S.C. Pub. Interest Found. v. Calhoun Cnty. Council

• Decision Date: 10 February 2021
• Docket Number: Appellate Case No. 2019-001016,Opinion No. 28008
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC INTEREST FOUNDATION, Amy Hill, and Rebecca Bonnette, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. CALHOUN COUNTY COUNCIL, Respondent.

432 S.C. 492

854 S.E.2d 836

SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC INTEREST FOUNDATION, Amy Hill, and Rebecca Bonnette, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellants,

v.CALHOUN COUNTY COUNCIL, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2019-001016

Opinion No. 28008

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard October 15, 2020

Filed February 10, 2021

James G. Carpenter, of Carpenter Law Firm, PC, of Greenville, for Appellants.

Charles Douglas Rhodes, III, Michael Wade Allen, Jr., and R. Patrick Flynn, all of Pope Flynn, of Columbia; Robert E. Tyson, Jr. and Benjamin Rogers Gooding, both of Robinson Gray Stepp & Laffitte, LLC, of Columbia, all for Respondent.

Joshua C. Rhodes, General Counsel, and John K. DeLoache, Senior Staff Attorney, both of South Carolina Association of Counties, of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae South Carolina Association of Counties.

JUSTICE HEARN :

This case concerns the scope of the thirty-day limitations period set forth in Section 4-10-330(F) under the Capital Project Sales Tax Act ("the Act"). S.C. Code Ann. §§ 4-10-300 to -390 (2019). Voters in Calhoun County approved a referendum in the November 2018 general election imposing a one percent sales and use tax—a penny tax—to fund a list of fifteen projects. Nearly five months later, Appellants filed suit, contending four of the projects were not authorized pursuant to section 4-10-330. The County responded that the statute of limitations had expired, and alternatively, the projects fell within the scope of the Act. The circuit court found the thirty-day limitations period barred the action and did not address the merits. We affirm, holding the statute of limitations has run.

FACTS

During the November 2018 general election, the voters of Calhoun County, by a margin of 57% to 43%, approved a referendum imposing a penny tax to fund fifteen projects. These proposed projects ranged from the construction of water distribution lines, to fire stations, to dredging and beautification of recreational and fishing facilities. At issue in this appeal are the following four projects:

4. Calhoun County-Sandy Run Fire District Ladder Truck Project-to include the acquisition and equipping of a new ladder truck in the Sandy Run Fire District. To support the northern portion of Calhoun County, particularly industry located therein. $350,000

11. Calhoun County Emergency Communications Project-to include the constructing, acquiring, and equipping of facilities and equipment to provide 800 MHz radio service for emergency service providers in Calhoun County. $500,000

12. Calhoun County Ambulance Project-to include the acquisition and equipping of ambulances to be operated by Calhoun County Emergency Services Department. $165,000

13. Calhoun County Sandy Run Fire District Tanker Truck Project-to include the purchase of the fire truck to serve the Sandy Run area. $267,000

On November 26, 2018, the County adopted a resolution declaring the results of the referendum. More than four months later, on April 3, 2019, the Foundation filed a declaratory judgment action seeking an order that the four projects exceeded the scope of the Act and therefore were invalid, and to enjoin the collection of the penny tax. The tax collection began May 1, 2019. Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the circuit court held a hearing. The Foundation contended penny tax proceeds could not be used for the four projects because none of them was specifically included in the Act. The County disagreed, arguing for a more expansive reading of the statute. The County also noted the Act expressly contains a thirty-day statute of limitations. In response, the Foundation argued the limitations period only applies to procedural challenges alleging election irregularities, not those which involve the substance of an approved project. Regarding the merits, the County contended the four projects clearly fell within the Act, as they were sufficiently tethered to an enumerated project. The circuit court ultimately concluded the thirty-day statute of limitations barred the Foundation's claims, and therefore did not reach the merits. The Foundation filed a direct appeal pursuant to Rule 203(d)(1)(A)(iii) and (iv), SCACR.

ISSUE

Did the circuit court err in determining section 4-10-330(F)'s thirty-day limitations period barred this action?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a circuit court's order from a motion for summary judgment, appellate courts sit in the same position as the circuit court. Turner v. Milliman, 392 S.C. 116, 121-22, 708 S.E.2d 766, 769 (2011). When the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the issue becomes a question of law for the Court to decide de novo. Wiegand v. U.S. Auto. Ass'n , 391 S.C. 159, 163, 705 S.E.2d 432, 434 (2011). Additionally, the interpretation of a statute is a question of law for the Court to review de novo. DomainsNewMedia.com, LLC v. Hilton Head Island-Bluffton Chamber of Commerce , 423 S.C. 295, 300, 814 S.E.2d 513, 516 (2018).

