S. Cty. Mutual Ins. Co. v Ochoa
| Decision Date | 02 March 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-98-469-CV,13-98-469-CV |
| Parties | Page 452 19 S.W.3d 452 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000.) SOUTHERN COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY AND TRINITY UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellants, v. DAVID OCHOA, ET AL., Appellees. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On appeal from the 332nd District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]
[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before Chief Justice Seerden and Justices Dorsey and Chavez
Southern County Mutual Insurance Co. and Trinity Universal Insurance Co. (collectively "Trinity") appeal from a final summary judgment against them for $40,000 policy limits on an automobile liability policy, plus the interest that has accrued since 1994 on a separate judgment against their insured, Ronnie D. Bleeker, for approximately $11,500,000 in excess of the policy limits. Trinity raises four issues on appeal, complaining that the trial court erred in failing to transfer venue, in failing to abate, and in granting summary judgment while fact issues remain concerning Trinity's defenses of res judicata and prior payment of the claim. We reverse and remand.
The lawsuit underlying the present appeal is only the latest of several actions arising out of a 1990 collision in Williamson County, Texas, in which Bleeker negligently killed or injured numerous members of the Villarreal and Ochoa families (collectively the "Ochoas"). At the time of the accident, Bleeker possessed an auto liability insurance policy from Southern County Insurance Company for the minimum required by law, $20,100 per person and $40,000 per accident. Trinity Universal reinsured Southern County's policies and handled their claims.
In February 1991, the Ochoas sued Bleeker in Hidalgo County district court for wrongful death and personal injuries resulting from his negligence in causing the collision. They obtained a judgment against him for $11,556,001 on January 3, 1994. Bleeker appealed, but did not supersede that judgment, which this Court generally affirmed.1 In the meantime, the trial court had signed a March 1, 1994, turnover order allowing the Ochoas to satisfy their judgment by pursuing Bleeker's claims against Trinity.
On December 8, 1992, Southern County filed an interpleader action in Williamson County, naming as defendants Bleeker, the Ochoas, and the Austin Hospital that had treated the injured family members. Southern County concurrently placed a check for its $40,000 policy limits into the registry of court. Although the interpleader action was dismissed for want of prosecution in February 1995, Trinity contends that the $40,000 is still in the registry of court.
On July 18, 1994, the Ochoas, pursuant to the turnover order and suing in Bleeker's name, filed a Stowers2 action against Trinity for the amount of the judgment the Ochoas recovered against Bleeker. The trial court granted judgment for the Ochoas, but the Texas Supreme Court ultimately reversed and rendered judgment that they take nothing.3
On December 10, 1997, Trinity filed a declaratory judgment action in Williamson County district court, asking for a declaration of its obligations to Bleeker and the Ochoas under the insurance policy. That lawsuit remains pending in Williamson County.
Finally, on December 29, 1997, the Ochoas filed in Hidalgo County district court the present lawsuit against Trinity for the policy limits and for interest on the prior judgment against Bleeker under a provision of the insurance policy allowing the insured to recover the interest accruing until Trinity pays the policy limits. Trinity moved for transfer of venue to Williamson County, and alternately pled for abatement based on dominant jurisdiction of its declaratory judgment action in that county. The Ochoas moved for summary judgment on their claims, and Trinity defended against summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) the present suit is barred by res judicata and the claims are barred by collateral estoppel, based on the prior take-nothing judgment on their claims against Trinity; (2) Trinity had already paid policy limits by tendering the funds into the registry of the Williamson County district court; and (3) Bleeker had breached his own obligations by failing to cooperate with Trinity inconnection with his settlement of the prior action against him. The trial court heard the motions together, denied transfer or abatement, and granted summary judgment for the Ochoas.
By its first issue, Trinity complains that the trial court erred in denying its motion to transfer venue to Williamson County.
An appellate court is obliged to conduct an independent review of the entire record to determine whether venue was proper in the ultimate county of suit, and this review should be conducted like any other review of a trial court's fact findings and legal rulings, except that the evidence need not be reviewed for factual sufficiency. Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752, 758 (Tex. 1993). However, the venue facts in the present case are generally uncontested, leaving only the legal issue of whether venue was proper in Hidalgo County.
Trinity's principal place of business was in Dallas County, and the collision occurred in Williamson County, where the insurance policy was also issued to Bleeker. However, the Ochoas sought to establish venue in Hidalgo County solely based on the fact that they obtained their judgment against Bleeker in a Hidalgo County district court.
The present permissive venue statute generally allows the plaintiff to bring suit in the county of the defendant's residence or principal office, or "in the county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 15.002(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1999). This statute is a revision of the old permissive venue statute which allowed suit "in the county in which all or part of the cause of action accrued or in the county of defendant's residence if defendant is a natural person." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 15.001 (repealed 1995).
