Rydbom v. Ames
| Decision Date | 17 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 2:20-00043 |
| Parties | DENNIS J. RYDBOM, Petitioner, v. SUPERINTENDENT DONNIE AMES Mt. Olive Correctional Complex, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Petitioner's Petition Under 28 U.S.C § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Document Nos 2 and 2-1), filed on January 17, 2020. By Standing Order entered on January 18, 2020, the above case was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for submission of proposed findings of fact and a recommendation for deposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (Document No. 3) Having thoroughly examined the record in this case, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the District Court grant Respondent's “Motion to Dismiss and for Judgment on the Pleadings” (Document No. 21) and deny Petitioner's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 27).
On May 25, 1996, the Marietta Police Department received a report that an unidentified female's body was found in Marietta, Washington County, Ohio, later identified as Sheree Ann Petry. (Document No. 21-1, p. 51.) The Marietta Police Department began an investigation of the murder of Ms. Petry under the supervision of Richard Meek. (Id.) On May 27, 1996, officers from the Marietta Police Department, accompanied by Patrolman Phyllis from the Williamstown Police Department, went to Ms. Petry's residence in Williamstown, Wood County, West Virginia. (Id., p. 31-32.) Several items were seized as a result of this search. (Id.)
On March 28, 1996, a search warrant was executed by officers from the Marietta Police Department and Washington County Sheriff's Department at the residence of Steve and Sherri Saines, where Petitioner was residing at the time. (Id., p. 19.) The officers (Id.)
Petitioner subsequently moved to Phoenix, Arizona, where he had lived before moving to Ohio, and, on November 12, 1996, Detective Brian E. McIndoo of the City of Phoenix Police Department filed an application for a search warrant of Petitioner's residence. (Document No. 212, p. 1-2.) The affidavit form provided that Det. McIndoo had been contacted on November 12, 1996, by Officer Greg Nohe of the Marietta Police Department and provided with an account of the investigation of Ms. Petry's murder and Petitioner's possible involvement. (Id., p. 4.) The search warrant provided for the seizure of a number of the victim's missing possessions, including her purse and its contents, her day planner, her underwear, a bathing suit, and a night gown. (Id., p. 1.)
On December 3, 1996, Petitioner was indicted for the aggravated murder of Ms. Petry in the Washington County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas. (Document No. 21-3, p. 1.) Petitioner moved to dismiss the proceedings in Ohio on the basis of a lack of territorial jurisdiction on December 18, 1996. (Id., p. 2.) The Court of Common Pleas granted that motion on January 27, 1997 (Id., p. 3), finding that the investigation revealed that the victim died in Williamstown, Wood County, West Virginia, where she had lived. State v. Rydbom, No. 97-CA-16, 1998 WL 177541, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 14, 1998). The State of Ohio appealed, but the dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Ohio on April 14, 1998. Id. at *6.
On July 11, 1997, a Wood County grand jury indicted Petitioner on one count of First Degree Murder. (Document No. 13-2.) On November 4, 1997, Petitioner filed a handwritten pro se motion captioned “Defendant's Motion to Represent Himself.” (Document No. 21-4.) In this motion, Petitioner requested that the Circuit Court dismiss his two attorneys as counsel of record in his case, but reappoint one of them to serve “as either co-counsel or standby counsel.” (Id.) Petitioner cited his belief that his attorneys were not sufficiently focused on his desire to avoid trial delays as his primary motivation in seeking to proceed pro se. (Id.)
