S.H. v. Fairfax Cnty. Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 19 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:11–cv–128. |
| Citation | 875 F.Supp.2d 633 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | S.H., et al., Plaintiffs, v. FAIRFAX COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Paula Amy Rosenstock, Michael J. Eig and Associates, Chevy Chase, MD, for Plaintiffs.
Patricia Claire Amberly, Blankingship & Keith PC, Fairfax, VA, for Defendant.
Before the Court are cross-Motions for Judgment on the Administrative Record. (Dkt. Nos. 13 & 15). This matter returned to the Court following remand to the administrative hearing officer for clarification of his opinion. For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record. Furthermore, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record and DISMISSES S.H.'s Complaint.
In this action, George and Barbara Hopkins (the “Parents”) bring suit on behalf of their daughter, S.H., under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (“IDEA”) for Fairfax County Board of Education's (“FCBE”) failure to provide S.H. with “free and appropriate public education” (“FAPE”). The Parents contest the decision of an administrative hearing officer (the “Hearing Officer”) that they are not entitled to receive tuition reimbursement for S.H.'s enrollment at the Lab School of Washington (“Lab” or “Lab School”) during the 2007–2008, 2008–2009, 2009–2010, and 2010–2011 school years. The Hearing Officer concluded that the Individualized Education Plans (“IEPs”) proposed by Fairfax County Public Schools (“FCPS”) for each year in question would provide S.H. with a FAPE.
S.H. has average intelligence but significant education needs. At the time these proceedings began, S.H. was fourteen years old. FCPS found S.H. eligible for special education on January 26, 2005, during her second grade year. After a series of evaluations, the FCPS local screening committee found S.H. demonstrated auditory memory and visual motor integration disorders and had difficulty with reading, written expression, and verbal expression. S.H. continued in the FCPS system in the third and fourth grades. Although Fairfax County is S.H.'s local school district, her Parents placed her at Lab, an out-of-district private special education school, for her fifth grade year. S.H. has attended Lab since that time. On July 30, 2010, the Parents requested a Due Process hearing, claiming that the in-district placement within the FCPS system was inappropriate and not reasonably calculated to confer educational benefits upon S.H., and that the appropriate educational placement was at Lab. Hearings were held before Hearing Officer George C. Towner over eight days in October 2010. The Hearing Officer heard testimony from eighteen witnesses and the administrative record grew to encompass thousands of pages.
On November 22, 2010, the Hearing Officer issued a fifty-five page decision, finding FCPS' proposed IEPs would provide S.H. with a FAPE for each of the four school years at issue. The Parents filed this action on February 4, 2011. The Parties filed cross-Motions for Judgment on the Administrative Record on August 19, 2011. The Court heard oral argument on the cross-Motions on September 23, 2011, and took the Motions under advisement. The Court then remanded the matter to the Hearing Officer for clarification of his decision. The Hearing Officer provided a revised decision on January 31, 2012. The Parties provided supplemental briefing addressing the Hearing Officer's revised decision. This matter is now ripe for disposition.
Before addressing the facts of this matter, the Court pauses to provide a brief background of the IDEA. The purpose of the IDEA is to “ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment and independent living.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). To meet its goal, the IDEA requires states receiving federal education funds to provide disabled children with a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); Sumter Cnty. Sch. Dist. 17 v. Heffernan, 642 F.3d 478, 483 (4th Cir.2011). “A FAPE ‘consists of educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit from the instruction.’ ” Sumter Cnty., 642 F.3d at 483 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188–89, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
To meet the IDEA's FAPE requirement, the School Board must develop and review an IEP for each child with a disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(4). IEPs are written statements for each disabled child designed by a team of school district educators and administrators, education experts, and the child's parents. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)-(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.321(a). In developing the IEP, the IEP team considers the strengths of the child; parental concerns; the results of testing and other evaluations of the child; and the academic, developmental, and functional needs of the child. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(A)-(d)(3)(B)(i). If a dispute arises over the sufficiency of an IEP, the statute requires that the parents notify the school district of their complaints and enter into mediation. Id. § 1415. If mediation is unsuccessful, the law allows the parents to bring a due process action before an administrative hearing officer. Id. The party aggrieved by the hearing officer's decision may file a civil action in state or federal court. Id. § 1415(i)(2).
A state's substantive obligations under the IDEA are “relatively limited.” Sumter Cnty., 642 F.3d at 484. The IDEA “does not require a perfect education.” M.S. ex rel. Simchick v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 553 F.3d 315, 328 (4th Cir.2009); see also20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). Indeed, the IDEA does not obligate public school to furnish “every special service necessary to maximize each disabled child's potential.” Hogan v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 645 F.Supp.2d 554, 562 (E.D.Va.2009). Rather, “a FAPE must be reasonably calculated to confer some educational benefit on a disabled child.” MM ex rel. DM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cnty., 303 F.3d 523, 526 (4th Cir.2002) (emphasis added). IEPs are sufficient under IDEA if they afford “the child the basic floor of opportunity that access to special education and related services provides.” Hogan, 645 F.Supp.2d at 562 (internal quotations omitted). Nonetheless, “Congress did not intend that a school system could discharge its duty under the [IDEA] by providing a program that produces some minimal academic advancement, no matter how trivial.” Hall ex rel. Hall v. Vance Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 636 (4th Cir.1985). The IEP must be reasonably calculated to permit the child to receive “some non-trivial educational benefit.” Sumter Cnty., 642 F.3d at 486.
If a public school cannot provide a FAPE in the public school system, the IDEA requires the school district to assume the cost of educating the child in a private school that meets the child's educational and social service needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B). Parents may be reimbursed for unilateral private placementwhen a court or hearing officer determines: (1) a school district failed to provide a FAPE; and (2) the private placement was suitable. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 247, 129 S.Ct. 2484, 174 L.Ed.2d 168 (2009). In making its determination, courts examine “all relevant factors, including the notice provided by the parents and the school district's opportunities for evaluating the child.” Id. The court also has discretion to award reimbursement for “some or all of the cost of the child's private education.” Id. Indeed, “courts retain discretion to reduce the amount of a reimbursement award if the equities so warrant—for instance, if the parents failed to give the school district adequate notice of their intent to enroll the child in private school.” Id.
FCPS held S.H.'s first IEP meeting on February 15, 2005, when S.H. was in second grade. The IEP identified two needs and goals in basic reading skills and written language. The IEP also established classroom accommodations, such as preferential seating, extended time, and the opportunity to respond orally. It provided for three hours a week in a special education setting and special education services in a general education setting on an intermittent basis. The Parents agreed with the contents of the IEP.
FCPS held an IEP meeting on February 22, 2006, during S.H.'s third grade year. This IEP expanded S.H.'s needs and goals to include mathematics. Special education services were increased from three hours to nine and a half hours a week, of which two and a half hours were in a special education setting. Again, the Parents agreed to the IEP.
At that time, a Qualitative Reading Inventory (“QRI”) test indicated S.H.—a third grader—read at a second grade level. Additional progress reports from April and June 2006 indicated S.H. “was making sufficient progress to achieving her goals.” AR 23; AR 50.1
In September 2006, S.H. began her fourth grade year at Colvin Run Elementary School (“Colvin Run”), S.H.'s neighborhood public elementary school. The 2006–2007 year would turn out to be S.H.'s final year in the FCPS system. On September 14, 2006, S.H.'s IEP was formally amended to include occupational therapy. S.H. would receive two hours a month of occupational therapy, with one hour in a special education setting.2 This amendment resulted from an occupational therapy evaluation conducted by FCPS the previous summer, which identified S.H.'s difficulties...
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