S. Strauss v. United Food and Commercial Workers

Decision Date13 August 2007
Docket NumberNo. 07-CV-2432 (JFB)(ETB).,07-CV-2432 (JFB)(ETB).
Citation503 F.Supp.2d 567
PartiesS. STRAUSS, INC., Plaintiff, v. UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 342, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

Richard M. Howard, Esq., Meltzer Lippe Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP, Mineola, NY, for Plaintiff.

Ira D. Wincott, Esq., Mineola, NY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BIANCO, District Judge.

Plaintiff S. Strauss, Inc. ("Strauss") seeks to stay an arbitration initiated by defendant United Food and Commercial Workers' Union, Local 342 (the "Union"). For the reasons that follow, the Court denies plaintiffs motion to stay arbitration.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed, unless otherwise noted.

A. The Instant Action

Strauss is a purveyor of meats and foodrelated products. (Pl.'s Pet. ¶ 1.) The Union purports to represent certain employees of Strauss pursuant to several collective bargaining agreements entered into by the parties. (Id. Ex. A.) Strauss entered into a collective bargaining agreement (the "CBA") with the Union on October 16, 2006, that covered the period from November 1, 2004 to October 31, 2008. (Pl.'s Pet. Ex. A.) Strauss does not dispute that it entered into the CBA or that it has entered into various other CBAs with the Union over the course of the last forty years.1 (Id. 17-8.) Strauss asserts that it entered into the CBAs "so that its owners and possibly one or two critical employees ... could participate in the [Union's] affiliated employee welfare plan." (Id. ¶ 5.) However, the Union asserts that the CBAs were intended to govern the employment relationships of a large number of Strauss employees. (Dft.'s Aff. in Opposition ¶ 14.)

On May 30, 2007, the Union served on Strauss a demand to arbitrate a dispute regarding Strauss' alleged violation of the CBA; specifically, the Union asserted that Strauss had "interfered with the Union's ability to represent its members. and engaged in direct dealing by unilaterally attempting to change the working condition[s] of the employees and by discouraging and/or directing the employees not to sign Union authorization cards ... and to forego Union wages and working conditions which were collectively bargained, in violation of the [CBA]." (Id. Ex. A.) According to the Union, it issued that demand after receiving complaints from certain Strauss employees, and after attempting to resolve the issues with Strauss management. (Dft.'s Aff. ¶ 5.) Subsequently, on May 31, 2007, the Union filed charges against Strauss regarding these issues with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"). (Dft.'s ¶ 5.) Also on May 31, 2007, Strauss filed a Recognition Method Petition ("RM Petition") with the NLRB that, according to Strauss, sought to have the NLRB "determine the effect of the [CBA] and representational rights of the employees." (Pl.'s Mem. at 2.)

Strauss commenced this action on June 5, 2007, in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Nassau County, by filing an Order to Show Cause and a petition to stay arbitration, wherein Strauss sought an "emergency" stay of the arbitration initiated by the Union.2 Defendant removed the case to this Court on June 15, 2007. Strauss' petition seeks a stay of the arbitration pending the resolution of Strauss' RM Petition before the NLRB. Plaintiff argues that the arbitration should be stayed on the ground that the parties' CBA is a "sham," and, thus, the arbitration clause contained therein should not be enforced. (Pl.'s Pet. ¶ 8.) In support of that position, Strauss asserts that the Union "has ignored any and all of its purported obligations under the series of [CBAs] executed by the parties," (id. ¶ 8), has never filed a grievance against Strauss, and has never sought to arbitrate a dispute with Strauss pursuant to the CBA's arbitration clause (Dft.'s Aff. ¶ 19). As such, according to Strauss, "it was always understood [by the parties] that Strauss would not actually be bound by the CBA," notwithstanding the fact that the parties have entered into CBAs for at least the past twenty-one years. (Id. ¶ 14.)

B. The Action Filed in the Southern District of New York

In June 2007, certain funds affiliated with the Union (the "Funds") commenced an action against Strauss in the Southern District of New York (the "SDNY Action").3 (Dft.'s Aff. Ex. A.) In an amended complaint dated June 14, 2007, the Funds sought an immediate audit of Strauss' books and records and an order compelling Strauss to proceed to arbitration regarding the alleged nonpayment by Strauss of money owed to the Funds under the same CBA at issue in this action.4 (Id. ¶¶ 21-34.)

Subsequently, Strauss moved for a stay of an arbitration proceeding initiated by the Funds based on the same grounds asserted in this action — namely, that the CBA was a "sham," and that the parties to the CBA, including the Union and its Funds, "never intended to enter into a true collective bargaining relationship." (Dft.'s Aff. Ex. B.) In so moving, Strauss specifically argued that "[m]uch" of the substance of its filings in the SDNY Action was also submitted, without alteration, to this Court in relation to the instant action. (Id.) According to Strauss, there are "identical issues pending before the two [c]ourts" relating, inter alia, to the validity of the CBA. (Id.)

