Ryerson v. Berryhill
| Decision Date | 02 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-CV-3509-S-BK |
| Parties | HELEN RYERSON, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Pursuant to the District Judge's Standing Order of Reference, Doc. 30, this case has been referred to the United States magistrate judge for pretrial management. The Court now considers the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. Doc. 45; Doc. 47; Doc. 55. As detailed herein, Plaintiff's motion should be DENIED, and Defendant's motion should be GRANTED.2
In October 2015, Plaintiff, an attorney over the age of 50 and of Chinese descent, filed a counseled complaint against Defendant, her employer, alleging that Defendant had violated Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq. Doc. 1 at 1, 3. In brief, Plaintiff contends that two of her co-workers harassed her, and her supervisor and others discriminated against her by trying to get her transferred, commencing disciplinary charges against her, docking her pay, and retaliating after Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Doc. 1 at 3-9. Plaintiff raised the following counts in her complaint: (1) race and national origin discrimination and harassment, in violation of Title VII; (2) discrimination, in violation of the ADEA; and (3) retaliation under Title VII and the ADEA. Doc. 1 at 10-11. Both parties have now moved for summary judgment on all claims, with Plaintiff proceeding pro se.3
In connection with their summary judgment motions, the parties submitted evidence which reveals the following: Plaintiff serves as a senior attorney for the Social Security Administration, providing legal advice and drafting opinions for the administrative law judges ("ALJs") who decide disability claims. Doc. 57 at 329. At the times relevant to this lawsuit, Joan Parks-Saunders, an African American woman, was the Chief ALJ for the region and Plaintiff's third-line supervisor. Doc. 57 at 208. The two levels of management between Parks-Saunders and Plaintiff consisted of a second-line supervisor named Fay Adams, also an African American woman, and a first-line supervisor named Peter Jung, a man of Korean descent. Doc. 57 at 208.
The particular discriminatory/retaliatory actions about which Plaintiff complains are as follows: (1) commencing in November 2009 and through the present, Defendant paid her at the GS-13 level despite the fact that she was performing GS-14 level work, Doc. 1 at 3; (2) from 2009 to 2011, Park-Saunders refused to office Plaintiff in the legal team corridor, instead keeping her in a corridor for administrative clerks/analysts, Doc. 1 at 3; (3) her office in that corridor was between two clerks who spoke loudly, making it difficult for Plaintiff to work, Doc. 1 at 3-4; (4) the two clerks harassed Plaintiff by and through intimidation tactics, laughter, turning off her office lights while she was working, and the like, Doc. 1 at 3-4; (5) Parks-Saunders refused to relocate the clerks despite Plaintiff's request and instead offered to relocate Plaintiff to a windowless office, Doc. 1 at 4; (6) in December 2011, Parks-Saunders informed Plaintiff that she would be placed in the Dallas Processing Center ("DPC"), over Plaintiff's objections, and told her that she would claim Plaintiff had always worked in DPC, Doc. 1 at 4-5; (7) in December 2011, Parks-Saunders agreed to transfer Plaintiff to an area that Parks-Saunders did not supervise, but reneged on her agreement the following month and transferred Plaintiff to DPC instead, Doc. 1 at 5; (8) when Plaintiff took leave to deal with the health conditions she suffered as a result of stress, Jung "ransacked" her office and left her private information accessible to the rest of the office, Doc. 1 at 5; (9) on January 30, 2012, Plaintiff reported certain of Parks-Saunders' "illegal actions" to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Social Security Commissioner, and others, after which Parks-Saunders retaliated against Plaintiff by marking her absent without leave ("AWOL") from February to May 2012, even though Plaintiff was onpermitted leave, Doc. 1 at 6; (10) since May 2012, Plaintiff has been required to work at DPC over her objections, Doc. 1 at 6; (11) after Plaintiff filed her EEO charge on February 6, 2012, Defendant retaliated against her by fabricating performance problems, demanding that she complete tasks in a timeframe not applied to other attorneys, refusing to allow her to manage her caseload independently, and subjecting her to a disciplinary proceeding in connection with her complaints about the alleged ransacking of her office, Doc. 1 at 7; (12) in June 2012, after Plaintiff complained about Jung ransacking her office, Jung proposed that Plaintiff be suspended for timesheet discrepancies, Doc. 1 at 7-8; and (13) in August 2012, Adams implemented Plaintiff's suspension and terminated her planned transfer to a different office in retaliation for Plaintiff asking "headquarters" for clarification about an instruction Adams had given her, Doc. 1 at 7-8.
