Ryder v. Flanders

• Decision Date: 13 October 1874
• Citation: 30 Mich. 336
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Thomas H. Ryder and others v. Edwin Flanders. [1]

30 Mich. 336

Thomas H. Ryder and others v. Edwin Flanders. ^[1]

Supreme Court of Michigan

October 13, 1874

Submitted on Briefs July 24, 1874.

Error to Van Buren Circuit.

Judgment reversed, with costs, and a new trial awarded.

Richards & Barnum, for plaintiffs in error.

Severens & Boudeman, for defendant in error.

OPINION

Christiancy J.:

Plaintiffs in error brought ejectment in the circuit court for the county of Van Buren for two parcels of land in that county amounting, together, to about ninety-six acres, claiming in part as heirs and devisees of one Samuel Ryder, in part by descent, and in part by purchase from all the other heirs, as well as by a deed from the widow of said Samuel Ryder, to whom this land, with all the other lands of said Samuel, were devised during the term of her natural life, should she so long remain his widow and unmarried, and no longer; "and then, in either case" (that is, in the event of her death, or marriage before death), "the estate to revert to his children lawfully begotten, to be then equally divided between them."

It was admitted by the defendant, upon the trial, that he was in possession of the premises, as the tenant of Hiram Baker, and that said Samuel Ryder was in possession and seized of the premises in the year 1845, and so continued until March, 1850, and that his widow, or some portion of his family, continued in the occupation thereof until 1860, said Samuel having died in California, or on his way home, in 1852.

Plaintiffs also introduced evidence of their descent from said Samuel Ryder, and that of his three other children, constituting all his heirs through whom they claimed; that one of said last-named three died unmarried and without issue, in 1862, whereby his interest, as heir, passed in equal shares to his mother and each of his surviving brothers and sisters, including the plaintiffs and two others (Comp. Laws of 1871, § 4309, sub. 3); that the widow married again in 1856; that she conveyed to the plaintiffs all her interest in the premises in August, 1871, and that the other two heirs conveyed to plaintiffs their respective interests May 6, 1871.

The defendant, as tenant of one Hiram Baker, claimed, first, under a partition purporting to have been made on the petition of the guardian of one of the heirs (who sold to plaintiffs in 1871), presented August 4, 1857, the order for partition being dated August 31, 1857; and, second, a deed purporting to have been made by John Baker, as guardian of these plaintiffs and of William B. Ryder (then minors) to said Hiram Baker, upon a sale recited to have been made December 29, 1860.

As to the partition, the record of which was very imperfect, and the proceedings, so far as shown, informal and somewhat irregular, it was claimed by the plaintiffs in error, and strenuously insisted by them upon the trial, that it was utterly void and of no effect; and the court, in his charge to the jury, though some requests had been charged looking the other way, expressly assumes that there was no valid partition, and submits the case to them upon this theory; any question upon this partition is therefore aside from the case upon the record, and we are to treat the case as if no attempt had been made to show a partition.

Before proceeding to the question of the validity of the guardian's sale, it is proper to determine whether the plaintiffs made out such a case as would have authorized a recovery if the guardian's deed was void. The plaintiffs claimed on the trial and insisted upon the argument before us, that the provision or condition limiting the devise to the widow to the time she should remain unmarried, and passing the estate over to the children upon her marriage, was void; and that consequently she took an absolute estate for life, which, with the share she inherited from the child who died without issue, passed by her deed to the plaintiffs.

But I do not think it necessary to determine this question in the present case, nor whether the provision, if valid (of which I do not intend to intimate a doubt), is in the nature of a mere condition, which could only be forfeited by the entry of the heirs to whom the estate was, in the language of the will, to revert (of which there was no evidence), or a conditional limitation, which determined the estate and passed it over to the children and heirs, ipso facto, without entry, upon the marriage of the widow. First, if valid and simply in the nature of a condition subsequent, so that she might have continued to hold the estate until entry made for its forfeiture, her conveyance divested her of that right and vested whatever right she might have held, in the plaintiffs, as completely as an entry could have effected the same result; if valid and in the nature of a conditional limitation, then no entry was necessary, but her estate terminated and vested in the heirs immediately upon her marriage, and was, by the rest of them, conveyed to the plaintiffs; and in either case, being no more than a life estate, when it vested in the plaintiffs, or in them and the other heirs who have conveyed to them, they having already the fee, subject only to that less estate, the latter was at once merged in the fee, there being no intervening estate; and thus, in either case, the plaintiff's became seized of the entire estate in fee. Second, if the condition or conditional limitation was void, then she was the absolute owner of a life estate, while the children (the heirs) owned the estate in fee, subject only to that life estate, and her conveyance transferred it to the plaintiffs, her grantees, and they also having acquired the title of all the other heirs, this life estate, as in the first case, merged in the fee, and the plaintiffs, in like manner as upon the first hypothesis, became the absolute owners of the fee.

The plaintiffs must therefore be regarded as having made a case sufficient to warrant a recovery of the entire estate, unless their rights and that of William B., their brother, who died without issue, were divested by the sale made to Hiram Baker, by their guardian, John Baker, in December, 1860.

We proceed, therefore, to consider the guardian's sale, and the charge of the court in connection therewith.

The court, at the request of the defendant, charged the jury that "if the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiffs or either of them, after arriving at the age of twenty-one years, with a full knowledge of all the facts, received their proportion of the proceeds of the guardian's sale in question, they are estopped from asserting now a title to this land, and the verdict should be for the defendant." And again, "that the statute provides that the ward cannot avoid his guardian's sale of his lands on account of any irregularity in the proceedings: provided it shall appear, first, that the guardian was licensed to make the sale by a court of competent jurisdiction;second, that he gave a bond which was approved by the judge of probate, in case any bond was required by the court upon granting the license; third, that he took the oath prescribed by the statute; fourth, that he gave notice of the time and place of sale as prescribed by law; and, fifth, that the premises were sold accordingly at public auction, and are held by one who purchased them in good faith. The first four requisites are shown by the records and files from the probate court to have been complied with, and the jury are to determine whether the fifth requisite exists, viz.: whether the premises were sold by public auction, and are held by one who purchased them in good...