Ryans v. Whatley
| Decision Date | 08 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11-CV-46(MTT) |
| Parties | RHONDA A. RYANS, Plaintiff, v. DR. SALLY WHATLEY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 41). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
Pro se Plaintiff Rhonda Ryans filed her initial compliant on March 28, 2011, alleging that various individual Defendants discriminated against her based on her gender and retaliated against her for her complaints of discrimination. (Doc. 1). Ryans also asserts various state law claims. According to Ryans, the Defendants' conduct violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Georgia state law. On July 7, 2011, the Court convened a discovery conference. At that conference, the parties agreed that the individual Defendants were not the proper parties to respond to Ryans' claims based on federal law. Accordingly, on July 15, 2011, the Court entered an order substituting the Dougherty County School System ("DCSS") as the Defendant for Ryans' federal law claims. (Doc. 29). Pursuant to that same order, the Court directed Ryans to supplement her complaint to provide a clear statement of the factual and legal bases of herclaims. Ryans filed her supplemental complaint July 26, 2011.1 (Doc. 30). On February 29, 2012, the Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. After Ryans responded to the Defendants' motion, the Court ordered the Defendants to reply, which they did on May 30. Ryans filed her sur-reply on June 11.
Rhonda Ryans has worked for DCSS in some capacity since 2002 or 2003. (Doc. 43 at 8). In August 2005, she began working as a paraprofessional at South Georgia Regional Achievement Center ("SGRAC") in Albany, Georgia.2 While employed at SGRAC, Ryans claims she was sexually harassed in December 2005 by Venorris Bradley, another DCSS employee. Ryans claims she complained to Superintendent Sally Whatley in April or May 2007, but that Superintendent Whatley instructed her to first voice her complaints to the principal, pursuant to DCSS policy. (Doc. 30 at 11). On December 17, 2007, Ryans claims she met with Venorris Bradley, Assistant Superintendent Carlos Keith, and Principal John I. Davis to discuss the alleged harassment, but that no action was ever taken. (Doc. 30 at 12-13). On March 18, 2008, Ryans filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging she was sexually harassed, subjected to a hostile work environment, and retaliated against for complaining of the alleged harassment ("EEOC Charge 1"). (Doc. 43-1 at 65). Ryans received a notice of right to sue from the EEOC on or about July 21, 2010. (Doc. 43-1 at 66).
During this time, Ryans remained employed at SGRAC. On October 15, 2009, she claims she filed a grievance against Principal Davis complaining of continued discrimination and retaliation. Neither Ryans nor the Defendants have produced a copy of this alleged grievance.3 On November 4, 2009, Ryans claims, Office Manager Annette Jenkins made false accusations that Ryans was leaving school premises without signing out. Ryans also accuses Jenkins of falsifying and forging documents. (Doc. 30 at 15-16). Two days later, on November 6, Ryans claims Counselor Audrey Simmons Davis made false accusations over the phone to Human Resources Director Tracy Williams regarding an alleged argument between Audrey Davis and Ryans.4 (Doc. 30 at 16). There also may have been some type of informal meeting among these parties the same day.
On January 17, 2010, Ryans filed another charge of discrimination with the EEOC ("EEOC Charge 2"). (Doc. 43-1 at 68). In EEOC Charge 2, Ryans claims she was discriminated against because of her sex and retaliated against for filing EEOC Charge 1 and the grievance against Principal Davis in October 2009. Specifically, she claims that between October 1 and November 6, 2009, her "terms and conditions of employment [were] different from those of [her] male co-workers in that [she was] denied compensation time, excluded from staff photos, required to sign out when leaving campus, denied travel devices and computer information and [her] copied documents were shredded." (Doc. 43-1 at 68). Ryans also claims she was reprimanded on November 6, 2009, and that she was "notallowed to work in the Phoenix Program inside Phoenix Hall," meaning that her classroom was located outside the building in a portable unit. (Doc. 43-1 at 68). The EEOC issued a notice of right to sue regarding EEOC Charge 2 on January 3, 2011. (Doc. 43-1 at 69).
