S.F. v. McKinney Indep. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 06 March 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 4:10-CV-323-RAS-DDB
• Parties: S.F., b/n/f S.F. and S.F., Plaintiffs, v. MCKINNEY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

S.F., b/n/f S.F. and S.F., Plaintiffs,

v.MCKINNEY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 4:10-CV-323-RAS-DDB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SHERMAN DIVISION

Dated: March 6, 2012

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Now before the Court are Defendant's Motion for Judgment (Dkt. 45) and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 46). As set forth below, the Court finds that the motions should GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Plaintiffs, parents of a minor child with disabilities, S.F., filed this action pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq., seeking reimbursement of attorneys' fees and allowable expenses incurred in successfully defending an administrative special education due process hearing initiated by Defendant McKinney Independent School District ("the District"), along with reimbursement of fees and expenses in pursuing the instant matter. Defendant has asserted a counterclaim challenging various findings at the administrative hearing.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Prior to this suit, Defendant initiated an administrative hearing challenging Plaintiffs' request for independent educational evaluations ("IEEs") pursuant to the IDEA. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b).Plaintiffs filed various counterclaims at the administrative level. The Special Education Hearing Officer ruled in favor of Plaintiffs on the sole issue raised by Defendant and concluded that Defendant's evaluations were not only inappropriate but in violation of the IDEA and several professional standards. The Hearing Officer ordered Defendant to pay for the IEEs and additionally found in favor of Plaintiffs on multiple counterclaims challenging Defendant's provision of an appropriate education to S.F.

Plaintiffs filed this action in order to recover the award of attorneys' fees as the "prevailing party" in accordance with 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Plaintiffs also seek recovery of damages and litigation expenses, including expert fees under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12205 and 28 C.F.R. § 35.175, damages under Sections 504 and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. Defendant has filed a counterclaim challenging the Special Education Hearing Officer's administrative findings regarding Plaintiffs' due process counterclaims. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2) (allowing a party who receives an adverse decision from a special education due process hearing to bring a civil action in district court challenging that decision).

Thus, the present case is both a suit by Plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees and an appeal by Defendant of the Special Education Hearing Officer's administrative decision. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment in this case on both Plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees and other damages and Defendant's appeal of the Special Education Hearing Officer's administrative decision.

STANDARD

This case arises under the IDEA, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482. The IDEA's purpose is "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).

States receiving federal assistance under the IDEA must: (1) provide a "free appropriate public education" ("FAPE") to each disabled child within its boundaries, and (2) ensure that such education is in the "least restrictive environment" ("LRE") possible. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 247 (5th Cir.1997); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1), (5). The FAPE provided must be developed to each disabled child's needs through an "individual educational program" ("IEP"), which is a written statement prepared at a meeting attended by a school district representative, a teacher, the child's parents or guardians, and, when appropriate, the child. Michael F., 118 F.3d at 247; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). In Texas, the committee responsible for preparing an IEP is known as an Admissions, Review, and Dismissal Committee ("ARD Committee").

The role of the judiciary under the IDEA is limited, leaving the choice of educational policies and methods in the hands of state and local school officials. White v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 343 F.3d 373, 377 (5th Cir. 2003), citing Flour Bluff Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Katherine M., 91 F.3d 689, 693 (5th Cir. 1996). The court must reach an independent decision based on a preponderance of the evidence. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 2000); Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 252 (5th Cir. 1997); Teague Indep. Sch.Dist. v. Todd L., 999 F.2d 127, 131 (5th Cir. 1993). However, this requirement "is by no means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review." Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 73 L. Ed.2d 690 (1982). Instead, "due weight" is to be given to the hearing officer's decision. Id. Thus, "courts must be careful to avoid imposing their view of preferable educational methods upon the States. The primary responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded a handicapped child, and for choosing the educational method most suitable to the child's needs, was left by the Act to state and local educational agencies in cooperation with the parents or guardian of the child." Id. at 207. The Court's task therefore is not to second guess a school district's decisions or impose its own plans for the education of disabled students; rather, it is the narrow one of determining whether the District complied with the IDEA. White v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 343 F.3d 373, 377 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Edu., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989).

The party seeking relief under the IDEA bears the burden of proof. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 126 S. Ct. 528, 535-537 (2005). The United States Supreme Court has explained the burdens - as to IEP challenges - as follows:

The burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP is properly placed upon the party seeking relief. In this case, that party is Brian, as represented by his parents. But the rule applies with equal effect to school districts: If they seek to challenge an IEP, they will in turn bear the burden of persuasion before an ALJ.

Id., 546 U.S. at 62, 126 S. Ct. at 537; see also Michael F., 118 F.3d at 252 ("a party attacking the appropriateness of an IEP established by a local educational agency bears the burden of showing whythe IEP and the resulting placement were inappropriate under the IDEA."). The burdens of proof at the district court level are identical to those at the administrative level. Richardson ISD v. Michael Z., 580 F.3d 286, 292 n. 4 (5th Cir. 2009) ("[A]t the district court level, as at the administrative level, the party challenging the IEP bears the burden of showing that the IEP and the resulting placement are inappropriate under the IDEA.").

The Court notes that there has been significant dispute among the parties about their respective burdens herein. Based on the Schaffer opinion, it appears to the Court that, in a case like this one where both a school district and parents seek affirmative relief at the administrative level, each bears the burden of proof as to their respective affirmative claims to the Special Education Hearing Officer and this Court. Defendant is correct in stating that "[a] presumption exists in favor of the local public school district's plan for educating the child," however such a presumption exists "provided [the district] comports with IDEA." Teague Indep. Sch. Dist., 999 F.2d at 132. Thus, even with the presumption, it seems to the Court that, contrary to Defendant's contentions, the ultimate burden still rests with a district which initiates administrative proceedings as to the claims it has initiated and with the parents as to any counterclaims raised in response. Nonetheless, the Court finds that even if the burden here rested solely on Plaintiffs as the parties challenging the district's actions and even taking into account the presumption given to the District, a preponderance of the evidence shows that Plaintiffs prevail under the IDEA.

Both parties have filed summary judgment motions and responses framing their positions in light of the administrative record before the Court. Here, the parties have not requested that the record be supplemented with evidence outside of the voluminous administrative record or that anyadditional discovery to be conducted.¹ Therefore, the Court will determine the merits of the summary judgment motions based on the administrative record. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Robert M., 168 F. Supp.2d 635, 638 (W.D. Tex. 2001), aff'd, 54 Fed. Appx. 413 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Hunger v. Leininger, 15 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 839, 115 S. Ct. 123 (1994).

Although the IDEA sets forth specific burdens of proof as to proceedings under it, the Court will hold both parties to the procedural standards required in all summary judgment proceedings. As such, the parties are expected to cite to specific facts in the record. Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Assoc. of North Texas, P.A., 139 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 1998). The citations to evidence must be specific, as the district court is not required to "scour the record" to determine the merits of the parties' arguments. E.D. Tex. Local R. CV-56(d); see also Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir.1998) (Rule 56 does not require court to rifle through the record in search of evidence to...