S.T. v. Napolitano
| Decision Date | 05 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. H-12-285 |
| Parties | S. T., by and through Ashok and Bakula Trivedi, Plaintiff, v. SECRETARY JANET NAPOLITANO, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, BRIAN CLARKE, Acting Regional Director of Houston Passport Agency, MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, and HILLARY R. CLINTON, Secretary of the United States Department of State, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
The plaintiff, S.T., challenges the denials of his N-600 Application for Certificate of Citizenship ("N-600"), passport application, and social security card application by the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), the Secretary of DHS, the Acting Regional Director of the Houston Passport Agency, the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, and the Secretary of State. (Docket Entry No. 25). The applications were denied due to insufficient evidence establishing a biological relationship between S.T. and United States citizens Ashok and Bakula Trivedi (S.T.'s alleged biological parents). This evidence of a biological relationship is necessary for S.T. to derive American citizenship from the Trivedis. The defendants required the Trivedis to submit DNA test results for S.T. to establish the biological relationship. The Trivedis claim that they did not perform the DNA testing on S.T. because doing so would violate their religious beliefs.
In the third amended complaint, S.T. asserted claims against all the defendants under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, and the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. S.T. also asserted claims against DHS, the Secretary of DHS, the Passport Agency Director, and the Secretary of State under the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. In addition, S.T asserted a claim under 8 U.S.C. § 15031 against the Social Security Commissioner.
The defendants filed a motion for partial dismissal on August 9, 2012. (Docket Entry No. 31). They concede that S.T. states claims under RFRA and § 1503, and filed an answer to those claims.2 (Id. at 1; Docket Entry No. 30). The defendants have moved to dismiss the remaining claims.
Based on the complaint, the motion to dismiss and responses, and the relevant law, this court grants in part and denies in part the motion for partial dismissal. The motion is granted as to S.T.'s claims under the APA, Mandamus Act, First Amendment, and EAJA. The APA, Mandamus Act, and First Amendment claims are dismissed with prejudice. The EAJA claim is dismissed without prejudice to reassertion at the appropriate stage in the case. The motion to dismiss S.T.'s request for declaratory relief is denied.
The reasons for these rulings are set out below.
S.T. is a citizen of India. He is currently eleven years old. Bakula and Ashok Trivedi are both natives of India. Ashok became a United States citizen in 1997; Bakula became a citizen in 1995. (Docket Entry No. 25, ¶ 2).
Bakula and Ashok Trivedi practice the Swaminarayan religion. They believe they are required to follow their swami's religious instruction fully and completely. About a year before S.T.'s birth in 2001, their swami told them they would soon have a child who was a gift from a divine source. The swami instructed them that the child must never be subjected to medical testing. They assert that they have complied with this instruction. (Id., ¶¶ 3-4).
In September 2001, S.T.'s parents arrived with S.T. at the U.S. Consulate in Mumbai, India. They asserted that they were S.T.'s biological parents and applied on his behalf for a Consular Report of a Birth Abroad of a Citizen of the United States of America ("CRBA"), a passport, and a social security card. The applications were denied. The denial documents stated that the Trivedis failed to provide evidence of a blood relationship to S.T. but that the Trivedis could submit DNA test results for S.T. to provide the evidence. A consular official with whom the Trivedis metindicated that the applications would not be granted without the DNA test results. (Id., ¶¶ 5-6). S.T.'s application for a social security card was denied in February 2010. (Id., ¶ 14).
In February 2010, S.T. entered the United States under a humanitarian-parole grant. In April 2010, S.T. again filed a passport application and an N-600. The State Department and the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") again asked for DNA testing to establish the biological relationship between S.T. and the Trivedis. No DNA testing was performed. The passport application was denied in December 2010 and the N-600 was denied in September 2011. (Id., ¶¶ 7-12).
On June 28, 2011, S.T. filed a new passport application. (Id., ¶ 11). In October, 2011, S.T. filed an appeal from the denial of his N-600 with the USCIS Administrative Appeals Office. (Id., ¶ 13). During this appeal process, S.T. claimed a religious objection to DNA testing, stating, "Even if [S.T.'s] birth certificate is not accepted as evidence by USCIS for a claimed biological relationship, [S.T.'s] religious beliefs forbid the use of scientific testing." (Docket Entry No. 11, Ex. 11, N-600 Appeal, pt. 3).
On January 30, 2012, S.T. filed the present suit. He argued primarily that the defendants' insistence on DNA testing as a condition for approving the applications violated his constitutional right to the free exercise of religion and was an invalid basis for denying him citizenship. (Docket Entry No. 25, ¶¶ 17, 22). He also sought a judicial declaration of citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1503. (Id., ¶ 30).
On May 22, 2012, S.T.'s appeal of his N-600 was denied as untimely. The AAO treated the appeal as a motion to reopen and reconsider and returned it to the USCIS to adjudicate. On June 12,2012, the motion was denied. On June 15, 2012, S.T.'s passport application was denied. (Docket Entry No. 31, at 3).
On August 9, 2012, the defendants filed this motion for partial dismissal. (Docket Entry No. 31). They argue that S.T.'s Declaratory Judgment Act claim must be dismissed because the Act does not provide an independent cause of action or basis for jurisdiction. They argue that the APA and Mandamus Act claims must be dismissed because adequate alternative judicial remedies exist. They argue that S.T.'s First Amendment claim must be dismissed because RFRA offers greater protection and because S.T. challenges a neutral act of general applicability. Finally, they argue that this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim for attorneys' fees because S.T. is not a prevailing party with a final judgment. (Id. at 2).
Each ground for dismissal is analyzed below.
An action is properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the action. Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum. Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). In reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction the court may consider (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981).
A court may also dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). "To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint 'does not need detailed factual allegations,' but must provide the plaintiff's grounds for entitlement to relief — including factual allegations that when assumed to be true 'raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). That is, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
The Declaratory Judgment Act does not create an independent basis for district-court jurisdiction. Rather, it provides a remedy when jurisdiction is otherwise established. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-72 (1950). S.T. seeks a declaratory judgment granting his N-600, passport, and social security card applications, and a declaratory judgment that he is a United States citizen. (Docket Entry No. 25, ¶¶ 20, 25, 30-31). Section 1503(a) specifically authorizes a plaintiff to sue an agency that has denied some privilege of citizenship for a declaratory judgment that the plaintiff is a United States citizen. The defendants concede that S.T. has stated a cognizable claim under 8 U.S.C. § 1503 as well as under RFRA.3 Those claims provide a basis for this court's subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Patel v. Rice, 403 F. Supp. 2d 560, 562 (N.D. Tex. 2005) ( ); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) ().
The defendants clarified in their reply brief that they ...
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