S.M. v. R.B.
| Decision Date | 23 May 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-184,No. 1,1,90-184 |
| Citation | 248 Mont. 322,811 P.2d 1295 |
| Parties | , 68 Ed. Law Rep. 160 S.M., J.A.M., M.M., J.K.M., and J.N.M., all individuals, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. R.B., an individual, and Missoula School District, a political subdivision of the State of Montana, Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
James P. O'Brien and Randolph J. Stevens, O'Brien Law Offices, Missoula, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Larry Jones; Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, Missoula, for defendants and respondents.
The complaint alleges that R.B., an educational aide for the Missoula School District, sexually assaulted four-year-old plaintiff S.M., who was enrolled in the Missoula School District special education program for the developmentally disabled. The defendants include the School District and the School District personnel involved in the special education program. The District Court for the Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, granted defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint of the plaintiffs on the grounds of immunity, and subsequently granted the motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on the same grounds. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The issues are:
1. Have the Montana statutes and case law interpretations resulted in an ambiguity requiring a reversal of the District Court holding that the defendants are immune under Sec. 2-9-111, MCA?
2. Does the purchase of insurance waive immunity?
3. Did the District Court improperly fail to rule on plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983?
4. Is Sec. 2-9-111, MCA, unconstitutional?
The facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint and the Second Amended Complaint are as follows:
Plaintiffs included S.M., her two parents, and the other two minor children in her family. S.M. was a four-year-old suffering developmental disabilities and was enrolled in the School District's special education program when the acts occurred. Plaintiffs allege that the special education program established a special relationship between S.M., her family, and the School District.
R.B. was an educational aide for the School District, who helped in the education and training of developmentally disabled children attending the School District's program.
The School District maintained a policy of liability insurance insuring against liabilities arising from its negligence. Plaintiffs contend the procurement of such insurance constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity to the extent of the insurance coverage.
Plaintiffs alleged that on or about April 16, 1987, R.B. sexually assaulted S.M. and committed sodomy and attempted rape. S.M. received vaginal lacerations of such severity that reconstructive surgery will be required at adulthood. She suffers continual nightmares, and has become fearful of school.
Plaintiffs alleged that the School District and its employees were negligent in the hiring, controlling and supervising of R.B. as an educational aide. Plaintiffs maintain the School District knew or should have known that R.B. had "a predatory predisposition toward young developmentally disabled children by virtue of prior reports" that warned the School District of R.B.'s "antisocial and dangerous behavior".
Plaintiffs alleged seven different causes of action with various theories of liability which will be discussed where appropriate. In substance the defendants assert that plaintiffs' claims are barred by the following defenses:
doctrine of sovereign immunity;
doctrine of respondeat superior;
doctrine of exhaustion of remedies;
failure to seek administrative review;
lack of jurisdiction;
claims for monetary damages barred by Sec. 2-9-108, MCA;
claims for punitive damages barred by Sec. 27-1-221, MCA; and
claims barred by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1981).
Following the failure of R.B. to appear, plaintiffs moved for default judgment which was entered against him on September 8, 1989.
The School District filed a Rule 12, M.R.Civ.P., motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint. On January 25, 1990, the District Court granted the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint on the grounds of immunity. Subsequently, the District Court also granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint on the same grounds. From that order, plaintiffs appeal.
Have the Montana statutes and case law interpretations resulted in an ambiguity requiring a reversal of the District Court holding that the defendants are immune under Sec. 2-9-111, MCA?
Plaintiffs argue there is a statutory ambiguity which is apparent upon a comparison of Sec. 2-9-111, MCA, the immunity section, and Sec. 20-3-331, MCA, which authorizes the trustees of a school district to purchase insurance coverage against liability for death, injury or disability of any person. Essentially plaintiffs argue there is no purpose in authorizing a school district to purchase liability insurance if there is immunity. This contention is cared for in Part II of this opinion in which we conclude that the purchase of liability insurance in this case does constitute a waiver of immunity.
