S.J. v. Issaquah School Dist. No. 411

• Decision Date: 11 December 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-35183.,05-35183.
• Citation: 470 F.3d 1288
• Parties: S. J., a minor child by and through his parents S.H.J. and J.J., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ISSAQUAH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 411; Janet Barry, Superintendent; Diana Waterstrat, Director of Special Education, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1288

470 F.3d 1288

S. J., a minor child by and through his parents S.H.J. and J.J., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ISSAQUAH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 411; Janet Barry, Superintendent; Diana Waterstrat, Director of Special Education, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 05-35183.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted November 13, 2006.

Filed December 11, 2006.

Jeannette A. Cohen, Shoreline, WA, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Robert B. Mitchell (argued) and Karen H. Simmonds (on the briefs), Preston Gates & Ellis, Seattle, WA, for the defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington; Robert S. Lasnik, Chief District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-04-01926-RSL.

Before: ALARCÓN, RYMER, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

RYMER, Circuit Judge:

This appeal presents the question whether, in an action arising under federal law where there is no federal statute of limitations, a federal court borrows the state's time period for service of process as well as for filing suit.

S.J., a juvenile, appeals the district court's dismissal of his claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., against the Issaquah School District and its Superintendent and Director of Special Education (collectively, "Issaquah"). The IDEA had no statute of limitations at the time, so the district court applied Washington's Administrative Procedure Act ("WAPA"), RCW 34.05.542(2), which provides that a petition for review must be filed and served within thirty days of service of the final order by a state administrative agency. As S.J. conceded that he had not attempted to serve Issaquah until after the thirty-day period, the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction.

We have previously held that Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure controls when an action which arises under federal law is "commenced" for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations borrowed from state law. Sain v. City of Bend, 309 F.3d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir. 2002). It follows that federal procedural rules thereafter govern the action, at least when there is a federal rule to apply. Here there is, because Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a time limit for service of process (120 days). Accordingly, we hold that a federal court borrowing a state's time period for filing suit brought under federal law should not also borrow the state's time limits for serving the complaint. As S.J.'s IDEA action was timely commenced for purposes of tolling the borrowed statute of limitations when it was filed within 30 days, we reverse.

I

S.J. is a juvenile who attended schools in the Issaquah School District through the sixth grade. In 2002, unable to work out an Independent Education Plan with the district, S.J.'s parents enrolled him at a private school for special education students. The parents then filed a request for a state due process hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings for the Superintendent of Public Instruction alleging various claims under the IDEA. A hearing was held and the administrative law judge mailed an order constituting the final agency determination of S.J.'s claims on August 12, 2004. It granted some, but not all, of the relief sought, and advised S.J. of the right to appeal and of the filing and service requirements in RCW 34.05.542(2). The thirtieth day after service of the order was Saturday, September 11, 2004. S.J. filed a complaint in the district court on Monday, September 13, 2004, which was timely under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 3 and 6(a). S.J. attempted to serve all defendants on Tuesday, September 14, 2004, by delivering copies of the summons and complaint to the Superintendent's administrative assistant.

Issaquah moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(5) on the grounds that the statute of limitations had run because S.J. had failed to perfect service within the thirty-day period required by state law and that service of the summons and complaint was insufficient under Rule 4. The district court agreed that S.J.'s failure to meet the service requirement of the borrowed statute of limitations deprived it of jurisdiction,¹ and did not reach the issue of sufficiency of service.

S.J. has timely appealed.

II

Congress had not provided a federal statute of limitations governing IDEA claims at the time this action commenced.² For this reason, courts considering such claims must borrow the most closely analogous state statute of limitations so long as it does not undermine the policies of the IDEA. See Livingston Sch. Dist. Nos. 4 & 1 v. Keenan, 82 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1996). In Keenan, we selected the statute of limitations provided by the state's Administrative Procedure Act because "a civil action under the IDEA challenging an administrative hearing officer's decision after a due process hearing is more analogous to judicial review of an administrative appeal than to an action upon a liability created by statute." Id. at 916. Applying Keenan, the district court in this case borrowed the thirty-day statute of limitations for judicial review of agency orders in the WAPA. No one disputes that choice. This provision states: "A petition for judicial review of an order shall be filed with the court and served on the agency, the office of the attorney general, and all parties of record within thirty days after service of the final order." RCW 34.05.542(2).

S.J. argues that the federal rules control service once he commenced the action by filing his complaint within the thirty-day period provided by RCW 34.05.542(2), thereby tolling the statute of limitations. Issaquah counters that under RCW 34.05.542(2), an action is timely only if both filing and service are accomplished within thirty days because the statute combines the time period for filing and service. We have not addressed this scenario before, but Sain resolved the core question that controls the outcome.

As we explained in Sain, 309 F.3d at 1137-38, the Supreme Court held in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 100 S.Ct. 1978, 64 L.Ed.2d 659 (1980), and West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 107 S.Ct. 1538, 95 L.Ed.2d 32 (1987), that when an action is commenced for purposes of the statute of limitations differs depending upon whether the action is based on state or federal law. Walker indicated that in a diversity case, even though Rule 3 governs the date from which timing requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are measured, federal courts borrow state service rules that are integral to the statute of limitations in order to determine when the action is commenced for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations. However, West indicated that when the underlying cause of action is based on federal law and it is necessary to borrow a limitations period from another federal statute, the action is not barred if it has been commenced in compliance with Rule 3 within the borrowed limitations period regardless of the borrowed statute's service requirements. We took the next step in Sain, holding that the rule from West, where the borrowed statute was federal, also applies when the statute of limitations is borrowed from state law.

The issue in Sain was whether Oregon law for computing the number of elapsed days for purposes of satisfying a borrowed state statute of limitations should apply in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or whether Rule 6(a) should govern. This depended on whether Rule 3 or Oregon law controlled when the action was deemed to have commenced; if Rule 3 controlled commencement, then Rule 6(a) necessarily governed computation of time, but if Oregon law controlled commencement, then Oregon law would also govern computation of time. Noting that under Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268-69, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), only the length of the limitations period and "closely related questions of tolling" are governed by state law for § 1983 actions, we concluded that the class of "closely related questions of tolling" does not include rules for determining when a cause of action commences. 309 F.3d at 1138. Accordingly, we held that Rule 3 provides the tolling rule for a borrowed state statute of limitations when an action is brought under federal law. In these circumstances, the action is commenced in federal district court for purposes of the statute of limitations when the complaint is filed and, as a corollary, the computation of time for purposes of Rule 3 tolling is governed by Rule 6(a). Id.

Issaquah submits that Sain is distinguishable for three reasons, none of which is persuasive. First, it argues that an IDEA action following a state agency due process hearing is in the nature of an "appeal," and so does not fall within Rule 3 which only applies to "civil actions." While we have recognized that an IDEA action resembles an administrative appeal for purposes of selecting the most analogous state statute of limitations, Keenan, 82 F.3d at 916, and articulating the standard of review, Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg ex rel. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 890-92 (9th Cir. 1995), we have never suggested that such actions are not "civil actions" governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We so described IDEA actions in Keenan, 82 F.3d at 916, and the IDEA itself provides that "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision [of the state agency] ... shall have the right to bring a civil action . . . in a district court of the United States." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Rule 3, which states that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court," applies to all suits of a civil nature other than those covered by Rule 81. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 1, 2. There is no basis for concluding that IDEA actions are not "of a civil nature" simply because they have an appellate flavor in some respects. Accord...