S. S. Kresge Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Com'n

• Decision Date: 13 March 1942
• Docket Number: 37669
• Citation: 162 S.W.2d 838,349 Mo. 590
• Parties: S. S. Kresge Company, a Corporation, Appellant, v. Unemployment Compensation Commission of Missouri and Helen L. Forsyth
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

162 S.W.2d 838

349 Mo. 590

S. S. Kresge Company, a Corporation, Appellant, v. Unemployment Compensation Commission of Missouri and Helen L. Forsyth

No. 37669

Supreme Court of Missouri

March 13, 1942

Rehearing Denied May 5, 1942. Motion to Transfer to Banc Overruled June 17, 1942.

Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court; Hon. Emory H. Wright Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Henry L. Jost and Roger C. Slaughter for appellant.

(1) The findings of fact as stated by the appeals referee and adopted and affirmed by the Commission, and again adopted and affirmed by the court, utterly fail to support the conclusions of law of the appeals referee and the Commission and the adoption thereof by the court, for the reason that the aforesaid findings of fact show on their face that the employee not only left her job voluntarily, but that she further refused employment which the Commission, through its employment service, deemed to be suitable when it directed her to said employment, and therefore her wage credits should be cancelled. Sec. 10, III, Sec. 9431, R. S. 1939, as amended by the Laws of 1939. (2) The Commission was the sole judge as to whether the reemployment was suitable and the commission having directed claimant to accept such employment, it will be presumed that the commission found such employment suitable, there being ample evidence to justify the commission for so holding, since claimant had been continuously employed for several years. (3) Administrative tribunals should base their findings and opinions upon facts and evidence appearing in the record before them. Morgan v. United States, 305 U.S. 648, 59 S.Ct. 222, 83 L.Ed. 1134; Newman v. Rice-Stix D. G. Co., 335 Mo. 572, 73 S.W.2d 268, 94 A. L. R. 751. (4) The judgment of the court, which affirmed the conclusions of law of the appeals referee and the commission, entirely disregards the statutory law of this State as set forth in the Unemployment Compensation Act of 1937, as amended by the Laws of 1939, and the judgment is contrary to all well-settled rules of statutory construction, and completely ignores the clearly defined intent of the Legislature as set forth in the act. 25 R. C. L. 960, note 10; Henry, etc., Co. v. Evans, 97 Mo. 47, 10 S.W. 868, 3 L. R. A. 332; 25 R. C. L. 1012-1013, note 6, 1030, par. 266, note 3. (5) The decision of the court, if permitted to stand, will unlawfully and illegally deprive S. S. Kresge Company, appellant herein, of its property without due process of law, in contravention of Article II, Section 30 of the Constitution of Missouri, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, Section 1, for the reason that the award made by the Commission to Helen Forsyth, and approved and affirmed by the court, will be charged against the reserve account maintained by defendant Unemployment Compensation Commission in the name of S. S. Kresge Company, and under and by the terms of Section 6 of the act, appearing at page 585, Laws of 1937, subsection (b) and Section (c) subsection (3), page 586, the payroll tax to be levied against employers in 1942 and thereafter, is to be determined by the experience record of such employer from the effective date of the act to 1942.

Harry G. Waltner, Jr., and Viva Hunt for respondent.