Plaintiffs contend there is ambiguity as a result of the various cases previously decided in Montana. In particular, plaintiffs rely upon B.M. v. State (1982), 200 Mont. 58, 649 P.2d 425. Plaintiffs argue that in B.M. this Court found there was no governmental immunity for negligence committed under a special education program and that such theory should be applied in the present case. In considering the cases, it is necessary that we first set forth the provisions of Sec. 2-9-111, MCA:
Immunity from suit for legislative acts and omissions. (1) As used in this section:
(a) the term "governmental entity" includes the state, counties, municipalities, and school districts;
(b) the term "legislative body" includes the legislature vested with legislative power by Article V of The Constitution of the State of Montana and any local governmental entity given legislative powers by statute, including school boards.
(2) A governmental entity is immune from suit for an act or omission of its legislative body or a member, officer, or agent thereof.
(3) A member, officer, or agent of a legislative body is immune for damages arising from the lawful discharge of an official duty associated with the introduction or consideration of legislation or action by the legislative body.
(4) The immunity provided for in this section does not extend to any tort committed by the use of a motor vehicle, aircraft, or other means of transportation.
Plaintiffs have not discussed the cases subsequent to B.M. which must be considered. In State ex rel. Eccleston v. Montana Third Judicial Dist. Ct. (1989), 240 Mont. 44, 53, 783 P.2d 363, 369, the Court set forth the contentions of the plaintiffs in B.M. and stated:
In B.M., the plaintiffs sued the State for negligence in placing a six-year-old child in a special education program for educable mentally retarded children. The State was granted summary judgment based on immunity under Sec. 2-9-111, MCA. We reversed on the grounds that the legislature had not enacted legislation to limit the liability of school boards in the administration of special education programs. We held that in the absence of a clear statutory declaration granting immunity it is this Court's duty to permit rather than to deny an action for negligence. B.M., 649 P.2d at 427.
However, Eccleston pointed out that Sec. 2-9-111, MCA, was not discussed in B.M. In concluding that under the decisions, the plain language of the statute constitutes a clear statutory declaration granting immunity, the Court said in Eccleston:
The plain meaning of the actual language used in Sec. 2-9-111, MCA, was not discussed in our decision in B.M. v. State. We have decided several other immunity cases since our 1982 decision in B.M. In the process, we have arrived at the current construction of Sec. 2-9-111, MCA, on a case-by-case basis. B.M.'s rule of strict construction still holds true. However it is now clear, particularly after our decisions in Bieber [v. Broadwater County, 232 Mont. 487, 759 P.2d 145 (1988) ] and Peterson, [v. Great Falls School District No. 1, 237 Mont. 376, 773 P.2d 316 (1989) ], that the plain language of the statute constitutes a clear statutory declaration granting immunity to the relators in this case.
Eccleston, 783 P.2d at 369. The Court then analyzed further and pointed out that the statute granted immunity to both the school district and its individual employees, and stated:
In this regard, we are not asserting in this opinion that the statute is unequivocally clear at first glance. Indeed, several interpretations of Sec. 2-9-111, MCA, have been argued in the line of cases that have come before us since the statute's adoption. However, it is this line of cases, particularly our recent decisions in Bieber and Peterson that has given a specific and reasonable interpretation to the statute based on the plain meaning of the actual language used. Moreover, this interpretation of Sec. 2-9-111, MCA, leads us to but one conclusion: the statute grants immunity to both the school district and its individual employees in this case.
Id. at 369. It is clear that Eccleston disposes of the argument made by the plaintiff. This interpretation was approved in Hayworth v. School Dist. No. 19 (1990), 243 Mont. 503, 795 P.2d 470, in which this Court affirmed the Eccleston rationale and its interpretation of B.M., and reached the conclusion that the claims of the plaintiffs in Hayworth were barred by the immunity found in Sec. 2-9-111, MCA.
In a similar manner, in Crowell v. School Dist. No. 7 (Mont.1991), 805 P.2d 522, 48 St.Rep. 81, this Court affirmed the rationale of Eccleston, holding that the school district in Crowell was immune from suit for an act or omission of its agent and that the physical education teacher was...
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S.M. v. R.B.
...this Court held that the School District waived immunity to the extent of any liability insurance it had purchased. See S.M. v. R.B. (1991), 248 Mont. 322, 811 P.2d 1295. We reverse in part and affirm the summary judgment in favor of Missoula School District No. The plaintiffs present the f......