Ryszkiewicz v. City of New Britain

• Citation: 479 A.2d 793,193 Conn. 589
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 10 July 1984
• Parties: Jennie M. RYSZKIEWICZ v. CITY OF NEW BRITAIN.

Page 793

479 A.2d 793

193 Conn. 589

Jennie M. RYSZKIEWICZ v. CITY OF NEW BRITAIN.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 28, 1984.

Decided July 10, 1984.

Dennis L. Kern, New Britain, with whom was James F. Kane, New Britain, for appellant (plaintiff).

Edward T. Lynch, Jr., New Britain, with whom were Seth Feigenbaum, Asst. City Atty., and on brief, Anita D. Cobb, New Britain, for appellee (defendant).

SPEZIALE, Chief Justice.

The dispositive issue in this appeal concerns the constitutionality of a special act of the Connecticut General Assembly. That special act, adopting the charter of the city of New Britain, inter alia, limits the city's liability for damages caused by ice or snow on the city's highways to $1000. We hold that that limitation violates the equal protection guarantees of the United States and Connecticut constitutions.

The case was tried to a jury, who could reasonably have found the following facts: On the morning of December 13, 1977, the plaintiff, Jennie M. Ryszkiewicz, was walking on a sidewalk abutting Washington Street in New Britain. Because of an accumulation of ice or snow on the sidewalk, the plaintiff fell and suffered physical injury.

The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant city of New Britain on March 15, 1978, alleging that as a municipal corporation it was charged by state law with the duty properly to care for and maintain all sidewalks within its confines. The plaintiff alleged that the city had breached this duty on December 13, 1977, and that its breach proximately caused the plaintiff's fall and resulting injuries.

In its answer the defendant raised a special defense. It claimed that pursuant to § 2709 of the New Britain city charter, as adopted by the General Assembly in 30 Spec. Acts 404, No. 420 § 2709 (1961) ¹ (hereinafter § 2709), in any action for injuries caused by ice or snow on highways within the city, the city's liability for damages could not exceed $1000.

The plaintiff responded by denying the validity of the special defense. She claimed that the limitation on the defendant's liability violated her right to equal protection of the law and due process of law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 20 of the Connecticut constitution. The plaintiff also filed a motion to strike the special defense on the same grounds. The trial court denied the motion.

At trial the plaintiff testified about the damages she sustained as a result of injuries suffered from the fall. As part of the damages she sustained, the plaintiff testified that she incurred medical expenses for treatment of her injuries. The bills introduced as evidence of treatment costs totaled more than $2000.

After both parties presented their evidence and counsel made closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury. On the issue of damages the court instructed the jury that they could not award damages in excess of the $1000 limit set by § 2709: "If you find that the city was liable in accordance with all of the requirements that I've set forth, you must come in with a verdict of $1000. You can't come in with a higher verdict. There's no doubt that a higher verdict would be brought I think, because the specials [medical treatment costs] alone are over $2000 .... [I]f you find liability, you must come in with a thousand dollars." The plaintiff properly excepted to the trial court's charge concerning the limitation on damages, again claiming that the limitation was unconstitutional. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $1000 and judgment was rendered accordingly.

On appeal the plaintiff claims, inter alia, ² that § 2709 violates constitutional guarantees of equal protection and that therefore it was error to limit the damage award in this case to $1000. ³ We agree.

At common law, Connecticut municipalities enjoy governmental immunity, in certain circumstances, from liability for their tortious acts. See Murphy v. Ives, 151 Conn. 259, 264, 196 A.2d 596 (1963); Warren v. Bridgeport, 129 Conn. 355, 358, 28 A.2d 1 (1942); Bacon v. Rocky Hill, 126 Conn. 402, 406, 11 A.2d 399 (1940); Hoffman v. Bristol, 113 Conn. 386, 389, 155 A. 499 (1931); Pope v. New Haven, 91 Conn. 79, 80, 99 A. 51 (1916); see also McQuillin,Municipal Corporations (3d Ed.Rev.1977) § 53.02. As regards liability for defective conditions in public roadways, "a common-law action lies against a municipality if the action is predicated on a condition in a highway which the municipality was bound to maintain and that condition amounted to a nuisance and was created by the positive act of the municipality. Monick v. Greenwich, 144 Conn. 608, 611, 136 A.2d 501 [1957]; DeLahunta v. Waterbury, 134 Conn. 630, 633, 59 A.2d 800 [1948]; Bacon v. Rocky Hill, supra." Murphy v. Ives, supra.