The Circuit Court addressed this motion at the start of a pretrial hearing the following day, November 5, 1997. The Circuit Court asked Petitioner if he was “still desiring to proceed pro se,” to which he replied “[y]es.” (Document No. 21-5, p. 1.) After the Court discussed with counsel whether Petitioner would be competent to represent himself, the Circuit Court attempted to warn Petitioner of the perils of self-representation, noting that his case was complex and involved scientific evidence. (Id., p. 2 - 4.) The Circuit Court advised Petitioner that “the problem that arises when someone proceeds pro se, is that they perceive things and interpret things that the Court says differently than a lawyer who is trained in the law would perceive those and interpret those statements.” (Id., p. 5.) The Circuit Court cautioned Petitioner “in ninety to ninety-five percent of the cases, it is to the Defendant's disadvantage to represent himself or herself” and that in representing himself, he “may make certain statements to the jury that the Court would deem testimony; and therefore, you would waive your right not to testify.” (Id., p. 6.)
Upon being asked if he understood the issues self-representation presented, Petitioner again reemphasized that his priority had been his right to a speedy trial, that he was disappointed that his attorneys has not prioritized this, and that they had even potentially caused delays by filing motions unrelated to that issue. (Id., p. 7.) Petitioner then qualified his desire to proceed pro se, explaining:
I agree that I need help. I don't profess to know the law, especially West Virginia law, but I know the English language, and the law is not supposed to be so overwhelmingly complex where a normal person cannot understand what's going on. That's why I've asked that Pat Radcliff still be allowed to assist me. I need help . . . but I want-I want to have the overriding authority and responsibility of what gets pursued with regard to this defense.
(Id., p. 8.) The Circuit Court then discussed the extent to which Petitioner was already entitled to strategic control of his defense, advancing the idea that Petitioner should have such control by default, while Petitioner argued that an attorney typically controls most strategic decisions. (Id., pp. 8 - 10.) The parties continued to discuss this issue, with Petitioner stressing that he needed strategic control of his defense so he would have authority to prevent his attorneys from filing any motions which would cause further trial delays. (Id., pp. 10 - 20) Petitioner continued to maintain, however, that “[i]f I don't have to waive the right to have some type of assistance in my defense, I don't want to.” (Id., p. 20.)
The Circuit Court ultimately recessed so that the parties could research the extent to which a defendant should normally have strategic control of his defense. (Id., p. 28.) Upon resuming the hearing, one of Petitioner's attorneys explained that what Petitioner actually wanted was “that he be allowed to proceed pro se with standby counsel . . . [t]hat is, having the powers of counsel to cross-examine, give opening statements, just as counsel would, and to make, of course, strategic decisions concerning the case.” (Id., p. 29.) The State opposed Petitioner's request, noting that it would create confusion. (Id., p. 30.) The Circuit Court agreed, noting “I am not, at this point, ready to permit the Defendant to personally be involved in the conduct of the trial,” but left open the possibility that Petitioner could be involved in a specific aspect of trial, such as questioning a witness, if he made a request ten days prior to trial. (Id., pp. 31 - 32.)
The parties then discussed whether the path moving forward would be considered “hybrid” representation or standby representation. (Id., pp. 33 - 36.) The Circuit Court allowed the representation situation to continue moving forward as follows:
Okay, and my decision then is that you have-you have the ultimate decision on all those matters, matters of strategy and all those things, but that you will not be actively participating in the course of the trial unless you specifically advised the Court in advance. Is that your understanding?
(Id., p. 37.) Petitioner responded “[y]es sir,” and the Circuit Court asked, “[a]nd you have no problem with that?” (Id.) Petitioner confirmed (Id., p. 38.)
On February 6, 1998, Petitioner was convicted by jury of Murder in the First Degree of Ms. Petry. (Document No. 13-5.) The Circuit Court sentenced Petitioner in May 1998 to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. (Document No. 13-6.)
Following trial, Petitioner moved to discharge counsel. (Document No 21-6, p. 2.) At a hearing on December 2, 1998, Petitioner categorized the basis of his motion as an inability to agree on what issues should be the focus of the appeal, given the page limit. (Id., p. 2.) Petitioner stated that he wished to focus more heavily on non-constitutional evidentiary claims, while counsel preferred to focus on constitutional issues. (Id., p. 11.) Despite his...
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