S.L. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs.
| Decision Date | 09 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 79A05–1303–JC–98.,79A05–1303–JC–98. |
| Citation | 993 N.E.2d 1198 |
| Parties | In the Matter of S.L. and J.L., Children Alleged to be Children in Need of Services, S.B.-L., Mother, Appellant–Respondent, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, Appellee–Petitioner. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court; The Honorable Faith A. Graham, Judge; Cause Nos. 79D03–1212–JC–164 and 79D03–1212–JC–165.
Teri A. Flory, Flory and Smith, Attorneys at Law, Lafayette, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Robert J. Henke, Indiana Department of Child Services, Indianapolis, IN, Craig Jones, Indiana Department of Child Services, Lafayette, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
S.B.-L. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's order detaining her minor child, J.L, and determining J.L. and her other child, S.L. to be children in need of services (“CHINS”). Mother presents three issues for review, which we consolidate and restate as:
1. Whether the evidence supports the trial court findings.
2. Whether the findings support the trial court's conclusions ordering the removal of J.L. from Mother's home and adjudicating S.L. and J.L. to be CHINS.
We affirm.
Mother has two children, S.L., born May 23, 2000, and J.L., born May 25, 2001. On December 8, 2012, the Department of Child Services in Tippecanoe County (“DCS”) received a report that S.L. had been reported missing. He had since been located, but Mother “did not want to deal with him due to significant mental health issues.” Appellant's App. at 46. On December 12, the DCS received a report that S.L. was again at the probation department as a runaway and had received several warnings, that he had been at the probation department five times since January due to runaway charges, that Mother had placed S.L. outside in the past as punishment, that he had made threats to Mother and J.L., and that he had discussed suicidal ideation. S.L. was picked up as a runaway again on December 13 and 14. On December 14, the DCS took custody of S.L.
On December 17, the DCS filed a motion for authorization to file a petition alleging S.L. and J.L. to be CHINS, a joint CHINS petition, and a request to take both children into custody. On the same day, the court approved the filing of the CHINS petition and, at the conclusion of the detention hearing, entered a detention order granting wardship of S.L. and J.L to the DCS and removing the children from Mother's home pursuant to Indiana Code chapter 31–34–1. And at the initial hearing, Mother and the children's father 1 denied the allegations in the CHINS petition.
On January 14, 2013, the DCS filed a predispositional report, and the trial court held a fact-finding hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court held that the DCS had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the children were CHINS, continued their placement outside Mother's home, and ordered services to Mother and the children to continue. And following a dispositional hearing on February 13, the trial court ordered the majority of the services to the family to continue and again continued placement of the children outside Mother's home. Mother now appeals.
Indiana Code Section 31–34–1–1 provides that a child under eighteen years old is a CHINS if:
(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision; and;
(2) the child needs care, treatment or rehabilitation that the child:
(A) is not receiving; and
(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.
The DCS has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS. Ind.Code § 31–34–12–3. When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom. Hallberg v. Hendricks County Office of Family & Children, 662 N.E.2d 639, 646 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Id.
The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). We may not set aside the findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. Ind. Trial R. 52(A); Menard, Inc. v. Dage–MTI, Inc., 726 N.E.2d 1206, 1210 (Ind.2000). In our review, we first consider whether the evidence supports the factual findings. Menard, 726 N.E.2d at 1210. Second, we consider whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind.1996). A judgment is clearly erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal standard. Menard, 726 N.E.2d at 1210. We give due regard to the trial court's ability to assess the credibility of witnesses. Ind. Trial R. 52(A). While we defer substantially to findings of fact, we do not do so to conclusions of law. Menard, 726 N.E.2d at 1210. Again, we do not reweigh the evidence; rather we consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the judgment. Yoon v. Yoon. 711 N.E.2d 1265, 1268 (Ind.1999).
Further, in this case the trial court entered special findings in the fact-finding order sua sponte.2 When a trial court makes specific findings upon its own motion, the general judgment will control as to the issues upon which the court has not found and specific findings control only as to the issues they cover. C.B. v. B.W., 985 N.E.2d 340, 344 (Ind.Ct.App.2013) (citation omitted), trans. denied. Thus, it may not be necessary that each and every special finding be correct, and even where one or more special findings are clearly erroneous, the judgment may be affirmed if the judgment is supported by other findings or is otherwise supported by the record. Where, as here, special findings are entered sua sponte, the general judgment will be affirmed if it can be sustained upon any legal theory by the evidence introduced at trial. Id. While special findings entered sua sponte control as to the issues upon which the court has found, they do not otherwise affect our general judgment standard of review, and we may look both to other findings and beyond the findings to the evidence of record to determine if the result is against the facts and circumstances before the court. Id.
Mother first argues that the evidence does not support the findings with regard to J.L. In particular, Mother contends that most of the evidence offered at the detention hearing pertained to S .L., not to J.L. She also contends that evidence in the record contradicts the trial court's findings. We initially note that Mother has pointed to only one specific finding, and she does not provide a citation to the record for that finding. Each contention on appeal must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on, and failure to do so may result in waiver of an issue. SeeInd. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). We will not search the record to find a basis for a party's argument. Carter v. Hilliard, 970 N.E.2d 735, 755 (Ind.Ct.App.2012). Mother has waived review of her claim that the evidence does not support the finding quoted in her brief.
Waiver notwithstanding, we exercise our discretion to consider the merits of Mother's argument that the evidence does not support that finding. In the detention order, the trial court found:
Both boys have at one point or another over the past year reported that food is withheld as a punishment, that their mother has beaten them, that they have been forced to stand outside in inclement weather, and that they have been forced to take off all of their clothes as punishment. Mother admitted to making the children stand outside on the balcony at times and admitted videotaping the children taking off all of their clothes.
Appellant's App. at 38. At the detention hearing, Jennifer Steinsdoerfer, an assessor with the DCS, testified as to the conditions of the children. In particular, she testified that S.L. had run away from Mother's home at least four times in the past year and at least three times in December 2012, that S.L. had reported that Mother had videotaped the children naked as punishment for stealing, that Mother had made the children stand outside the home in inclement weather as punishment, and that there was not enough food in the house. Mother points to other evidence that does not support or that contradicts the evidence offered through Steinsdoerfer. But, again, we consider the evidence most favorable to the trial court's judgment. Yoon, 711 N.E.2d at 1268. And that evidence supports the finding that Mother challenges. Mother's contention that the evidence does not support the quoted finding must fail.
In her brief, Mother also raises additional but vague challenges to the findings that the boys had reported that Mother had physically harmed them, that the trial court was concerned for J.L.'s well-being in the event only S.L. were removed from the home, and that there was an emergency. Mother has failed either to provide adequate information to locate the challenged findings in the record or to support her contentions with cogent argument and citation to legal authority.3 As such, those issues are waived. SeeApp. R. 46(A)(8)(a). Waiver notwithstanding, Steinsdoerfer testified that S.L. had reported being beaten by Mother, and the trial court's statement after the detention hearing clearly evinced the court's concern for J.L. if he were to remain with Mother and only S.L. were removed. Mother's arguments with regard to the first two points merely...
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