Ryerson v. Utley

• Decision Date: 07 January 1868
• Citation: 16 Mich. 269
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Martin Ryerson et al. v. William S. Utley

16 Mich. 269

Martin Ryerson et al. v. William S. Utley

Supreme Court of Michigan

January 7, 1868

Heard October 23, 1867 [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]

Appeal in chancery from Muskegon circuit.

The bill in this cause was filed to restrain the collection, by a commissioner, of a special contribution towards the payment of a claim against the state for certain improvements on the Muskegon river.

The facts were admitted by stipulation. A decree was rendered in accordance with the prayer of the bill, and a perpetual injunction granted.

The case involves the constitutionality of the act of 1857 (Sess L., No. 147), and that of 1867 (Sess. L., No. 56).

Decree affirmed, with costs.

G. V. N. Lothrop and D. Darwin Hughes, for complainant:

1. The act of 1867, p. 82, § 10, is void under the provision of the state constitution, which declares that "the state shall not be a party to, or interested in any work of internal improvement, nor engage in carrying on any such work, except in the expenditure of grants to the state of land or other property:" Const., art. 14, § 9.

This was designed, both to keep the state from running into debt, and also to keep the state free from enterprises which are not well carried on by public officers.

It is true the state, in terms, avoids liability for this debt in this act. Yet this is only colorable. It by law levies a tax, or contribution, collectible by its own officer, payable by him into the state treasury, and thence paid on the warrant of the auditor-general to the extinguishment of the debt. In effect, then, it becomes a party to this work. It is within the clear scope of the provision above cited.

2. The law embraces more than one object, and the matter now in question is not at all indicated by the title of the act.

The title is "An act to provide for the preservation of the Muskegon river improvement, and for other purposes."

In fact, the principal purpose of the act is to provide for the payment of the Beard claim. This is substantially distinct from and having no necessary connection with the care and preservation of the work. It, therefore, is in violation of this clause of the constitution, as expounded by this court: 13 Mich. 494.

The recent decision of the court of appeals in New York on the act transferring the license power to the police commissioners is to same effect. See also 7 Ind. 506, 681; 9 Ind. 363, 380; 11 Id. 199; 14 Id. 239; 2 Minn. 330.

The claim of Beard, if not a debt of the state, is a debt of the internal improvement fund. That fund, and that only, is liable for it. The state can not directly assume payment of it. Nor can it lawfully impose the payment of it on any locality or upon any individuals. Yet the latter is precisely what this act proposes to do.

It imposes the payment of this debt on those who navigate the Muskegon river. And it seizes their property, and without their consent applies it to the payment of this claim.

It is not a toll or tax to maintain the navigable condition of the river. It does not profess to be that: 8 Mich. 279; 4 N. Y., 423.

It is simply a forced contribution from the complainants to pay the debt of the internal improvement fund, if the claim is, in law, any debt at all.

Such a taking is, of course, unlawful. If it were a taking for the public use, it would be an unlawful exercise of the right of eminent domain. But, as a taking to pay a debt due an individual, it is wholly indefensible: 8 Mich. 291; 2 Pet. 657; 39 Penn. St. R., 73; 4 Hill 144.

And, if possible, this objection is strengthened by the statement of the answer, that the internal improvement fund has proper resources of its own.

George Gray, for defendant:

1. The law of 1857, p. 394, making the appropriation for the improvement is not repugnant to section 9, article 14, of the constitution; because it provides only for the expenditure of a grant or grants of land and other property in the state.

The internal improvement fund, from which the appropriation is made, is formed and acquired wholly from grants to the state, and this fund is not, and was not at the time of the passage of said last mentioned act, or at any time since, either exhausted, or without ample means to meet this expenditure.

The appropriation in question made by said act is the expenditure of a grant to the state, and is not, therefore, a violation, in spirit or letter, of section 9, article 14, of the state constitution; consequently the act No. 56 of the laws of 1867 can not, for that reason, be deemed unconstitutional.

