S.K. v. N. Allegheny Sch. Dist.

Decision Date19 November 2015
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 14-218
Citation146 F.Supp.3d 700
Parties S.K., a minor, by his parent, K.K., and K.K., Plaintiffs, v. North Allegheny School District, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

Jeffrey J. Ruder, Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Michael L. Brungo, Roger W. Foley, Jr., Maiello, Brungo & Maiello, LLP, Brian P. Benestad, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendant.

OPINION

CONTI

, Chief District Judge
I. Introduction

Pending before the court is a motion for leave to file an amended complaint (ECF No. 34) filed by plaintiff K.K. on her own behalf and on the behalf of her severely disabled minor child, S.K. K.K. and S.K. in the proposed amended complaint allege that defendant North Allegheny School District (the District) violated their rights under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the Rehabilitation Act), 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.,

34 C.F.R. § 104.4, Chapter 15 of the Pennsylvania Code, 22 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 15 (Chapter 15),1 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

The District provides a service transporting its students between their schools and respective daycare facilities located within the District's attendance boundaries (the “transportation service”). K.K. and S.K. allege that the only daycare able to care for S.K.'s medical needs, i.e., Child's Way, is located outside the District's attendance boundaries, and the District refused to transport S.K. between Child's Way and his school, the Western Pennsylvania School for Blind Children. (“WPSB”). According to S.K. and K.K., the District's failure to reasonably modify its transportation service and transport S.K. between Child's Way and the WPSB is discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, Chapter 15, and the ADA. K.K. and S.K. seek to file an amended complaint to assert their rights against the District under those antidiscrimination laws. The District argues, however, that the court should not permit K.K. and S.K. to file an amended complaint because K.K. does not have standing under Article III of the United States Constitution and the court did not permit S.K. to file a motion for leave to file an amended complaint.

This case presents heart wrenching facts about a mother's efforts to provide care for and resources to her severely disabled son. The issues raised in this case are emotional and difficult. For the reasons set forth below, S.K. in the proposed amended complaint did not set forth a plausible claim for relief because the District did not deny him any benefit to which he is entitled. K.K., however, set forth a plausible claim for relief based upon her association with her disabled son. The motion for leave to file an amended complaint will, therefore, be granted with respect to K.K.'s claims and denied with respect to S.K.'s claims.

II. Procedural History

This civil action was initiated on February 18, 2014, when K.K. filed a complaint on S.K.'s behalf requesting injunctive relief and compensatory education to remedy the failure of the District to provide transportation between S.K.'s daycare, Child's Way, and S.K.'s school, WPSB (“WPSB”). (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 3, 10, 17, 18.) According to the complaint, S.K. was denied access to a federally funded program, i.e., the District's transportation service, because of his disability. (Id. ¶¶ 27-40.) Based upon these core factual allegations, S.K. in the complaint asserted claims under the Rehabilitation Act, Chapter 15, and the ADA. (Id. ¶ 1.)

On March 18, 2014, the District filed a motion to dismiss S.K.'s complaint and a brief in support of its motion. (ECF Nos. 9, 10.) On April 15, 2014, S.K. filed a brief in opposition to the District's motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 19.) On June 5, 2014, the court held a hearing on the District's motion to dismiss and determined that supplemental briefing was necessary to resolve the motion to dismiss. On July 7, 2014, the District filed a supplemental brief, (ECF No. 26), and on August 6, 2014, S.K. filed his supplemental brief in opposition. (ECF No. 27.) On August 22, 2014, the court held a hearing with respect to the supplemental briefing and requested that the parties file second supplemental briefs. On October 3, 2014, S.K. filed his second supplemental brief (ECF No. 30), and on October 31, 2014, the District filed its second supplemental brief (ECF No. 31). On January, 22, 2015, the court held a hearing on the second supplemental briefing and advised the parties that the District's motion to dismiss would be granted. On March 20, 2015, the court issued an opinion and order granting the District's motion to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 32 and 33.) The court granted the motion to dismiss because S.K. did not plausibly allege that the District denied him any benefit to which he was entitled. In their brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss and second supplemental brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss, K.K. and S.K. requested leave to amend. (ECF No. 20 at 12; ECF No. 30 at 8.) The court denied S.K.'s request for leave to amend, but permitted K.K. to file a motion for leave to file an amended complaint in her own right. (Id. )

On April 20, 2015, S.K. and K.K. filed a joint motion for leave to file an amended complaint and brief in support of the motion. (ECF Nos. 34 and 35.) S.K. and K.K. attached the proposed amended complaint to the motion for leave to amend. The proposed amended complaint names S.K. and K.K. as plaintiffs, sets forth the same claims asserted by S.K. in the original complaint, and sets forth similar claims on behalf of K.K. According to S.K. and K.K., in the amended complaint they set forth allegations that under the relevant laws, the District deprived S.K. of various benefits owed to him and K.K. is a person aggrieved who was directly injured by the District's conduct. (ECF No. 34-1.)

