S.C. v. S.B. (In re M.B.)

• Decision Date: 12 April 2016
• Docket Number: No. 65S04–1604–MI–00180.,65S04–1604–MI–00180.
• Citation: 51 N.E.3d 230
• Parties: In re the CUSTODY OF M.B. B/N/F S.C. and D.C., Appellants (Petitioners below), v. S.B. AND S.W., Appellees (Respondents below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

51 N.E.3d 230

In re the CUSTODY OF M.B.B/N/F S.C. and D.C., Appellants (Petitioners below)

v.S.B. AND S.W., Appellees (Respondents below).¹

No. 65S04–1604–MI–00180.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

April 12, 2016.

Raymond P. Dudlo, Brandon J. Powell, Kelly A. Lonnberg, Bamberger, Foreman, Oswald and Halm, LLP, Evansville, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 65A04–1412–MI–00607

DAVID, Justice.

Indiana Code § 31–17–2–3(2) allows any person other than a parent to commence a custody action over a child, which is not incidental to a marital dissolution, legal separation, or child support action. In the present case, the paternal aunt and uncle of minor child, M.B., filed an independent action seeking custody of M.B. However, this action was dismissed by the trial court, finding that Aunt and Uncle did not have standing to bring an independent custody action, and the circuit court had no jurisdiction to hear a conflicting action, because a child in need of services (CHINS) proceeding involving M.B. was already pending in the Posey County Juvenile Court. We now grant transfer and reverse the circuit court. Aunt and Uncle had standing to bring the independent custody action, and the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the custody action. However, where the juvenile court was already exercising exclusive jurisdiction over the CHINS proceeding, and Aunt and Uncle's independent custody action did not arise under one of the enumerated exceptions to that exclusive jurisdiction, the circuit court should stay any proceedings and abstain from exercising its jurisdiction until the CHINS case has concluded. Accordingly, dismissal on the grounds of lack of standing and subject matter jurisdiction was error. We reverse and remand to the circuit court.

Facts and Procedural History

M.B. is the five-year-old child of S.B. (Mother) and S.W. (Putative Father). Mother and Father were never married. In January 2014, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) filed a petition alleging that M.B. was a child in need of services (CHINS). Mother admitted to M.B.'s status as a CHINS, Mother began receiving services, and M.B. was to remain in placement with relatives. Throughout the CHINS proceeding, DCS planned to reunify M.B. with Mother.²

In April 2014, while the CHINS case was still pending, M.B.'s paternal aunt, S.C., and paternal uncle, D.C., sought to intervene in the CHINS case (hereinafter Aunt and Uncle). The trial court denied Aunt and Uncle's motion to intervene, and they did not appeal that determination.

On July 8, 2014, Aunt and Uncle filed an emergency petition for custody under a separate cause number, but it was filed in the Posey County Circuit Court, where the CHINS case was also pending.³ Aunt and Uncle asserted that they were seeking full legal and physical custody of M.B. since she had been removed from Mother and Father, Mother was incarcerated facing criminal charges when the petition was filed, and M.B. was currently placed in foster care. However, M.B.'s foster parent was her maternal grandmother. Additionally, the court appointed Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) reported to the court that M.B. had previously been removed from placement with Aunt and Uncle when Aunt tested positive for methamphetamine, Aunt and Mother had previously gotten into a physical altercation, Aunt made inappropriate remarks about Mother to M.B., and ultimately the GAL did not believe that placing M.B. with Aunt and Uncle was in M.B.'s best interests.

A hearing was held, and upon the request of the court, the parties filed briefs with the court on two primary issues: (1) Whether the case should have been assigned a JP (Juvenile Paternity) cause number rather than an MI (Miscellaneous) cause number, and whether the trial court was at liberty to order the cause number to be changed; and (2) Whether Aunt and Uncle had standing to file an independent action seeking custody of M.B. while a CHINS case was pending. Subsequently, the trial court determined that Aunt and Uncle did not have standing to bring an independent custody action, and the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the independent custody matter while a CHINS case was pending.

