Rybolt v. State
| Decision Date | 28 June 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A04-0109-CR-402.,49A04-0109-CR-402. |
| Citation | 770 N.E.2d 935 |
| Parties | Jeffrey RYBOLT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Susan D. Rayl, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Cynthia L. Ploughe, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Jeffrey Rybolt ("Rybolt") was charged with possession of marijuana,1 as a Class A misdemeanor, in Marion Superior Court. Rybolt filed a motion to suppress the marijuana found as the result of a pat-down search conducted during a traffic stop. The motion was denied. He has filed this interlocutory appeal arguing that the marijuana obtained by police during the pat-down search should have been suppressed because the search was unlawful in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
We reverse.
On September 21, 2000, Officer Robert Brake ("Officer Brake") responded to a dispatch that a vehicle was stopped in the crosswalk at the intersection of Pennsylvania and South Streets in Indianapolis. Officer Brake pulled up behind the vehicle, which was driven by Rybolt, with his emergency lights activated and attempted to get Rybolt's attention by using his air horn. When Rybolt remained unconscious, Officer Brake approached the vehicle and tapped on the driver's side window. Rybolt eventually awoke and rolled down his window. Rybolt then gave his driver's license to Officer Brake, pursuant to Brake's request.
Officer Brake believed that Rybolt was under the influence of narcotics because Rybolt had "heavy glossy eyes," which he felt was indicative of marijuana use. Tr. p. 16. Therefore, after Officer Brake took Rybolt's license, he immediately ordered Rybolt to step out of the vehicle. Rybolt cooperated immediately and fully with Officer Brake's direction.
Although Rybolt did not make any furtive or nervous movements, Officer Brake performed a pat-down search of Rybolt because of Brake's belief that any person who commits a drug offense is likely armed. Tr. pp. 21-22. During the search, Officer Brake felt a plastic bag in Rybolt's pocket. Officer Brake believed from his experience that the bag contained marijuana, and therefore, he asked for Rybolt's consent to reach into his pocket. Rybolt gave his consent, and Officer Brake retrieved the bag, which contained 6.06 grams of marijuana.
Rybolt was charged with possession of marijuana, as a Class A misdemeanor. Rybolt moved to suppress the marijuana obtained as a result of the pat-down search. The motion was denied, and Rybolt requested that the trial court certify its order denying his motion to suppress for interlocutory appeal. The trial court granted his request, and on October 5, 2001, our court accepted jurisdiction of this interlocutory appeal. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Rybolt argues that the pat-down search was conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution,2 and therefore, the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. The admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and we will not disturb its decision absent a showing that the court abused that discretion. Williams v. State, 754 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ind.Ct.App.2001),trans. denied. When we review a motion to suppress, we will not reweigh the evidence, but will determine if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's ruling. Camp v. State, 751 N.E.2d 299, 301 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). "We look to the totality of the circumstances and consider all uncontroverted evidence together with conflicting evidence that supports the trial court's decision." Id. The trial court's judgment will be affirmed if it is sustainable on any legal grounds apparent in the record. Id.
The Fourth Amendment provides "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches or seizures shall not be violated." A search warrant is a condition precedent to a lawful search. Williams, 754 N.E.2d at 587. "Searches conducted outside the judicial process are per se unreasonable unless subject to a few well delineated exceptions." Id. at 587-88 (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993)). The State bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of one of the exceptions. Id. at 588. An exception exists "when a police officer makes a Terry stop, if he has reasonable fear of danger, he may conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of the suspect in an attempt to discover weapons that might be used to harm him." Id. (citing Shinault v. State, 668 N.E.2d 274, 277 (Ind.Ct.App.1996)). The officer's authority to perform a pat-down search is dependent upon the nature and extent of his particularized concern for his safety. Id. (citing Wilson v. State, 745 N.E.2d 789, 792 (Ind.2001)). A police officer "may not frisk for weapons `on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked.'" Wilson, 745 N.E.2d at 792 (quoting Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979)).
In Camp, a police officer observed the defendant stop his vehicle on a residential street in a high-crime area at 4:30 in the morning. Camp, 751 N.E.2d at 300. A passenger in the defendant's vehicle approached a house where he met and spoke with a woman for about twenty seconds, and the woman appeared to give something to the passenger. Id. at 300-01. The passenger then returned to the vehicle and he and the defendant drove away. The officer followed and stopped the vehicle after the defendant failed to make a complete stop at an intersection. Id. The officer made a request to search the vehicle and the defendant consented. When the defendant got out of the vehicle, the officer conducted a pat-down search of him and found a crack pipe. Id.
Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). We also observed that the officer's search of the defendant was not justified. Id. at 304. However, we determined that "inadequacy of the officer's justification for the search [was] not dispositive because we [found] Camp consented to the search." Id.
In Jett v. State, 716 N.E.2d 69, 70 (Ind. Ct.App.1999), the defendant was stopped for speeding and improper passing. After the police officer stopped the defendant, the defendant immediately exited his vehicle. However, when the officer ordered him to get back into his vehicle, he did so. Id. The officer then advised the defendant of the reason for the traffic stop, asked the defendant to exit the vehicle, and the officer conducted a pat-down search of the defendant. Id. During the search, the officer felt something hard, which could have been a weapon. The officer looked inside the defendant's pocket and observed a cigarette package with a plastic bag sticking out of it. The plastic bag contained a leafy substance, which was later identified as marijuana. Id. The defendant was arrested and convicted for possession of marijuana. Id.
On appeal, the defendant argued "that the officer's patdown search was not supported by an objectively reasonable fear for the officer's safety." Id. The State contended that the pat-down search was reasonable because the defendant exited his vehicle immediately after the officer stopped him, "which was unusual and could be seen as a sign of hostility toward the officer." Id. However, we determined that "a reasonable person in the officer's circumstances would not have reasonable suspicion to believe that" the defendant was armed and dangerous and stated:
[w]e accept the officer's interpretation of [the defendant's] action as a possible sign of hostility. However, the officer testified that [the defendant] did not attempt to rush him and, in fact, [the defendant] immediately complied with the officer's order to get back inside his vehicle. After reentering his vehicle, [the defendant] made no furtive or threatening movements and remained inside his vehicle until the officer ordered him out in order to perform the patdown search. Thus, any fear for his safety that the officer may have felt based on [the defendant's] initial exit of his vehicle was alleviated by [the defendant's] subsequent behavior. In fact, the officer testified that "there was nothing indicating that [the defendant] was armed, it just ... the ... for officer's safety anyone and everyone can be armed." This type of generalized suspicion does not authorize a patdown search.
Id. at 70-71 (internal citation omitted).
In Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775, 781 (Ind.2001), the defendant was under investigation for allegedly dealing narcotics, and the police officer providing...
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