Rykhus v. Rykhus, No. 13409

• Court: Supreme Court of South Dakota
• Writing for the Court: DUNN
• Citation: 319 N.W.2d 167
• Parties: Donald J. RYKHUS, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Lois Rae RYKHUS, Defendant and Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 13409
• Decision Date: 12 May 1982

Page 167

319 N.W.2d 167 Donald J. RYKHUS, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Lois Rae RYKHUS, Defendant and Appellant. No. 13409. Supreme Court of South Dakota. Submitted on Briefs March 23, 1982.
Decided May 12, 1982.

Page 169

William Mark Kratochvil of Calhoon & Kratochvil, Brookings, for plaintiff and appellee.

David Alan Palmer of Strange, Strange & Palmer, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellant.

DUNN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a decree of divorce in favor of appellee Donald Rykhus that terminated a twenty-six year marriage between the parties. Appellant Lois Rykhus appeals. We affirm.

The parties were married on October 24, 1953. Four children were born to the marriage, two of whom were minors at the time of trial. Appellee is presently employed as the Superintendent of Schools in Onida, South Dakota. He was previously employed as the Elkton Superintendent of Schools. Appellant has worked as a housewife for the last twenty years.

Appellee sought a divorce from appellant alleging infliction of grievous mental and physical suffering. Appellant counterclaimed alleging adultery as grounds for divorce. The trial court found that appellant treated appellee with extreme cruelty, but that the evidence presented by appellant was insufficient to prove adultery.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred by granting appellee a divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty. The record indicates that during the course of the marriage and particularly after 1971, appellant had repeated outbursts of temper. Appellant threatened to stab appellee on several occasions with knives, stabbed him once with a scissors, hit him in the face once, and ordered him to leave the house. On one occasion, appellant required appellee to write a note promising that "he would not drink, smoke, swear or chase women in the future." The record also indicates that appellant, while angry at her husband and trying to find him, kicked the glass out of an Elkton School door.

Extreme cruelty is defined in SDCL 25-4-4 as "the infliction of grievous bodily injury or grievous mental suffering upon the other, by one party to the marriage." In a marital setting, the definition of extreme cruelty differs according to the personalities of the parties involved. Brandsma v. Brandsma, 318 N.W.2d 318 (S.D.1982); Pochop v. Pochop, 89 S.D. 466, 233 N.W.2d 806 (1975). We must view the evidence in light of the full context of the marriage and not in the narrow light of isolated incidents. Brandsma v. Brandsma, supra; Palmer v. Palmer, 281 N.W.2d 263 (S.D.1979). We find that the showing of physical abuse and mental suffering in this case was sufficient to support the trial court's finding of extreme cruelty.

Appellant contends that appellee condoned her behavior by continuing to live in the family home. In Gassman v. Gassman, 296 N.W.2d 518 (S.D.1980), we stated that to constitute condonation there must be forgiveness, reconciliation, reunion and the restoration of all marital rights. See also SDCL 25-4-22; Melinn v. Melinn, 329 Mich. 96, 44 N.W.2d 886 (1950). In this instance, the cause of divorce consists of a course of offensive conduct which aggregately constitutes the claim of extreme cruelty. Thus, under SDCL 25-4-23, continued "cohabitation, or passive endurance, or conjugal kindness shall not be evidence of condonation of any of the acts constituting such cause, unless accompanied by an express agreement to condone. In such cases, condonation can be made only after the

Page 170

cause of divorce has become complete, as to the acts complained of." See also Brockel v. Brockel, 80 S.D. 547, 128 N.W.2d 558 (1964). No evidence was introduced at trial to show that an express agreement to condone was reached. Evidence of cohabitation or of appellee's passive endurance of appellant's fits of rage are insufficient under SDCL 25-4-23 to support a finding of condonation.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant her a divorce on the grounds of adultery. Adultery is defined by...