S & M Constructors, Inc. v. City of Columbus, No. 81-837

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
• Writing for the Court: LOCHER; WILLIAM B. BROWN; DOUGLAS, J., of the Sixth Appellate District, sitting for CELEBREZZE
• Citation: 70 Ohio St.2d 69,24 O.O.3d 145,434 N.E.2d 1349
• Parties: , 24 O.O.3d 145 S & M CONSTRUCTORS, INC., Appellant, v. CITY OF COLUMBUS, Appellee, et al.
• Decision Date: 19 May 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-837

Page 69

70 Ohio St.2d 69 434 N.E.2d 1349, 24 O.O.3d 145 S & M CONSTRUCTORS, INC., Appellant,
v.
CITY OF COLUMBUS, Appellee, et al. No. 81-837. Supreme Court of Ohio. May 19, 1982. Syllabus by the Court

A municipality may disclaim in writing its liability to the contractor of a sewer construction project for additional expenses necessitated by conditions differing from those described in subsurface reports.

In 1975, appellant, S & M Constructors, Inc., successfully bid on the Milo-Grogan sewer construction project of the city of Columbus, appellee. The project required tunneling under Fifth Avenue in Columbus.

Thirty-eight days intervened between the initial advertisement of the project and the bid date. During this time, appellee made subsurface reports available to all prospective bidders upon request. Mason and Ray, Inc. ("Mason"), prepared these reports in 1970 and 1974 at the request of the design engineer for the project, Burgess & Niple, Ltd. ("Burgess"), and with the approval of appellee. The reports analyzed subsurface borings done on either side of the centerline of the project.

During construction, appellant encountered concretions ^* and inflows of water at various locations. The concretions caused appellant's tunnel-boring machine to fail. Each condition resulted in construction delays and additional costs to appellant.

Appellant filed a complaint against appellee, seeking damages for the additional costs incurred. Appellee impleaded Burgess as a third-party defendant to indemnify appellee against any liability arising out of the reports. The Court of Common Pleas found, inter alia, that: (1) there was no [434 N.E.2d 1351]

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evidence of inaccuracies in the Mason reports, (2) "Mason and Ray specifically searched for evidence of concretions * * * but no evidence of concretionary material was found," and (3) appellee made all factual information on subsurface conditions available to all prospective bidders. The court concluded that appellant had no right to rely on them as "complete, a part of the contract documents, or as warranted to show the actual subsurface conditions."

The trial court based its conclusion on the following provision, SP-31, in appellant's contract with appellee: "Delete paragraph three of Standard Specification 104.02 and substitute the following therefore (sic ): Test borings have been made at several locations along the line of the work involved under the Contract. Copies of the soil report, dated August 28, 1970 and the supplemental soil report, dated December 12, 1974, are available on request in the office of the Chief Sewerage Engineer, City of Columbus, Ohio, and may be examined upon request in the office of Burgess & Niple, Limited, 2015 West Fifth Avenue, Columbus, Ohio. Samples of core borings recovered may be observed at the office of Mason & Ray, Inc., 6035 Huntley Road, Columbus, Ohio. Said borings, test excavations, and other subsurface investigations, if any, are incomplete, are not a part of the contract documents, and are not warranted to show the actual subsurface conditions. The Contractor agrees that he will make no claim against the City or the Engineer if, in carrying out the work, he finds that the actual subsurface conditions encountered do not conform to those indicated by said borings, test excavations, and other subsurface investigations." The trial court found that "S & M Constructors entered the contract with the City of Columbus to construct the Milo-Grogan project with the opinion that SP-31 was illegal and unenforceable." The court concluded that "(p)rovision SP-31 is clear and unambiguous on its face * * *." Accordingly, the Court of Common Pleas granted judgment for appellee. The trial court also granted judgment for Burgess on appellee's third-party complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

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Andrews & Ryan and Robert E. Ryan, Beachwood, for appellant.

Donald R. Keller, Gregory S. Lashutka and Patrick M. McGrath, Columbus, for appellee.

LOCHER, Justice.

Appellant's proposition of law raises one issue: whether SP-31, as a matter of law, bars appellant from recovering its additional expenses. Appellant claims a right to recover, because it relied on the Mason reports. We disagree.

We recognize from the outset that this is a case in contract. "A Government contract should be interpreted as are contracts between individuals, with a view to ascertaining the intention of the parties and to give it effect accordingly, if that can be done consistently with the terms of the instrument." Hollerbach v. United States (1914), 233 U.S. 165, 171-172, 34 S.Ct. 553, 555, 58 L.Ed. 898. Our analysis, likewise, hinges on the principles of contract law.

The trial court concluded that SP-31 is clear and unambiguous on its face, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In Ullmann v. May (1947), 147 Ohio St. 468, 72 N.E.2d 63, this court held:

"1. Where a written agreement is plain and unambiguous it does not become ambiguous by reason of the fact that in its operation it will work a hardship on one of the parties thereto and corresponding advantage to the other. (Ohio Crane Co. v. Hicks, 110 Ohio St., 168, 143 N.E. 388, approved and followed.)

" * * *

"4. In the absence of fraud or bad faith, a person is not entitled to compensation on the ground of unjust enrichment if he received from the other that which it was agreed between them the other should give in return."

We examine the language of SP-31 in light of this standard.

[434 N.E.2d 1352] SP-31 expressly excludes paragraph three of Standard Specification 104.02 from the terms of the contract between appellant and appellee. Paragraph three provides: "Should the Contractor encounter or the Director discover during the progress of the work subsurface or latent physical conditions at the site differing materially from those indicated in this contract, or unknown physical conditions at the site of an unusual nature, differing materially from those ordinarily encountered and generally recognized as...