On July 3, 2007, the Honorable Alvin K. Hellerstein issued an order in the SDNY Action directing the parties to proceed to arbitration "[for the reasons stated on the record" at oral argument. (Dft.'s Aff. Ex. E.) During the oral argument, Strauss' counsel asserted that the issue before the court was "whether there was a true collective bargaining relationship ever established, [and] whether, if there was, it has been abandoned." (Dft.'s Aff. Ex. F.) Judge Hellerstein then asked Strauss' counsel if Strauss and the Union had, in fact, "signed a collective bargaining agreement and a supplement, which makes it effective for the period in question?" (Id.) Strauss' counsel responded: "No question about it, they [have] signed collective bargaining agreements for 40 years plus." (Id.) Nevertheless, Strauss' counsel proceeded to argue that, because the CBA was a "sham," "there is no effectiveness to that collective bargaining agreement." (Id.)

Ultimately, however, Judge Hellerstein rejected Strauss' argument, and concluded that, as to the "narrow issue" before him — namely, "whether under the grievance proceedings of a binding agreement, duly entered into according to its terms, arbitration should be had" — that the parties should proceed to arbitration. (Id. (emphasis added)) Judge Hellerstein then reiterated his ruling: "[t]he motion to stay the arbitration is denied on the ground that there is an, apparently, validly executed collective bargaining agreement in effect between the relevant unions and the relevant employers." (Id.)

II. DISCUSSION
A. The Motion to Stay Arbitration

Federal law favors arbitration as a form of dispute resolution in the area of labor relations. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). Therefore, any doubt that a dispute is arbitrable "must be resolved in favor of arbitrability so long as the arbitration clause in question is susceptible to an interpretation that it covers the dispute." Seabury Cond. Corp. v. Dist. Council of N.Y. and Vicinity of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of Amer., 461 F.Supp.2d 193, 196 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (citing AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Comm'ns Workers of Amer., 475 U.S. 643, 650, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986)); see also N.Y.'s Health and Human Service Union v. NYU Hasps. Ctr., 343 F.3d 117, 119 (2d Cir.2003) ("Where the collective bargaining agreement contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability.") (internal citation omitted).

The arbitration clause at issue in this case provides that:

Grievances arising between the Employer and the employees or between the Union and the Employer shall be reported to the Union and the Employer respectively. In the event no adjustment can be reached within two (2) days after the grievance is submitted by one party to the other, either party may then apply ... for appointment of an arbitrator.

(Pl.'s Ex. A.) "[W]here, as here, the `arbitration clause is broad, any claim that falls within its scope will be considered arbitrable absent compelling proof to the contrary." Intl Union of Elevator Constructors, AFL-CIO v. Nat'l Elevator Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir.1985) (citing Nolde Brothers, Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Union, 430 U.S. 243, 255, 97 S.Ct. 1067, 51 L.Ed.2d 300 (1977) and Ottley v. Sheepshead Nursing Home, 688 F.2d 883, 886 (2d Cir.1982)); see also Assoc. Brick Mason Contractors of Greater N. Y., Inc. v. Harrington, 820 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir.1987) ("We will order arbitration if the arbitration clause is broad and if the party seeking arbitration has made a claim that on its face is governed by the contract, even if the claim appears to be frivolous."). "`Proof to the contrary' requires language that is `clear and unambiguous' or `unmistakably clear." Id. (citing Gangemi and Gen. Electric Co., 532 F.2d 861, 866 (2d Cir.1976)).

The claims at issue here clearly fall within the broad scope of the arbitration clause — that is, the Union's allegations that Strauss has "interfered with the Union's ability to represent its members and engaged in direct dealing by unilaterally attempting to change the working conditiori[s] of the employees and by discouraging and/or directing the employees not to sign Union authorization cards ... and to forego Union wages and working conditions which were collectively bargained, in violation of the [CBA]," (id. Ex. A), are unquestionably "[g]rievances arising between the Employer and ... the Union" within the meaning of the arbitration clause (Pl.'s Ex. A). Indeed, in its submissions to this...

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  • P.R. Tel. Co. v. Worldnet Telecomm., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • September 15, 2014
    ...where primary jurisdiction argument had been raised against the arbitrator's jurisdiction); S. Strauss, Inc. v. United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. 342, 503 F.Supp.2d 567, 576 (E.D.N.Y.2007) (referring case to arbitration and finding that questions of arbitrability are “not within the ‘s......
  • P.R. Tel. Co. v. Worldnet Telecomm., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • September 15, 2014
    ...where primary jurisdiction argument had been raised against the arbitrator's jurisdiction); S. Strauss, Inc. v. United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. 342, 503 F.Supp.2d 567, 576 (E.D.N.Y.2007) (referring case to arbitration and finding that questions of arbitrability are “not within the ‘s......
  • P.R. Tel. Co. v. Worldnet Telecomm., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • September 15, 2014
    ...where primary jurisdiction argument had been raised against the arbitrator's jurisdiction); S. Strauss, Inc. v. United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. 342, 503 F. Supp. 2d 567, 576 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (referring case to arbitration and finding that questions of arbitrability are "not within the......

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