2. The last named act of 1867 is not in violation of section 20, article 4, of the constitution.

The general subject and the object of the law is but one, and that is fairly indicated by the title. The language may not be such as the counsel for the complainants would have used to express that subject, purpose or object, which reaches to the past as well as to the future; but yet it can not be said to mislead.

The constitutional provision must receive a reasonable construction with a view to give it effect, and not too rigorous and technical a construction. The purpose of the constitutional provision was that neither the members of the legislature, nor the public, should be misled by the title; not that the title should embody all the distinct provisions of the bill: 13 Mich. 481; 8 N. Y., 241; 2 Met. Ky., 219; 3 Id. 566; 19 N. Y., 116; Sedgw. Stat. and Const. Law, p. 567, et seq.

3. Before a law can be pronounced unconstitutional, its incompatibility with the constitution must be clear, and every possible presumption, not clearly inconsistent with the language and subject matter, is to be made in favor of the constitutionality of state legislation: 6 Cranch. 87; 1 Mich. 295; 4 Id. 224; 5 Id. 251; 8 Id. 320; 13 Id. 127; 15 Id. 322.

4. It can not be said that this is an improvement of private property, or for private benefit, and not for public purposes. On the contrary, it is claimed that the Muskegon river is a public highway, and it is admitted that the improvement in question was, and is, a valuable and permanent improvement; one absolutely necessary to the navigation of the river. It is, therefore, needed by the public; the public had a right to make it, and each person who enjoys it should bear his share of the burden, and pay his proportionate part of the cost and expense: 8 Mich. 291, et seq.

The right in the state to take and exact tolls is not doubted, and the perfect justice and uniformity of the mode of assessing and collecting the tolls in the present instance can not seriously be questioned. The complainants do not pretend that the operations of the law or the acts of the defendant, are unequal or wanting in uniformity and generality: Sess. Laws of 1867, p. 79, act No. 56; 8 Mich. 278.

Cooley, Ch. J. Campbell and Christiancy, JJ. concurred. Graves, J. did not sit.

OPINION

Cooley Ch. J.:

The constitution of this state (art. 14, § 9) provides that "the state shall not be a party to or interested in any work of internal improvement, nor engaged in carrying on any such work, except in the expenditure of grants to the state of land or other property." The legislature of 1857 passed "An act to provide for the improvement of navigation over the sand flats of the Muskegon river" (Laws 1857, p. 394), which act appropriated $ 50,000 from the internal improvement fund of the state for constructing such levees and other works between Muskegon lake and Maple river as might be necessary to secure the free navigation of Muskegon river. The last section of the act provided that no money should be drawn from the general fund in the treasury of the state for such improvement, and that the state should not be responsible or held liable for any contract growing out of such improvement, except as by that act provided. This section probably had no other purpose than to evidence the legislative intention to keep strictly within the provisions of the constitution, and not to engage the state in this improvement, except to the extent of the appropriation from the internal improvement fund, which fund was the proceeds of lands donated to the state for works of this character.

Under this act a contract was let to John A. Brooks for constructing the contemplated work, for the sum of $ 50,000, and it was actually constructed by William Beard, his assignee, and duly accepted. The auditor-general, however, refused to draw his warrant for the amount, for the alleged reason that the internal improvement fund was exhausted, and the legislature of 1867 passed an act "to provide for the preservation of the Muskegon river improvement, and for other purposes;" a principal purpose of which appears to be the levying and collecting of tolls on the commerce of Muskegon river, sufficient to pay the $ 50,000 and interest thereon, within five years. The question before us is, whether this act is constitutional.

If the state, when it entered into the contract with Brooks, had stipulated that the contract price should be paid from tolls levied on commerce, or from any species of taxation, the unconstitutionality of the contract would have been too plain to admit of argument. The case would plainly be one where the state had engaged in a work of public improvement, to be paid for in some other mode than by the expenditure of grants to the state. But certainly the case is not varied in its legal aspects by the fact that the original contract provided for the payment in a constitutional mode, and the unconstitutional substitution is made afterwards. The constitution does not permit the state either to contract a debt for a public improvement, or to expend in its construction anything but the grants which it has received for the purpose, and any ...