Rynerson v. National Cas. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 February 1994
• Docket Number: Docket No. 139595
• Citation: 203 Mich.App. 562,513 N.W.2d 436
• Parties: Mary A. RYNERSON, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Richard D. Rynerson, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NATIONAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 436

513 N.W.2d 436

203 Mich.App. 562

Mary A. RYNERSON, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Richard D Rynerson, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NATIONAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 139595.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Dec. 8, 1993, at Lansing.

Decided Feb. 8, 1994, at 9:30 a.m.

Released for Publication April 1, 1994.

Ralph H. Dinse, West Branch, for plaintiff.

Arthur M. Hoffeins, Dearborn, for defendant.

Before TAYLOR, P.J., and REILLY and TALBOT, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals as of right the judgment in favor of plaintiff following a jury trial. Plaintiff sued to collect benefits under defendant's group accident insurance policy covering newspaper carriers. The policy provided coverage for loss "due to Injury." "Injury" was defined in the policy as "accidental bodily injury sustained by the Insured which is the direct result of an accident, independent of disease or bodily infirmity or any other cause." Defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that there was no proof of any accidental bodily injury that would entitle plaintiff to benefits under the policy. The trial court denied defendant's motion, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff. The issue is whether voluntary physical exertion causing an unexpected, unanticipated, and unforeseen result can be considered an "accidental bodily injury ... which is the direct result of an accident." We conclude it cannot and reverse.

Plaintiff's decedent was employed as a rural route carrier by the Bay City Times. On November 9, 1987, the decedent attempted to repair his truck, which would not start properly. Apparently, he tried but failed to remove a bolt with a wrench. He came out from under the hood of the truck complaining that he "got a kink" in his neck. The decedent was treated that evening by a chiropractor. After returning home from the chiropractor's office, he collapsed, went into a coma, and died the following day. According to the expert medical testimony, the cause of death was a massive cerebral hemorrhage brought on by the strain exerted by the decedent while attempting to fix the truck.

Defendant contends that the circumstances of the death did not entitle plaintiff to benefits under the policy and, therefore, the trial court erred in failing to grant its motion for a directed verdict. According to defendant, "a purely voluntary act in doing just what the insured intended to do cannot in any sense be held to constitute an accidental bodily injury." Because the decedent's actions in attempting to remove a bolt were voluntary, defendant argues, there was no coverage under the terms of the policy.

In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict, this Court examines the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and gives the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference that may be drawn from the evidence. If reasonable minds could differ in regard to whether the plaintiff has met the burden of proof, a motion for a directed verdict should be denied. Teodorescu v. Bushnell, Gage, Reizen & Byington (On Remand), 201 Mich.App. 260, 264, 506 N.W.2d 275 (1993).

Our Supreme Court, in Collins v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 271, 294 N.W.2d 194 (1980), ruled that unexpected injuries caused by voluntary intoxication are "accidental bodily injuries." In Collins, the plaintiff's husband died as a result of acute alcoholic intoxication. The accidental death and dismemberment policy in question had a double indemnity provision for coverage for "accidental bodily injuries." The Court stated that when the term "accidental bodily injuries" is used, the inquiry is not whether the agency causing the injury or death was accidental, but rather whether the injury itself was accidental.

[A] distinction has arisen in many states between the term "accidental means" and the terms "accident", "accidental death", and, as used in the policy at issue, "accidental bodily injuries". This distinction is succinctly explained in 10 Couch, Insurance (2d ed), § 41:28, pp 49-50 "[A]ccidental death is an unintended and undesigned result arising from the acts voluntarily done, whereas death by accidental means is a result arising from acts unintentionally done or events undesignedly occurring. The term "accidental means" refers to the occurrence or happening which produces the result, rather than the result; it is concerned with the cause of the harm rather than the character of the harm." [Collins, supra at 275, 294 N.W.2d 194.]

The Court indicated that the policy in issue did not include the more restrictive language requiring death from "accidental means," but only that the insured sustain "accidental bodily injuries." Thus, " 'if death results from the voluntary act of the victim, but the result is unexpected, unanticipated and unforeseen, it is an accidental death.' " Id., quoting Minton v. Stuyvesant Life Ins. Co., 373 F.Supp. 33, 35 (D.Nev.1974).

Two Sixth Circuit cases have indicated that the Collins interpretation of the phrase "accidental bodily injuries" is limited to cases involving the distinction between accidental and intentional injuries. ¹ In Riesterer v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 653 F.2d 268 (C.A.6, 1981), and Skowronek v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 567 F.Supp. 63 (E.D.Mich., 1983), aff'd 754 F.2d 167 (C.A.6, 1985), the insureds exhibited signs of a heart attack during or shortly after exertion while working. Both Riesterer and Skowronek held that the Collins interpretation of "accidental bodily injuries" was not controlling and of little guidance in the fact situations presented where the court had to distinguish between accidental death and natural death. Riesterer at 269-270; Skowronek at 65. In both cases the court followed Oregon precedent and held that an on-the-job heart attack following a voluntary act could not be considered an "accidental injury" unless the job-related activity preceding the heart attack was unusual, abnormal, or unexpected. Finding no Michigan law deciding the precise issue, the court concluded that Michigan would adopt...