DISCUSSION

The Foundation contends the thirty-day limitations period set forth in section 4-10-330(F) only applies to procedural challenges, such as a lawsuit asserting voting irregularities. Because the focus of the Foundation's lawsuit is on the substance of the referendum—whether the projects fall outside the scope of the Act—it argues the statute of limitations does not apply. Conversely, the County asserts section 4-10-330(F) does not distinguish between procedural and substantive challenges. We agree with the County.

Section 4-10-330 of the South Carolina Code authorizes a county governing body to establish a commission that designates projects to be included on a referendum for the voters' consideration during an election. Specifically, the provision requires the ordinance set forth the purpose of the penny tax funds, which, "may include the following types of projects: (b) courthouses, administration buildings, civic centers, hospitals, emergency medical facilities, police stations, fire stations, jails, correctional facilities, detention facilities, libraries, coliseums, educational facilities under the direction of an area commission for technical education, or any combination of these projects[.]" S.C. Code Ann. § 4-10-330(A)(1)(b). Additionally, section 4-10-330(E) requires in part, "The election commission shall conduct the referendum under the election laws of this State, mutatis mutandis,¹ and shall certify the result no later than November thirtieth to the county governing body and to the Department of Revenue." In this appeal, we are required to determine the import of section 4-10-330(F), which states,

Upon receipt of the returns of the referendum, the county governing body must, by resolution, declare the results thereof. In such event, the results of the referendum, as declared by resolution of the county governing body, are not open to question except by a suit or proceeding instituted within thirty days from the date such resolution is adopted.

Specifically, the key language set forth in this provision is "the results of the referendum ...." Id. (emphasis added).

The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly. Amisub of S.C., Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control , 407 S.C. 583, 597, 757 S.E.2d 408, 416 (2014). "Where the statute's language is plain, unambiguous, and conveys a clear, definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning." Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Roberts , 393 S.C. 332, 342, 713 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2011). Accordingly, courts will "give words their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation." State v. Sweat , 386 S.C. 339, 350, 688 S.E.2d 569, 575 (2010) (citation omitted).

To begin, section 4-10-330(F) does not contain any express language limiting "the results of the referendum" to only procedural aspects, such as the vote count. While the Foundation contends the plain language of the phrase inherently creates this distinction, especially when viewed in comparison to the preceding subsection which describes election procedure, we disagree. It is not the province of this Court to engraft an additional provision onto a statute which is ostensibly clear on its face. State v. Cty. of Florence , 406 S.C. 169, 180, 749 S.E.2d 516, 522 (2013) (declining to "augment the statutory language" to include a requirement that is not contained in the statute at issue); Grier v. AMISUB of S.C., Inc. , 397 S.C. 532, 540, 725 S.E.2d 693, 698 (2012) (noting "when a statute is clear on its face, it is ‘improvident to judicially engraft extra requirements to legislation’ "). Further, when we look outside of subsection 4-10-330(F), the rest of the provision addresses the substance of the referendum, as demonstrated by the title of section 4-10-330, delineated as, "Contents of ballot question; purpose for which proceeds of tax to be used." See S.C. Energy Users Comm. v. S.C. Elec. & Gas , 410 S.C. 348, 357 n.5, 764 S.E.2d 913, 917 n.5 (2014) ("This Court may, of course, consider the title or caption of an act in determining the intent of the Legislature.") (citation omitted). Therefore, it would be entirely inconsistent for the limitations period to only apply to the vote count when section 4-10-330 addresses which projects are authorized to receive penny tax funds.

In addition to the absence of any qualifying language limiting the thirty-day limitations period to only procedural challenges, we find further support in our jurisprudence involving other abbreviated statutes of limitations. In Hite v. Town of West Columbia , landowners challenged the town's annexation of property, contending the town did not satisfy the statutory requirement to obtain a petition signed by a majority of the property owners whose property was subject to the annexation. 220 S.C. 59, 63, 66 S.E.2d 427, 428 (1951). The provision at...