S & M Constructors, Inc. v. City of Columbus
Citation | 70 Ohio St.2d 69,24 O.O.3d 145,434 N.E.2d 1349 |
Decision Date | 19 May 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 81-837,81-837 |
Parties | , 24 O.O.3d 145 S & M CONSTRUCTORS, INC., Appellant, v. CITY OF COLUMBUS, Appellee, et al. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Ohio |
Syllabus by the Court
A municipality may disclaim in writing its liability to the contractor of a sewer construction project for additional expenses necessitated by conditions differing from those described in subsurface reports.
In 1975, appellant, S & M Constructors, Inc., successfully bid on the Milo-Grogan sewer construction project of the city of Columbus, appellee. The project required tunneling under Fifth Avenue in Columbus.
Thirty-eight days intervened between the initial advertisement of the project and the bid date. During this time, appellee made subsurface reports available to all prospective bidders upon request. Mason and Ray, Inc. ("Mason"), prepared these reports in 1970 and 1974 at the request of the design engineer for the project, Burgess & Niple, Ltd. ("Burgess"), and with the approval of appellee. The reports analyzed subsurface borings done on either side of the centerline of the project.
During construction, appellant encountered concretions * and inflows of water at various locations. The concretions caused appellant's tunnel-boring machine to fail. Each condition resulted in construction delays and additional costs to appellant.
Appellant filed a complaint against appellee, seeking damages for the additional costs incurred. Appellee impleaded Burgess as a third-party defendant to indemnify appellee against any liability arising out of the reports. The Court of Common Pleas found, inter alia, that: (1) there was no evidence of inaccuracies in the Mason reports, (2) "Mason and Ray specifically searched for evidence of concretions * * * but no evidence of concretionary material was found," and (3) appellee made all factual information on subsurface conditions available to all prospective bidders. The court concluded that appellant had no right to rely on them as "complete, a part of the contract documents, or as warranted to show the actual subsurface conditions."
The trial court based its conclusion on the following provision, SP-31, in appellant's contract with appellee: The trial court found that "S & M Constructors entered the contract with the City of Columbus to construct the Milo-Grogan project with the opinion that SP-31 was illegal and unenforceable." The court concluded that "(p)rovision SP-31 is clear and unambiguous on its face * * *." Accordingly, the Court of Common Pleas granted judgment for appellee. The trial court also granted judgment for Burgess on appellee's third-party complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Andrews & Ryan and Robert E. Ryan, Beachwood, for appellant.
Donald R. Keller, Gregory S. Lashutka and Patrick M. McGrath, Columbus, for appellee.
Appellant's proposition of law raises one issue: whether SP-31, as a matter of law, bars appellant from recovering its additional expenses. Appellant claims a right to recover, because it relied on the Mason reports. We disagree.
We recognize from the outset that this is a case in contract. "A Government contract should be interpreted as are contracts between individuals, with a view to ascertaining the intention of the parties and to give it effect accordingly, if that can be done consistently with the terms of the instrument." Hollerbach v. United States (1914), 233 U.S. 165, 171-172, 34 S.Ct. 553, 555, 58 L.Ed. 898. Our analysis, likewise, hinges on the principles of contract law.
The trial court concluded that SP-31 is clear and unambiguous on its face, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In Ullmann v. May (1947), 147 Ohio St. 468, 72 N.E.2d 63, this court held:
We examine the language of SP-31 in light of this standard.
SP-31 expressly excludes paragraph three of Standard Specification 104.02 from the terms of the contract between appellant and appellee. Paragraph three provides: Appellant cites various cases in which courts considered a "changed conditions" clause to be a significant factor. Foster Const. Co. C. A. v. United States (1970), 193 Ct.Cl. 587, 435 F.2d 873; Ray D. Lowder, Inc. v. State Highway Comm. (1975), 26 N.C.App. 622, 217 S.E.2d 682, certiorari denied, 288 N.C. 393, 218 S.E.2d 467; Metropolitan Sewerage Comm. v. R. W. Const., Inc. (1974), 72 Wisc.2d 365, 241 N.W.2d 371. Obviously, these authorities are inapposite because of the absence of a "changed conditions" clause in the contract for the Milo-Grogan project.
Appellant cites other cases in which errors appeared in portions of the contract-particularly, in the plans, specifications or blueprints. Hollerbach, supra, (233 U.S. 165, 34 S.Ct. 553, 58 L.Ed. 898); United States v. Spearin (1918), 248 U.S. 132, 39 S.Ct. 59, 63 L.Ed. 166; United States v. Smith (1921), 256 U.S. 11, 41 S.Ct. 413, 65 L.Ed. 808; Passaic Valley Sewerage Commrs. v. Holbrook, Cabot & Rollins Corp. (C.A. 3, 1925), 6 F.2d 721, certiorari denied, 269 U.S. 582, 46 S.Ct. 107, 70 L.Ed. 423; Pitt Const. Co. v. Alliance (C.A. 6, 1926), 12 F.2d 28; Levering & Garrigues Co. v. United States (1932), 73 Ct.Cl. 508; Condon-Cunningham, Inc. v. Day (1969), 22 Ohio Misc. 71, 258 N.E.2d 264; E. H. Morrill Co. v. State (1967), 65 Cal.2d 787, 56 Cal.Rptr. 479, 423 P.2d 551; Warner Const. Corp. v. Los Angeles (1970), 2 Cal.3d 285, 85 Cal.Rptr. 444, 466 P.2d 996; Raymond Intl., Inc. v. Baltimore Co. (1980), 45 Md.App. 247, 412 A.2d 1296, certiorari denied, 288 Md. 731, certiorari denied, 449 U.S. 1013, 101 S.Ct. 571, 66 L.Ed.2d 472; Hersey Gravel Co. v. State Highway Dept. (1943), 305 Mich. 333, 9 N.W.2d 567; Metropolitan Sewerage Comm. v. R. W. Const., Inc., supra. Yet, SP-31 states: "Said borings, test excavations, and other subsurface investigations, if any, are incomplete, are not a part of the contract documents * * *." (Emphasis added.) This language in the contract, therefore, clearly distinguishes this case from the authorities which appellant cites.
SP-31 further provides: Appellant argues that the difference between the conditions projected in the reports and the conditions actually found amount to misrepresentation. See Lima v. Farley (C.A. 6, 1925), 7 F.2d 40; Robert E. McKee, Inc. v. Atlanta (N.D.Ga., 1976), 414 F.Supp. 957; E. and F. Const. Co. v. Stamford (1932), 114 Conn. 250, 158 A. 551; Haggart Const. Co. v. State (1967), 149 Mont. 422, 427 F.2d 686; Peter Salvucci & Sons, Inc. v. State (1970), 110 N.H. 136, 268 A.2d 899, ordered reopened as to the issue of interest and costs only in 110 N.H. 502, 272 A.2d 854, affirmed on that issue in 111 N.H. 259, 281 A.2d 164. ...
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