On April 20, 2015, S.K. appealed the court's order granting the District's motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 36.) On May 11, 2015, the District filed a response and brief in opposition to the motion for leave to file an amended complaint. (ECF Nos. 39 and 40.) On March 27, 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stayed the appeal of the court's order granting the District's motion to dismiss pending a decision by this court on the motion for leave to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 41.) On June 12, 2015, S.K. and K.K. filed a reply brief in support of the motion for leave to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 43.) The motion for leave to file an amended complaint is now ripe to be decided by the court.

III. Factual Allegations Set Forth in the Proposed Amended Complaint and Viewed as True for the Purpose of Deciding the Motion to Dismiss
A. Background

S.K. is a seven-year-old student within the District. (ECF No. 34-1 ¶ 13.) S.K. has a disability due to a diagnosis of Cornelai de Lange Syndrome

that causes S.K. to be blind, deaf, and incapable of basic self-care, such as feeding and toileting. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 13.) S.K. also has significant speech and language delays, cognitive impairments, social interaction skills deficits, attention deficit, gross and fine motor delays, and other adaptive needs. (Id. ¶ 13.) At all relevant times, S.K. was recognized as a protected handicapped student, pursuant to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and qualified to receive an equal opportunity to participate in nonacademic and extracurricular services and activities that are provided to his nondisabled peers, in accordance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., and Chapter 14 of the Pennsylvania Department of Education Regulations, 22 PA. Code § 14.101 et seq. (Id. ¶ 14.)

In 2011, S.K. began attending Child's Way, a daycare for children with special medical needs, so that K.K. could work. (ECF No. 34-1 ¶ 18.) Child's Way maintains a staff of registered nurses and childcare associates. (Id. ) Prior to S.K. attending Child's Way, and on other subsequent occasions, K.K. contacted all daycare centers within the District's boundaries to ascertain their ability to meet S.K.'s medical needs. (Id. ¶ 19.) All daycare facilities contacted lacked the needed medical and nursing support offered by Child's Way. (Id. ¶ 19.)

In March 2012, S.K. was enrolled in the District to attend kindergarten. (ECF No. 34-1 ¶ 15.) On July 26, 2012, in accordance with the IDEA, the District conducted an evaluation of S.K. (Id. ¶ 16.) The District concluded that S.K. required full-time visually impaired and hearing impaired support. (Id. ) S.K. was issued an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”), pursuant to the IDEA, according to which the appropriate placement for S.K. was at WPSB. (Id. ¶ 17.)

B. S.K.'s Medical Needs and the District's Transportation Service

The District transports students between their school and their respective daycare facilities located within the District's attendance boundaries. (ECF No. 34-1 ¶ 20.) K.K. requested that the District provide transportation for S.K. between WPSB and Child's Way. (Id. ¶ 21.) The District transports two other students from the District's attendance zone to WPSB. (Id. ¶ 22.) Child's Way is located 1.69 to 1.78 miles from WPSB. (Id. ) To support her request, K.K. provided the District with a letter dated July 28, 2011, from Dr. Brian Kilpela, M.D., providing that S.K. is not able to attend a “regular” daycare and that the type of care S.K. receives at Child's Way “is medically necessary due to his conditions.” (Id. ¶ 23.) K.K. also provided the District with correspondence from Erin Colvin (“Colvin”), a board certified pediatric nurse practitioner and Clinical Director of Child's Way. (Id. ¶ 24.) Colvin asserted in the correspondence that Child's Way is a good option for many medically fragile children “due to their consistent nursing care, whereas there is a risk of call-offs and inconsistent schedules with home nursing care.” and requested “that [S.K.] and his mother be afforded the same opportunity [as other children in the District are...

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