Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Scott
Decision Date | 05 September 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 48311,No. 2,48311,2 |
Citation | 129 Ga.App. 871,201 S.E.2d 672 |
Parties | RYDER TRUCK LINES, INC. v. Hugh H. SCOTT |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Fortson, Bentley & Griffin, Edwin Fortson, Athens, for appellant.
Hudson & Montgomery, Jim Hudson, Athens, for appellee.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
Scott sued Ryder for breach of a contract whereby Scott was to furnish Ryder, a common carrier, certain transportation services and equipment (tractors, trailers, and service as a 'sales agent' to solicit and procure freight traffic for Ryder). Scott was to receive a stated commission on gross revenues received by Ryder from shipments; and a percentage of the compensation received by Ryder from the freight traffic transported on the equipment. Scott was required to purchase certain carrier equipment in order to perform these services. The original contract provided that upon the death or disability of Scott, the contract was to be terminated, and Ryder was then to repurchase all of the equipment according to certain formulas (book value less depreciation).
The complaint of Scott, as amended, contends the parties orally modified the written agreement and mutually departed from same whereby Scott could purchase additional equipment for use under the contract if same were approved by the defendant, and if the contract were thereafter terminated as set out in the written contract because of the default of the defendant, the defendant would be obligated to repurchase said equipment according to the agreed amortization schedule. Plaintiff contends he continued to purchase additional equipment for use in defendant's carrier operation, but defendant failed to pay him his commissions and obligations and thus breached the contract. Plaintiff sued for damages resulting from the breach, i.e., sums due as a result of the refusal to pay commissions, sums due on certain maybills, other services rendered, and a demand for repurchase of the equipment. The equipment was originally purchased from defendant.
Defendant answered, denied the material averments of complaint, and contended plaintiff had breached the contract; denied any oral novation had been mutually agreed upon; affirmatively pleaded the statute of frauds, and sought damages from the plaintiff because of all of the foregoing.
Motion for summary judgment was filed by the defendant, and same was granted. On appeal to this court in Scott v. Ryder Truck Lines Inc., 120 Ga.App. 819, at page 822, 172 S.E.2d 365, at page 367, this court reversed, holding that the parties may: Thus, that case held that the pleadings in regard to the oral modifications and breach of contract were not pierced, and that movant failed to show it was entitled to summary judgment.
When the case was returned to the lower court a pretrial order was issued, severing the different issues to be determined and providing for a separate trial on the question as to whether there was a legally binding contract, which required Ryder to repurchase the equipment upon termination of the contract. Plaintiff contended in his amended complaint that the oral modification of the contract did require Ryder to repurchase at the contract's termination, and that same had been terminated and Ryder contended to the contrary.
Two questions were submitted to the jury for an answer: (1) Did the parties enter into an oral agreement after January 31, 1967, (date of original written contract), concerning the purchase of equipment from Scott by Ryder? (2) If the answer to (1) is 'yes,' state the terms of said oral agreement of repurchase.
Scott offered evidence to show that the parties were having difficulties under the contract, and that he purchased more than $50,000 worth of additional equipment after the parties met in Jacksonville and agreed that in the event of future default, defendant would take back the equipment at the price originally agreed upon in writing. Scott's evidence was to the effect that at this meeting the parties mutually agreed to adjust their difficulties, reduce the commissions, and in the event of further default, defendant Ryder would take the equipment back under the original formula.
In opposition to the foregoing, Ryder offered evidence to the effect that this was not altogether the agreement made at the Jacksonville meeting, and that Ryder did not agree to take back the equipment.
The jury in rendering its special verdict as to the first question answered 'yes,' and as to the second question, answered that upon...
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