S. Y. v. Best W. Int'l, Inc.
| Decision Date | 07 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 2:20-cv-616-JES-MRM |
| Court | United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Court of Middle District of Florida |
| Parties | S. Y., Plaintiff, v. BEST WESTERN INTERNATIONAL, INC., R&M REAL ESTATE CO INC DBA BEST WESTERN NAPLES PLAZA HOTEL, and ROBERT VOCISANO, Defendants. |
This matter comes before the Court on review of defendant Best Western International, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Counts I - IV of Plaintiff's Complaint and Memorandum in Support (Doc. #18) filed on October 2, 2020, and defendants R&M Real Estate Company, Inc. and Robert Vocisano Co-Tr's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice Plaintiff's Complaint and Memorandum in Support (Doc. #20) filed on October 13, 2020. Plaintiff filed an Opposition (Doc. #37; Doc. #38) to each motion on November 6, 2020, to which the defendants filed a Reply (Doc. #48; Doc. #49) on November 19th and November 26, 2020. For the reasons set forth below, the motions are denied.
The origins of this case began on October 30, 2019, when plaintiff and another alleged victim of sex trafficking filed a case in the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in and for Collier County, Florida. See S.Y. et al v. Naples Hotel Co. et al, Case No. 2:20-cv-118 (Doc. #1, p. 3). On December 31, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint which asserted ten claims against over forty defendants. Id. at (Doc. #1, pp. 2-4). The case was removed to federal court in February 2020. Id. at (Doc. #1). On April 15, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint. Id. at (Doc. #85). On August 5, 2020, the undersigned denied various motions to dismiss, but determined severance of the parties was appropriate. S.Y. v. Naples Hotel Co., 476 F. Supp. 3d 1251, 1258-59 (M.D. Fla. 2020). Following the Court's severance order, plaintiff and the other alleged victim filed nearly thirty new actions against various defendants, including this case.
The Complaint (Doc. #1) in this case was filed on August 19, 2020, and alleges that plaintiff S.Y., a resident of Collier County, Florida, was a victim of continuous sex trafficking at a certain Best Western Naples Plaza Hotel (the Best Western Hotel) in Naples, Florida between 2013 and February 2016. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 13, 22-24.) The Complaint alleges that during this time period the Best Western Hotel was owned and operated by defendants R&M RealEstate Company, Inc. (R&M) and Robert Vocisano Co-Tr (Vocisano) as a franchisee of defendant Best Western International, Inc. (Best Western). (Id. ¶¶ 25-28, 51.)
The Complaint alleges the following six claims: (1) violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. § 1595; (2) violation of the Florida RICO statute, § 772.104, Florida Statutes; (3) premise liability; (4) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; (5) negligent rescue; and (6) aiding and abetting, harboring, confining, coercion, and criminal enterprise. (Id. pp. 35-53.) Counts One through Four are asserted against each defendant, while Counts Five and Six are asserted against R&M and Vocisano. (Id.)
The motions raise numerous arguments as to why the Complaint as whole, and each individual claim, should be dismissed. The Court will address each of these arguments.
The Complaint identifies the defendants collectively as the "Best Western Naples Plaza Hotel Defendants." (Doc. #1, p. 1 introductory paragraph.) Both motions argue that because the Complaint groups the defendants together, it should be dismissed as a shotgun pleading. (Doc. #18, p. 11; Doc. #20, p. 6.)
One way in which a complaint may constitute an impermissible shotgun pleading is if it "assert[s] multiple claims againstmultiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against." Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1324-25 (11th Cir. 2021). Such a pleading fails "to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests," Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323, and violates the requirement that a plaintiff provide "a short and plain statement of the claim," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
The Complaint does indeed repeatedly refer to the defendants collectively as the "Best Western Naples Plaza Hotel Defendants." The failure to specify a particular defendant is not fatal, however, when "[t]he complaint can be fairly read to aver that all defendants are responsible for the alleged conduct." Kyle K. v. Chapman, 208 F.3d 940, 944 (11th Cir. 2000). The Complaint typically (but not always) alleges that "each and every" such defendant was involved in the activity described in the particular paragraph of the Complaint. A fair reading of the Complaint is that each of these defendants was involved in the identified conduct attributed to the "Best Western Naples Plaza Hotel Defendants." While defendants may disagree that such allegations are accurate, that dispute is for another day. The group allegations do not fail to state a claim, Auto. Alignment & BodyServ., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 953 F.3d 707, 732-33 (11th Cir. 2020), and the Complaint does not constitute a shotgun pleading.1
The motions argue certain claims should be dismissed due to plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showingthat the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This obligation "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). To survive dismissal, the factual allegations must be "plausible" and "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555; see also Edwards v. Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010). This requires "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), but "[l]egal conclusions without adequate factual support are entitled to no assumption of truth," Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Factual allegations that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability fall short of being facially plausible. Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Thus, the Court engages in a two-step approach: "When there are well-pleaded factualallegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
(1) Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
Both motions challenge the one federal claim, the alleged violation of the TVPRA set forth in Count One. The TVPRA provides a civil remedy to victims of certain types of human trafficking. The civil remedy portion of the Act provides:
(a) An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an appropriate district court of the United States and may recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees.
18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). The phrase "a violation of this chapter" refers to Chapter 77 of Title 18 of the United States Code. The only violation of Chapter 77 relevant to this case is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a), which provides in relevant part:
18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). To state a section 1595(a) claim in this case, plaintiff must plausibly allege that she was a victim of a criminal offense under section 1591(a), and then must plausibly allege that defendant (1)"knowingly benefit[ted] financially or by receiving anything of value," (2) from participation in a venture, (3) which defendant "knew or should have known has engaged in" sex trafficking under section 1591(a). S.Y., 476 F. Supp. 3d at 1255-56 (citing A.B. v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 3d 171, 181 (E.D. Pa. 2020)).
The motions argue that the Complaint lacks well-pled allegations that defendants participated in a "venture," as required by section 1595(a). (Doc. #18, pp. 14-15; Doc. #20, pp. 7-10.) Drawing on the definition of "venture" used in the criminal portion of the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(6)2, R&M and Vocisano assert that a "venture" requires two or more individuals "associated in fact."...
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