Ryan v. Weston (In re Weston)
Decision Date | 18 May 1903 |
Citation | 28 Mont. 207 |
Parties | In re WESTON. RYAN v. WESTON. |
Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Election contest by Patrick V. Ryan against John Weston, in which contestant instituted an original proceeding in the Supreme Court under substitute for Senate bill No. 71, eighth legislative assembly, for the appointment of a district judge to temporarily hold court in the district in which the contest was commenced. Proceedings dismissed.
This is an original proceeding instituted in this court by Patrick V. Ryan for the purpose of securing an order designating a judge of some district other than the Second Judicial District, to try and determine the contested election case of Ryan v. Weston. The proceeding is taken under the provisions of an act of the eighth legislative assembly of Montana, designated as “Substitute for Senate Bill No. 71” (unpublished), entitled “An act to provide for the designation and appointment of a district judge to temporarily hold court in another district than his own, and to perform the official duties of the district judge of such district where such judge is biased or prejudiced or for any cause disqualified from performing the same,” which is as follows:
“Be it enacted by the legislative assembly of the state of Montana:
Upon the filing of the petition this court, on its own motion, directed an order to be issued to the district judge in whose department the case of Ryan v. Weston is pending, and to the contestee, to show cause, if any they had, why the relief prayed for should not be granted, and directed a hearing upon the return thereof. At the hearing counsel for the district judge and for the contestee filed a motion to dismiss the proceedings, upon the ground that substitute for Senate bill No. 71 is unconstitutional, and that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition or to grant the relief prayed for. Upon this motion the questions involved were argued and submitted for determination.
W. E. Carroll and E. N. Harwood, for contestant.
Carpenter & Carpenter, Toole & Bach, and L. P. Forrestell, for contestee.
HOLLOWAY, J. (after stating the facts).
“The source of all power vested in the Supreme Court is the Constitution of the state, and in it must be found the measure of jurisdiction.” The foregoing succinct statement taken from the brief of the petitioner in the proceedings No. 1,928 (In re Boston & M. Consol. Copper & Silver Min. Co., 72 Pac. 1103), correctly lays the foundation for a determination of the question involved in this controversy. The general rule, repeatedly affirmed and now well understood, that the Constitution of the United States represents a grant of power by the several states and the inhabitants thereof to the general government, while the Constitutions of the several states operate upon the lawmaking branches of those governments as limitations of authority, must be understood and considered in this connection with the qualification which our own state Constitution has attached, that “the provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise.” Section 29, art. 3, Const. Mont. This declaration can have but one meaning-that, with reference to those subjects upon which the Constitution assumes to speak, its declarations shall be conclusive upon the Legislature, and shall prevent the enactment of any law which has for its purpose the extension or limitation of the powers which they confer. An examination of our Constitution discloses an attempt on the part of its framers to define the jurisdiction of this Court, and such definition must be accepted as a final declaration upon that subject: (1) The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction only, except as otherwise provided by this Constitution (section 2, art. 8), and shall have power to issue, hear, and determine such original and remedial writs as may be necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction (section 3, art. 8). (2) It shall have general supervisory control over all inferior courts, under such regulations and limitations as may be prescribed by law. Section 2, art. 8. (3) It shall have discretionary power to issue, hear, and determine writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition, and injunction. Section 3, art. 8.
For the purpose of this discussion, these are transposed, and will be considered in this order: (1) original jurisdiction; (2) appellate jurisdiction; and (3) supervisory jurisdiction.
The power to issue, hear, and determine the six original writs enumerated above marks the limit of the original jurisdiction of this court. The scope and purpose of these writs are too well defined and...
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