S.P. v. Lakelands Golf & Country Club
| Decision Date | 12 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 359710 |
| Parties | S.P., Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. LAKELANDS GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB and ROBERT BAIDEL, Defendants-Appellees/Cross- Appellants. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Livingston Circuit Court LC No. 21-31247-CD
Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and BOONSTRA and SWARTZLE, JJ.
Plaintiff appeals by right the trial court's order granting in part and denying in part defendant Lakelands Golf and Country Club's (LGCC) motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. LGCC and defendant Robert Baidel (Baidel) both cross-appeal that same order. We affirm in all respects, except to note that to the extent the trial court may have dismissed, rather than stayed, Counts I through IV of plaintiff's complaint, it erred by doing so and those complaints are hereby reinstated and stayed.
Plaintiff worked at LGCC as a bartender from 2017 until May 2021. In September 2021, plaintiff filed suit against LGCC and Baidel alleging that Baidel had sexually assaulted her while she was working as a bartender on April 3, 2021. According to plaintiff, at the time of the alleged assault, Baidel was a "member-owner" of LGCC, while LGCC describes Baidel as a "former member." Plaintiff further alleged that she reported Baidel's assault to LGCC, but that LGCC "did not meaningfully respond and Plaintiff was forced to encounter Defendant Baidel at work." Plaintiff alleged that she was constructively discharged from her employment with LGCC in May 2021 "due to a traumatic work environment."
Plaintiff's complaint set forth six claims. Counts I, II, and III alleged that LGCC had violated the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq., through sex discrimination (Count I), a hostile work environment (Count II), and retaliation (Count III). Count IV was entitled "Constructive Discharge." Counts V and VI were common-law assault and battery claims against Baidel based on the alleged sexual assault. Defendants answered the complaint. LGCC subsequently filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, arguing that plaintiff's claims were subject to arbitration under the mandatory arbitration provision of the LGCC employee handbook (the arbitration agreement), which plaintiff had signed in 2019. Baidel filed a concurrence with that motion and also argued that he was entitled to enforce the arbitration agreement despite not being a signatory to that agreement; additionally, Baidel argued that the question of the arbitrability of plaintiff's claims was, itself, a question for the arbitrator.
The trial court held a hearing on LGCC's motion on December 16, 2021. LGCC argued that all of plaintiff's claims, including the assault and battery claims, were related to the termination of her employment and therefore covered by the arbitration agreement. Baidel agreed with that argument and also argued that Baidel could enforce the arbitration agreement and that the arbitrability of plaintiff's claims should be decided by the arbitrator. Baidel asked the trial court to either stay or dismiss the case pending the arbitrator's decision on arbitrability and the resolution of arbitrable issues. Plaintiff responded that Baidel was not acting within the scope of his employment when he allegedly sexually assaulted plaintiff, and that the assault and battery claims were therefore unrelated to plaintiff's employment relationship with Lakelands and not covered by the arbitration agreement. Plaintiff also argued that her first three claims under the ELCRA were claims for sexual harassment and were not related to the termination of plaintiff's employment; therefore, they were not covered by the arbitration agreement. At best, plaintiff argued, only her claim for constructive discharge was covered by the arbitration agreement.
The trial court held that the issue of the arbitrability of plaintiff's claims was for the court to decide. The court then held that the first four counts of plaintiff's complaint were subject to the arbitration agreement and granted LGCC's motion with respect to those claims. The trial court denied LGCC's motion with regard to the assault and battery claims against Baidel, and stated that it was "just going to stay the case on those, on those matters until the arbitration process is completed." The court subsequently entered an order reflecting its ruling.
This appeal and the cross-appeals followed. After plaintiff's claim of appeal was filed, the trial court entered an order staying any arbitration proceedings and further trial court proceedings pending this Court's decision.
On appeal, plaintiff does not challenge the trial court's ruling regarding the arbitrability of Counts I, III, and IV of her complaint, but argues that the trial court erred by determining that Count II of her complaint (hostile work environment) was subject to the arbitration agreement. Plaintiff also argues that the trial court should have stayed, rather than dismissed, Counts I through IV of her complaint, and that the trial court should not have stayed Counts V and VI, but rather should have allowed those claims to move forward into discovery. We will address each argument in turn.[1]
Plaintiff argues that Count II of her complaint was not subject to the arbitration agreement. We disagree. We review de novo a trial court's determination that a claim is barred by an agreement to arbitrate. Lebenbom v UBS Fin Servs, 326 Mich.App. 200, 208; 926 N.W.2d 865 (2018). We also review de novo questions regarding the interpretation of contractual language. Id.
The goal of contractual interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the parties; to that end, clear and unambiguous contractual language will be interpreted according to its plain sense and meaning. Id. at 209 (citation omitted). Because of the strong policy promoting arbitration, ambiguity regarding whether a specific matter falls within the scope of an arbitration agreement is to be resolved in favor of submitting the matter to arbitration. Id. at 209-210. [T]he party seeking to avoid the arbitration agreement bears the burden of establishing that his or her claims fall outside the ambit of the arbitration agreement. Id. at 211, citing Altobelli v Hartmann, 499 Mich. 284, 295; 884 N.W.2d 537 (2016). In determining whether a claim falls within the scope of an arbitration agreement, "a reviewing court must look beyond the mere procedural labels to determine the exact nature of the claim to avoid artful pleading." Id. at 211 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Our Supreme Court has stated, in addressing an arbitration clause that referred to claims "relating to . . . employment or termination of employment,"[3] that the operative question is whether the claim could be maintained without reference to the employment contract or relationship at issue. Lichon v Morse, 507 Mich. 424, 444; 968 N.W.2d 461 (2021). In other words, if a nonemployee was subject to the same alleged treatment, could he or she have brought the same claims? Id. at 470.
Count II of plaintiff's complaint alleges that plaintiff "was subjected to unwelcome verbal or physical conduct due to her sex," "the unwelcome conduct was based on [p]laintiff's sex," and plaintiff was "sexually harassed." Count II further alleges that "[t]he unwelcome conduct affected a term and condition of Plaintiff's employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with [p]laintiff's work performance and/or created [sic] intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment" in violation of the ELCRA.
The ELCRA provides that an employer shall not "[s]egregate, classify, or otherwise discriminate against a person on the basis of sex with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment." MCL 37.2202(1)(c). Although plaintiff separates her claim for "sex discrimination" (Count I) from her claim for "hostile work environment" (Count II), the ELCRA is clear that proof of a hostile work environment is a method of establishing a claim for sexual harassment, and "discrimination because of sex includes sexual harassment." MCL 37.2103(i) and (i)(iii). Because proving sexual harassment is one method of proving sex discrimination, Count I and Count II of plaintiff's complaint, when read beyond their procedural labels, Lebenbom, 326 Mich.App. at 211, are essentially one claim for sex discrimination; indeed, Count II explicitly incorporates by reference the allegations of Count I.
Establishing proof of hostile work environment sexual harassment requires proof of the following elements:
It is clear from these elements, and our case law, that a claim for hostile work environment...
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