Rydie v. Biden
| Decision Date | 19 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-2359 |
| Parties | ISRAEL RYDIE; ELIZABETH FLEMING, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, in his official capacity as President of the United States; XAVIER BECERRA, in his official capacity as Secretary of Health and Human Services; LLOYD J. AUSTIN, III, in his official capacity as Secretary of Defense, Defendants - Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Jonathan Bolls, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellants.
Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Marleigh D Dover, Charles W. Scarborough, Lowell V. Sturgill Jr., Sarah Carroll, Casen B. Ross, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.
Before WILKINSON, DIAZ, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded with instructions by unpublished opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Richardson joined.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
Israel Rydie and Elizabeth Fleming sued their federal-agency employers and President Biden, challenging the President's executive order mandating that all federal employees receive COVID-19 vaccinations on pain of termination. To prevent being fired while the lawsuit progressed, they sought to enjoin the order. The district court ruled against them, finding (1) their constitutional claims lacked merit, (2) a final judgment in their favor could redress any harms they might suffer, and (3) the public interest disfavored injunctive relief.[1]
But the district court lacked jurisdiction.[2] Congress stripped the courts of jurisdiction to hear certain actions involving federal employment through an intricate statutory scheme-the Civil Service Reform Act ("CSRA"). Because Rydie and Fleming's challenges fall comfortably within that scheme we vacate the district court's judgment and remand with directions to dismiss this case.
In September 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 14, 043, requiring COVID-19 vaccinations for all federal employees. Exec. Order No. 14, 043, 86 Fed. Reg. 50, 989, 50, 989 (Sept. 9, 2021). The Order called for each agency to implement a program to enforce the vaccine mandate, and it permitted agencies to create "exceptions only as required by law." Id. at 50, 990.
Although the Order authorized agencies to implement individual vaccination programs, the Safer Federal Workforce Task Force-which President Biden created to "provide ongoing guidance to heads of agencies on . . . the continuity of Government functions during the COVID-19 pandemic"-provided specific direction. Exec. Order No. 13, 991, 86 Fed.Reg. 7, 045, 7, 046 (Jan. 20, 2021). The Task Force clarified that workers should receive their last vaccine dose on or before November 8, 2021.
The Task Force advised agencies that they could proceed against noncompliant employees starting November 9. It said that "the enforcement process" should begin with "a brief period of education and counseling (5 days)," with the goal to have employees "demonstrate progress toward becoming fully vaccinated." J.A. 107. If an employee failed to show progress, the guidance instructed agencies to suspend that employee for fourteen days or fewer. And if noncompliance persisted, the agency could terminate the employee. Agencies were expected to "hold the discipline in abeyance" if, at any phase, the employee proved that he or she received at least one vaccine dose. J.A. 108.
Israel Rydie is a Department of Defense employee at the Defense Information Systems Agency. Elizabeth Fleming is a Food and Drug Administration employee within the Department of Health and Human Services. Both Departments have adopted the Task Force's policies.
Rydie and Fleming haven't said whether they are vaccinated, and they don't intend to file for an exemption. They chose instead to sue the President, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of Defense (all in their official capacities) in the District of Maryland. Asking the court to declare the vaccination mandate unconstitutional, Rydie and Fleming claimed the President's order violated (1) the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments; and (2) separation of powers principles.
Rydie and Fleming moved for a nationwide, preliminary injunction, which the district court denied. Rydie v. Biden, No. 21-2696, 2021 WL 5416545, at *1 (D. Md. Nov. 19, 2021). The court began its analysis by discussing its authority to issue an injunction. It recognized that "[f]ederal courts are generally without power to enjoin the President." Id. at *3. So it took an injunction against President Biden off the table.[3]
The court then turned to its subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that this case presented a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. But it also considered whether Congress impliedly divested it of jurisdiction via the CSRA.
The district court discussed two sections of the CSRA. First, the court addressed 5 U.S.C. § 7513's procedure for challenging "certain serious adverse employment actions." Id. at *2. It acknowledged that the CSRA is the exclusive means to review covered actions, and § 7513 covers employee termination. Because Rydie and Fleming preemptively challenged their terminations, the court reasoned that they would "likely have to proceed through [§ 7513's] process." Id.
Second, the district court considered 5 U.S.C. § 1214's process for challenging "less severe actions." Id. It said that § 1214 requires filing a complaint with an independent agency-the Office of Special Counsel-which can hear claims asserting constitutional violations. Because Rydie and Fleming hadn't shown that they exhausted either process, the court declared their jurisdictional showing was "questionable at best." Id. at *3.
Even so, the district court analyzed the preliminary injunction on the merits, finding Rydie and Fleming's constitutional arguments unlikely to succeed. It also said that they wouldn't suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction because their alleged harms could be "fully redressed through reinstatement, backpay, and expungement of any mark of misconduct." Id. at *5. And it concluded that the balance of the equities and the public interest disfavored a preliminary injunction because the government had a compelling interest in stemming COVID-19's spread.
As a result, the district court denied relief. This appeal followed.[4]
We begin (and end) with subject-matter jurisdiction, a threshold requirement for Article III courts. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 671 (2009). The district court couldn't reach the merits of the motion for preliminary injunction without first resolving its jurisdiction. See Di Biase v. SPX Corp., 872 F.3d 224, 232 (4th Cir. 2017) ("We find, however, that this Court cannot, as the district court has done, assume subject matter jurisdiction merely to reach a less thorny issue."). But after professing doubt about its jurisdiction, the district court still proceeded to the merits.
We are left to infer that the court found jurisdiction was proper. And we review that determination de novo. Barlow v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 772 F.3d 1001, 1007 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc). Because we conclude that Congress intended for the CSRA to cover Rydie and Fleming's claims, we hold that the district court lacked jurisdiction.
Congress designed the Civil Service Reform Act "to replace the haphazard arrangements for administrative and judicial review of personnel action[s]." United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444 (1988). The Act "creat[ed] an elaborate new framework for evaluating adverse personnel actions against federal employees." Id. at 443 (cleaned up).
That framework describes "in great detail the protections and remedies applicable to such action[s], including the availability of administrative and judicial review." Id.
"Three main sections of the CSRA govern personnel action[s]." Id. at 445. Two of them are relevant here.[5] First, Chapter 23 lays out "merit system principles" by which agencies must abide. 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b). That chapter classifies certain violations of those principles as "prohibited personnel practice[s]." Id. § 2302(a). Employees who have suffered a "prohibited personnel practice" can file an allegation with the Office of Special Counsel. Id. § 1214(a). If the Special Counsel finds "reasonable grounds" suggesting a "prohibited personnel practice" occurred, he or she must report it to the Merit Systems Protection Board, the employing agency, and the Office of Personnel Management. Id. § 1214(b)(2)(B). If the agency doesn't fix the problem, "the Special Counsel may petition the Board," and the Board can order corrective action. Id. § 1214(b)(2)(C), (b)(4)(A). Corrective action may include attorneys' fees, back pay, and other compensatory damages. Id. § 1214(g). Judicial review of the Board's final orders is available in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Id. §§ 1214(c), 7703(b)(1)(A).
Second Chapter 75 governs more serious agency actions against executive-branch employees. See id. § 7501 et seq. The first subchapter discusses the procedure for imposing suspensions of fourteen days or less. Id. §§ 7501-7504. The second does the same for more severe actions. Id. §§ 7511-7515. It defines those actions as "removal, " "suspension for more than 14 days," "reduction in grade," "reduction in pay," and "furlough of 30 days or less." Id. § 7512(1)-(5). Both subchapters afford employees procedural rights, including notice, representation by counsel, the opportunity...
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