We need not decide, however, whether the defect involved in this case falls within the exception to governmental immunity outlined in Murphy v. Ives. The state legislature possesses the authority to abrogate any governmental immunity that the common law gives to municipalities. Cf. Shore v. Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 444 A.2d 1379 (1982); Comba v. Ridgefield, 177 Conn. 268, 413 A.2d 859 (1979); Martyn v. Donlin, 151 Conn. 402, 198 A.2d 700 (1964); see McQuillin, supra. As regards defective roadways, the legislature has done precisely that. General Statutes § 13a-149 ⁴ provides that "[a]ny person injured in person or property by means of a defective road or bridge may recover damages from the party bound to keep it in repair." The statute does not impose any limit on the amount of damages that may be recovered.

It was the defendant's duty to keep in good repair that portion of the sidewalk on which the plaintiff fell. General Statutes § 13a-99; ⁵ see Moleske v. MacDonald, 109 Conn. 336, 341, 146 A. 820 (1929). Thus, if § 13a-149 controlled on the question of damages, no limitation on a jury's award could be imposed, provided such award was reasonable. See, e.g., Wochek v. Foley, 193 Conn. 582, 477 A.2d 1015 (1984).

In this instance, however, the abolition of municipal immunity contained in § 13a-149 was superseded for the city of New Britain by § 2709. "As this court has previously noted, '[t]he city of New Britain operates under a special charter granted by the General Assembly in 1961. 30 Spec. Acts 404, No. 420.' First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Friendly Ice Cream, 161 Conn. 223, 225, 286 A.2d 320 [1971]." Grogan v. New Britain, 175 Conn. 174, 179, 397 A.2d 97 (1978). As set forth above, § 2709 specifically limits to $1000 the city's liability for damages from injuries caused by snow or ice on the city's highways. Because the special act limiting the city's liability was adopted after the legislature had abolished municipal liability for such causes of action in general; General Statutes § 13a-149; and because it specifically limits the otherwise unlimited liability imposed by § 13a-149, § 2709 of the special act is the controlling statute in this case. Norwalk Vault Co. of Bridgeport, Inc. v. Mountain Grove Cemetery Assn., 180 Conn. 680, 691, 433 A.2d 979 (1980); Budkofsky v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 177 Conn. 588, 592, 419 A.2d 333 (1979); New Haven Water Co. v. North Branford, 174 Conn. 556, 565, 392 A.2d 456 (1978); Charlton Press, Inc. v Sullivan, 153 Conn. 103, 110, 214 A.2d 354 (1965).

The plaintiff contends that because § 2709 limits tort liability for the city of New Britain, while the state's other municipalities enjoy no such limitation, § 2709 impermissibly discriminates between persons injured by the tortious acts of New Britain and persons injured under identical circumstances in any other municipality.

It is of no benefit to the defendant that at one time all municipalities were exempt from liability in cases such as this. Courts throughout the nation have consistently held that once the legislative body abolishes sovereign or governmental immunity, it must do so in a way that comports with federal and state constitutional guarantees of equal protection. See Peddycoart v. Birmingham, 354 So.2d 808 (Ala.1978); Harvey v. Clyde Park District, 32 Ill.2d 60, 67, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1965); Brown v. Wichita State University, 217 Kan. 279, 540 P.2d 66 (1975), rev'd in part on rehearing, 219 Kan. 2, 547 P.2d 1015, appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction sub nom. Bruce v. Wichita State University, 429 U.S. 806, 97 S.Ct. 41, 50 L.Ed.2d 67 (1976); Estate of Cargill v. Rochester, 119 N.H. 661, 406 A.2d 704 (1979); Patch v. Sebelius, 320 N.W.2d 511 (N.D.1982); Jenkins v. State, 85 Wash.2d 883, 540 P.2d 1363 (1975); Sambs v. Brookfield, 97 Wis.2d 356, 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980); Stanhope v. Brown County, 90 Wis.2d 823, 280 N.W.2d 711 (1979).

When a statute is challenged on equal protection grounds, whether under the United States constitution or the Connecticut constitution, ⁶ the reviewing court must first determine the standard by which the challenged statute's constitutional validity will be determined. If, in distinguishing between classes, the statute either intrudes on the exercise of a fundamental right or burdens a suspect class of persons, the court will apply a strict scrutiny standard wherein the state must demonstrate that the challenged statute is necessary to the achievement of a compelling state interest. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721, 93 S.Ct. 2851, 37 L.Ed.2d 910 (1973); San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, reh. denied, 411 U.S. 959, 93 S.Ct. 1919, 36 L.Ed.2d 418 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972); Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966). If the statute does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose in order to withstand an equal...