(1) The evidence conclusively proves that the claimant, Helen L. Forsyth, left her employment voluntarily and without good cause. Laws 1939, sec. 10 I (a), p. 912 (Missouri Unemployment Compensation Law). (2) The findings of fact of the Commission in any contested benefit appeal are conclusive if supported by competent evidence. Laws 1937, sec. 11 (i), p. 594 (Missouri Unemployment Compensation Law); Meyer & Company v. Unemployment Comp. Comm. of Missouri, and Metz, 152 S.W.2d 184. (3) The interpretation which the claims deputy, the appeals referee, the Commission, and the circuit court have placed upon the section of the law in question is the only interpretation which can carry out the purpose and intent of the Legislature in providing a penalty for two separate offenses -- one for voluntary quitting and the other for refusing suitable work. Laws 1939, sec. 10, pp. 912-914 (Missouri Unemployment Compensation Law); Commerce Clearing House, Unemployment Insurance Service: Alabama, p. 5044, par. 1965.04; Alabama, p. 5217, par. 4034 (Alabama Unemployment Compensation Law, sec. 214 E); Connecticut, p. 10,035, par. 1965.02; Connecticut, p. 10,218, par. 4026 (Connecticut Unemployment Compensation Law, sec. 1339e (b)); Indiana, p. 17,045, par. 1965.02; Indiana, p. 17,224, par. 4033 (Indiana Unemployment Compensation Law, sec. 6 (f) (2)); Iowa, p. 18,205, par. 4011 (Iowa Unemployment Compensation Law, sec. 1551.11 (A)); New Hampshire, p. 32,032, par. 1965.01; New Hampshire, p. 32,212, par. 4027 (New Hampshire Unemployment Compensation Law, sec. 4 C); New York, p. 35,073, par. 1965.04; New York, p. 35,213-2, par. 4017 (New York Unemployment Compensation Law, sec. 506); North Carolina, p. 36,052, par. 1965.01; Ohio, p. 38,031, par. 1965.01; Ohio, p. 38,213, par. 4027 (Ohio Unemployment Compensation Law, sec. 6 (d)); Oregon, p. 40,035, par. 1965.02; Oregon, p. 40,210, par. 4025 (Oregon Unemployment Compensation Law, sec. 126-705 (d)); Rhode Island, p. 42,034, par. 1965.01; Rhode Island, p. 42,221-2, par. 4047 (Rhode Island Unemployment Compensation Law, sec. 7 (8)); Texas, p. 46,038, par. 1965.01; Texas, p. 46,205-2, par. 4017 (Texas Unemployment Compensation Law, sec. 5 (c)); Wisconsin, p. 52,044, par. 1965.05; Wisconsin, p. 52,217, par. 4033 (Wisconsin Unemployment Compensation Law, sec. 108.04 (6)); Iowa Public Service Company v. Carl R. Rhode and Iowa Unemployment Comp. Comm., Iowa D. C. Black Hawk County, 1940, Commerce Clearing House, Unemployment Insurance Service, Iowa, p. 18,517, par. 8054. (4) If the construction of the law sought by the employer were given effect, Section 10 I (a) would be inoperative and meaningless which would be in direct conflict with the intention of the Legislature, the spirit and purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Law, and the well established rules of statutory construction. Laws 1937 (Missouri Unemployment Compensation Law): Secs. 3 (a), (d), p. 575; Secs. 8 (b), (d), p. 588; Laws 1939 (Missouri Unemployment Compensation Law): Sec. 10 I (a), p. 912; Sec. 10 III, p. 912; Bernier v. Bernier, 147 U.S. 246; Fosburgh v. Rogers, 114 Mo. 122, 21 S.W. 82; Petri v. Commercial Bank, 142 U.S. 650; State v. Jordon, 266 Mo. 394, 181 S.W. 1016; 25 R. C. L. 1004, 1006-1009, 1012, 1013. (5) The Commission has not found that the claimant has failed without good cause to accept suitable work when offered by the Commission. Laws 1937, sec. 2, p. 574 (Missouri Unemployment Compensation Law); Laws 1939 (Missouri Unemployment Compensation Law): Secs. 10 I, 10 III, pp. 912, 913. (6) The S. S. Kresge Company cannot be heard to state, at the expense of depriving the claimant of benefits to which she is rightfully entitled, that there is a remote possibility that at some future date its tax rate will be increased or will not be deceased. Laws 1937, sec. 6, p. 585 (Missouri Unemployment Compensation Law).

Bohling, C. Westhues and Barrett, CC., concur.

OPINION

BOHLING

Helen L. Forsyth, prior to her marriage, had been an employee of the S. S. Kresge Company, a corporation, at Kansas City, Missouri, having been employed November 1, 1934, and having voluntarily quit work January 15, 1939. As Mrs. Forsyth, she filed for benefits under the Missouri Unemployment Compensation Law (Ch. 52, Art. 2, Sec. 9432, R. S. 1939) on August 23, 1939. Her employer, through the Missouri State Employment Service (Sec. 9435, of said law) offered Mrs. Forsyth employment, she being able and available for work and having registered therefor, et cetera (Sec. 9430, with respect to eligibility for benefits). She made no effort to accept said offer and the employer claimed her wage credits should be cancelled under Subsec. III of Sec. 9431, R. S. 1939. The Employment Compensation Commission (hereinafter designated Commission) found that Mrs. Forsyth "left work voluntarily without good cause" and disqualified her for two weeks' benefits under Subsec. I, Subdiv. (a) of Sec. 9431; but, being of opinion that Mrs. Forsyth's failure to accept work was "with good cause," allowed benefits of $ 6.44 per week, subject to a maximum of $ 64.96 in benefits, on the theory principally that "the work offered claimant must be new work in order for it to be suitable work" to effect a cancellation of wage credits under Subsec. III, and that to hold otherwise would permit an employer, by offering reemployment in the same work, to arbitrarily destroy Subsec. I (a), and the employee's benefit rights. The employer perfects this appeal from a judgment affirming the action of the Commission, contending, among other things, that the action of the Commission deprives it of its property without due process of law.

The applicable provisions of Sec. 9431 read:

"I. An individual shall be disqualified for benefits under the following conditions and in each case the weeks of such disqualification shall be deducted from the benefit period and his wage credits charged correspondingly as if benefits had been paid, whether or not such individual obtains other employment during such weeks of disqualification.

"(a) For the week in which he has left work voluntarily without good cause, if so found by the Commission, and for not more than the four weeks which immediately follow such week, as determined by the Commission according to the circumstances in each case. . . .

"III. If the commission finds that an individual has failed without good cause either to apply for available suitable work when so directed by the commission or to accept suitable work when ofiered him by...