At the conclusion of her factual allegations, Plaintiff also proffers a laundry list of other acts that she alleges demonstrate "discrimination and/or retaliation" against her: (1) not being called back to work after the Fall 2013 government furlough while other similarly situated employees were called back, Doc. 1 at 8; (2) references to Plaintiff as "Jackie Chan" and/or "Lee" and greeting her with "sayonara," Doc. 1 at 8; (3) forcing Plaintiff to move her car while allowing similarly situated employees to park in the same area, Doc. 1 at 8; (4) accusing Plaintiff of lying about being unable to read illegible writings of an ALJ while believing similar complaints by other attorneys about the same ALJ, Doc. 1 at 8; (5) denying Plaintiff overtime while granting the overtime requests of similarly situated employees, Doc. 1 at 8; (6) not allowing Plaintiff to work at home while granting such requests for similarly situated employees, Doc. 1 at 8; (7) demanding that Plaintiff perform tasks in an unreasonable time frame, Doc. 1 at 8; (8) failing to notify Plaintiff of job opportunities provided to other attorneys and filling thosepositions with attorneys of lesser education, experience, and accomplishments, Doc. 1 at 8; (9) defaming Plaintiff to all managers and instructing them to "target" her, Doc. 1 at 8; (10) suppressing Plaintiff's various commendations from ALJs to negatively impact her performance reviews, Doc. 1 at 9; (11) fabricating false statements about Plaintiff's work while not reviewing the deficient work of other attorneys under similar standards, Doc. 1 at 9; (12) demanding that Plaintiff perform secretarial work not required of other attorneys, Doc. 1 at 9; (13) accusing Plaintiff of lying about her headaches and stomach pain, Doc. 1 at 9; (14) refusing to allow Plaintiff to work with office computer staff to fix her laptop so she could work from home while allowing similarly situated employees to do so, Doc. 1 at 9; (15) prohibiting Plaintiff from contacting information technology staff directly while not prohibiting others from doing so, Doc. 1 at 9; (16) refusing to grant Plaintiff one day of sick leave after her husband died, Doc. 1 at 9; (17) demanding to see documentation that Plaintiff was married, Doc. 1 at 9; (18) assigning Plaintiff 16-30 cases at a time while assigning similarly situated employees less work, Doc. 1 at 9; and (19) charging Plaintiff for untimely performance even when she was on leave, Doc. 1 at 9.
Title VII and the ADEA provide, in relevant part, that an employer may not "fail or refuse to hire" an applicant for employment "because of" the applicant's race, sex, or age. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (race/national origin); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (age). Title VII was the model for the ADEA, so the same general law applies to claims under either statute. See EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 615 & n.6 (5th Cir. 2009). Under the familiar McDonnell Douglas framework, once a plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of discrimination or retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer to show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for any adverse employment action. Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). An adverse employment action must consist of "ultimate employment decisions such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, or compensating." McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). For purposes of a retaliation claim, an adverse employment action is any act that "might well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." Burlington N. & Santa Fe Rwy. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (citation omitted).4 If the employer is successful in showing a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for an adverse action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to provide substantial evidence that the proffered reason is a pretext for the discrimination or retaliation. Laxton, 333 F.3d at 578.
The anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII and the ADEA permit plaintiffs to pursue discrimination claims under two distinct theories: disparate impact and disparate treatment. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005) (); Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 2000) (). As relevant here, "[d]isparate-treatment cases present the most easily...
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