Aunt and Uncle appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. In re the Custody of M.B., 40 N.E.3d 930 (Ind.Ct.App.2015), vacated. We now grant transfer thereby vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). We reverse the trial court, as dismissal for lack of standing and jurisdiction was error. We hold that Aunt and Uncle had standing to bring the independent custody action. We also hold that the Posey Circuit Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the independent custody action, but should have stayed the proceedings and abstained from exercising its jurisdiction until the CHINS action concluded. The juvenile court's exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over the CHINS proceeding did not divest the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction over an independent custody action, but it did require the circuit court to postpone its exercise of jurisdiction. We advise that the term “jurisdiction” should not be used too broadly.

Standard of Review

The question of a court's jurisdiction is a question of law. In Re B.C., 9 N.E.3d 745, 751 (Ind.Ct.App.2014). Thus, we afford no deference to the trial court and review jurisdiction de novo. Id.

Discussion

Under the facts of this case, a CHINS case was pending when Aunt and Uncle filed an independent action to obtain custody of M.B. Two questions seem to be presented in this case: (1) whether Aunt and Uncle had standing to initiate an independent custody action; and (2) whether the Posey County Circuit Court has jurisdiction to hear an independent custody action when a CHINS case is pending in the Posey County Juvenile Court?

I. Standing to Bring an Independent Custody Action

As for the first question, Indiana Code § 31–17–2–3(2) provides that an independent custody action may be commenced by “a person other than a parent by filing a petition seeking determination of custody of the child.” The reference to “a person other than a parent” is interpreted in its plain meaning. “[A]ny person ‘other than a parent’ may seek custody of a child by initiating an independent cause of action for custody that is not incidental to a marital dissolution, legal separation, or child support action.” In Re G.J., 796 N.E.2d 756, 762 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. denied. This leaves no doubt that Aunt and Uncle, in the present case, did have standing to seek custody of M.B. as they both qualify as a person other than a parent, and the custody action was not incidental to any of the aforementioned categories. Thus, the only question remaining is whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear the case.

II. Jurisdiction over the Independent Custody Action

As a threshold matter to addressing the jurisdictional question, we acknowledge that as of July 2015, the CHINS proceeding involving M.B. and Mother was terminated and reunification was achieved. Due to this, Aunt and Uncle would be free at this time to file an independent custody action. In other words, because the issue that was preventing Aunt and Uncle from seeking an independent cause of action is resolved, the question presented is moot. Mootness arises when the primary issue within the case “has been ended or settled, or in some manner disposed of, so as to render it unnecessary to decide the question involved.” Matter of Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind.1991). However, unlike the federal courts, whose jurisdiction is limited to actual cases and controversies, “the Indiana Constitution does not contain any similar restraint,” which permits our courts to decide cases on the merits “under an exception to the general rule when the case involves questions of ‘great public interest.’ ” Id.

The custody of Indiana's children is of the utmost importance. Additionally, this case presents a question that could often reoccur and similarly become moot before ever reaching this Court. When a child is found to be a CHINS, another family member or caregiver may want to at least initiate a custody action for that child while the CHINS case is pending, rather than have to closely monitor the CHINS docket for when the action has concluded and only then file an action seeking custody. As such, we seek to clarify when a suitable third-party may initiate an independent custody action and address the jurisdictional question that has been presented.

Indiana courts only have jurisdiction to the extent that jurisdiction has been granted to them by the constitution or by statute. State v. Sproles, 672 N.E.2d 1353, 1356 (Ind.1996) (citation omitted). Under Indiana Code § 33–28–1–2, the Posey Circuit Court has original jurisdiction in all civil cases. In the present case, only subject matter jurisdiction is in dispute. “Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which any particular proceeding belongs.” K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 540 (Ind.2006). It is not disputed that child custody falls within the general class of proceedings within the circuit court's jurisdiction. However, this question has been complicated due to the CHINS proceeding that was already pending in the Posey County Juvenile Court when the independent custody action was initiated in circuit court. Thus, we must also examine the extent to which legislation has set out the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

Indiana Code § 31–30–1–1(2) provides that “[a] juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction, except as provided in sections 9, 10, 12, and 13 of this chapter, in the following: ... (2) Proceedings in which a child ... is alleged to be a child in need of services under IC 31–34.” Each of these exceptions specifically allow for concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile court while a CHINS proceeding is pending. Section 9 provides that “[a] court having felony...