The changed language of section 15.002(a)(1) appears to have been patterned after a similar 1990 federal statute providing for venue in diversity cases in "a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred." 28 U.S.C. 1391(a)(2).
When the Texas legislature adopts a statute with wording substantially similar to a federal statute, we presume, absent some indication to the contrary, that the legislature intended to adopt the construction placed on that wording by the federal courts, and we look to federal cases as a guide to interpreting the state statute. Blackmon v. Hansen, 140 Tex. 536, 169 S.W.2d 962, 964-65 (1943); City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 969 S.W.2d 548, 556-57 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1998, pet. granted); Summers v. WellTech, Inc., 935 S.W.2d 228, 232-33 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ); Sharifi v. Young Bros., Inc., 835 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Tex. App.--Waco 1992, writ denied).
Accordingly, since few Texas cases have explored the meaning of the revision to the Texas permissive venue statute, we look to federal cases construing section 1391(a)(2), as well as Texas cases under the prior venue statute where appropriate.
Trinity argues on appeal that the present statute restricts the venue choice under section 15.002(a)(1) to only one county in which all or the most substantial part of the events giving rise to the lawsuit occurred. Trinity contends that the statute's provision for venue in "the" county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred implies a single county of proper venue under this subsection. While grammar may be on Trinity's side, history is not.
Although substantial changes were made by the revision, both the old and new venue statutes retain the same exact language allowing permissive venue "in the county" of the defendant's residence or where the "cause of action accrued"/"events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred." Compare TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 15.002(a)(1) & (2) (Vernon Supp. 1999) with TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 15.001 (repealed 1995). Yet, under the old statute, there was no question that the defendant might have several residences for venue purposes, and that parts of the cause of action might accrue in different counties. See Wilson v. Texas Parks and Wildlife Dept., 886 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tex. 1994); McIntosh v. Copeland, 894 S.W.2d 60, 65 (Tex. App.--Austin 1995, writ denied) (); see also GeoChem Tech Corp. v. Verseckes, 962 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tex. 1998); Munson v. Milton, 948 S.W.2d 813, 817 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1997, writ denied); Howell v. Mauzy, 899 S.W.2d 690, 697 (Tex. App.--Austin 1994, writ denied) (); see also Legal Security Life Insurance Co. v. Trevino, 605 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1980); Time Housing Corp. v. Nunez, 671 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1984, no writ) (single transaction that serves as the basis of the suit is sufficient to sustain venue).
When a statute, or some portion thereof, is re-enacted without material change, it is presumed that the legislature knew and adopted the interpretation placed on the original act and intended the new enactment to receive the same construction. Ector County v. Stringer, 843 S.W.2d 477, 479 n.4 (Tex. 1992); Blount v. Dutton, 967 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1998, no pet.); see also The Cadle Co. v. Butler, 951 S.W.2d 901, 908 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1997, no writ).
In addition, one provision of a statute will not be given a meaning out of harmony or inconsistent with other provisions, even though it might be susceptible to such construction if standing alone. Barr v. Bernhard, 562 S.W.2d 844 (Tex....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Simco Enterprises, Ltd. v. James River Ins. Co.
...is not obligated to pay a liability claim until [the] insured has been adjudicated to be legally responsible." Southern County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ochoa, 19 S.W.3d 452, 460 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.). Moreover, an insurer has no duty to indemnify its insured when found liable if ......
-
Light v. Whittington (In re Whittington), Bankruptcy No. 13-11036.
...is not the correct party in interest “could become the real party in interest through an assignment”); S. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ochoa, 19 S.W.3d 452, 465 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.) (“[W]hen a cause of action is assigned or transferred, the assignee becomes the real party in i......
-
Light v. Whittington (In re Whittington), 13-11036
...is not the correct party in interest "could become the real party in interest through an assignment"); S. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ochoa, 19 S.W.3d 452, 465 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.) ("[W]hen a cause of action is assigned or transferred, the assignee becomes the real party in ......
-
Light v. Whittington (In re Whittington)
...a plaintiff who is not the correct party in interest “could become the real party in interest through an assignment”); S. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ochoa, 19 S.W.3d 452, 465 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.) (“[W]hen a cause of action is assigned or transferred, the assignee becomes the......
-
Chapter 14-2 Another Suit Pending Between Same Parties for Same Claim
...suit between the same parties; and Involving the same claim.--------Notes:[10] Tex. R. Civ. P. 93(3); S. Cty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ochoa, 19 S.W.3d 452, 461 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000).[11] Southern Cty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ochoa, 19 S.W.3d 452, 461 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, no writ).[12......