In March 2010, Ryans was notified by then-Superintendent Whatley that she was being placed on 10-day paid administrative leave and that she was to undergo a "fit-for-duty" assessment with Dr. Cheryl Kaiser. (Doc. 43-1 at 72). Ryans underwent the assessment on March 12, 2010. On April 7, 2010, Ryans was informed via letter that she was being transferred from SGRAC to Lamar Reese Elementary Magnet School of the Arts ("Lamar Reese"). (Doc. 43-1 at 86). In that letter, Superintendent Whatley stated that Ryans had been involved in numerous incidents at SGRAC during the 2009-2010 school year that detracted from her "ability to provide effective classroom instruction." (Doc. 43-1 at 86). Among the incidents cited were Ryans' "irreconcilable differences with Dr. John I. Davis, Principal; [she] refused to allow Ms. Tracy Williams, Human Resources Director, to assist [her]; there ha[d] been problems with colleagues at [her] school; and [she] alleged that a Dougherty County School System police officer broke into [her] vehicle." (Doc. 43-1 at 86).
On October 1, 2010, after working at Lamar Reese for approximately six months, Ryans received notice that she would be suspended from Lamar Reese pending a hearing to determine whether further action would be taken. (Doc. 43-1 at 85). The disciplinary infractions cited in the letter included "tardiness for required district meetings and refusal to accept assistance and guidance in delivering physical education to assigned students; lack of performance regarding planning and delivering effective physical education at Lamar Reese Magnet School of the Arts; your disagreeable and often threatening behavior toward other teachers and staff; your recent more bizarre behavior involving an insistence onwearing a backpack at all times during instruction and your blatant refusal to respond to questions and directives from the Principal, Dr. Valerie Thomas."5 (Doc. 43-1 at 85). By agreement of the parties, the hearing was delayed until February 21, 2011. On the day of the hearing, the matter was settled between the parties and memorialized in a document entitled "Settlement Agreement," which was eventually signed and dated by Ryans on March 21, 2011. (Doc. 43-1 at 70-71). Pursuant to the agreement, Ryans' pay was reinstated as of December 8, 2010; her teacher's certification was reinstated retroactive to the date of its suspension, June 30, 2010; and she remained a DCSS employee. (Doc. 43-1 at 70). A week later, on March 28, 2011, Ryans filed this lawsuit.6
Summary judgment must be granted if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "A factual dispute is genuine only if 'a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 281 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991)). The burden rests with the moving party to prove that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Info. Sys. & Networks Corp, 281 F.3d at 1224. The district court must"view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in its favor." Id.
In EEOC Charge 1, Ryans contends she was sexually harassed, subjected to a hostile work environment, and retaliated against for complaining of the alleged harassment. The Defendants argue that all claims raised in Ryans' initial EEOC charge are time barred because she failed to file suit within 90 days of receiving the right-to-sue notice.
"Before instituting a Title VII action in federal district court, a private plaintiff must file an EEOC complaint against the discriminating party and receive statutory notice from the EEOC of his or her right to sue the respondent named in the charge." Forehead v. Fla. State Hosp. at Chattahoochee, 89 F.3d 1562, 1567 (11th Cir. 1996). The administrative charge must be filed within 180 days of the alleged discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). In addition to filing a timely EEOC charge, a plaintiff who wishes to bring a lawsuit in federal court must do so within ninety days of receiving her right-to-sue notice from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
Ryans filed EEOC Charge 1 on March 18, 2008. The evidentiary materials indicate that the EEOC sent Ryans a right-to-sue letter concerning the allegations in EEOC Charge 1 on July 21, 2010. It is also undisputed that Ryans did not file her lawsuit until March 28, 2011, 250 days after the EEOC mailed her notice of right to sue. Thus, Ryans clearly failed to file suit within Title VII's 90-day mandate. Unless some equitable exception applies, the claims asserted in EEOC Charge 1 are time barred.
As a basis for avoiding application of the 90-day time bar, Ryans claims she was told on several occasions by EEOC representatives handling her charge that her case would be"amended." (Doc. 30 at 21; Doc. 43-1 at 8). Presumably, this "amending" process would delay the running of the 90-day limitations period until some later date and allow Ryans to...
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