.S. at 53-54, 105 S.Ct. 3039.A plurality of four Justices opined that the "express words of [§ 2680(h) ]" facially barred plaintiff's claim because "in sweeping language [§ 2680(h)] excludes any claim arising out of assault or battery."Shearer,473 U.S. at 55, 105 S.Ct. 3039(citingUnited States v. Spelar,338 U.S. 217, 219, 70 S.Ct. 10, 94 L.Ed. 3(1949)).The court read § 2680(h) to "cover claims that sound in negligence but stem from a battery committed by a Government employee."Id.

Interpreting the views expressed by the plurality in Shearer, some lower courts construed the phrase "arising out of" in § 2680(h) broadly, barring all claims having any remote relationship to assault and battery.SeeJohnson by Johnson v. United States,788 F.2d 845, 850-54(2d Cir.1986);Thigpen v. United States,800 F.2d 393, 395(4th Cir.1986);Hoot v. United States,790 F.2d 836, 838, (10th Cir.1986);Garcia v. United States,776 F.2d 116, 118(5th Cir.1985).Other courts interpreted the "arising out of" language in § 2680(h) more narrowly, allowing for some exceptions.These courts permitted claims alleging governmental negligence, such as negligent hiring and supervision, and claims in which the United States owed the plaintiff an "independent affirmative duty" and breached that separate duty.SeeDoe v. United States,838 F.2d 220, 223(7th Cir.1988);Kearney v. United States,815 F.2d 535, 537(9th Cir.1987).

The Supreme Court revisited § 2680(h) in Sheridan v. United States,487 U.S. 392, 108 S.Ct. 2449, 101 L.Ed.2d 352(1988).In Sheridan,plaintiffs alleged that the government had been negligent in failing to restrain a sailor who had fired several shots at them.Prior to the assault and battery, the sailor had been visibly drunk and carrying a weapon on Navy property, in violation of Navy regulations.Sheridan,487 U.S. at 392-93, 108 S.Ct. 2449.The United States argued that § 2680(h) barred plaintiffs' claim, because the claim arose out of the assault and battery committed by the sailor.Addressing the issue, the Court acknowledged that there are two possible interpretations of the phrase "arising out of" in § 2680(h).Sheridan,487 U.S. at 399, 108 S.Ct. 2449.

The first possible interpretation is that a claim arises out of an assault and battery only where the plaintiff fails to allege an independent basis for tort liability.Under this interpretation, a claim is not barred so long as it alleges a negligent act or omission independent of the assault or battery.In such situations, the "attention of the trier of fact is focused on the Government's negligent act or omission; the intentional commission is simply considered as part of the causal link leading to the injury."Id.Consequently, an individual employee's assault and battery would not create government liability, but the government's "antecedent negligence" could give rise to liability.Id.

The second possible interpretation is that a claim arises out of assault and battery in any case where the plaintiff would have no claim "but for" the assault and battery.Thus, the typical negligent hiring, supervision, or retention claim would be barred by the exception, because "but for" the assault and battery, there would be no injury to the plaintiff.Sheridan,487 U.S. at 400, 108 S.Ct. 2449.After recognizing these two possibilities, the Supreme Court explicitly declined to resolve the issue, stating: "We need not resolve this dispute, however, because even accepting the Government's contention that when an intentional tort is a sine qua non of recovery the action `arises out of' that tort, we conclude that the exception does not bar recovery in this case."Id.The Sheridan Court declined to determine which interpretation is correct because it concluded that the United States owed plaintiff an...