E. S. v. State

• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: DEEN
• Citation: E. S. v. State, 215 S.E.2d 732, 134 Ga.App. 724 (Ga. App. 1975)
• Decision Date: 08 May 1975
• Docket Number: No. 3,No. 50586,50586,3
• Parties: E.S. v. STATE of Georgia

Page 732

215 S.E.2d 732

134 Ga.App. 724

E.S. v. STATE of Georgia.

No. 50586.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 3.

May 8, 1975.

Spence, Garrett & Spence, D. William Garrett, Jr., Alpharetta, for appellant.

Anne Workman, Sol., Paul Gemmette, Asst. Sol., Decatur, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

DEEN, Presiding Judge.

On January 21, 1974, this eleven-year old juvenile was the subject of a complaint filed with the Juvenile Court of DeKalb County charging him with delinquency in the commission of certain acts of criminal trespass and abusive language. On May 22 a 'replaced and amended' complaint was also filed, the difference being only in the amount of detail furnished on the sheet. E.S. was not detained. Adjudicatory and dispositional hearings were held on July 23, he was adjudge delinquent, and committed to six months probation. A motion for new trial was filed and denied, after which a motion to vacate the judgment for lack of jurisdiction was also denied and the defendant appeals. Held:

1. Code Ann. § 24A-1701(a) (Ga.L.1974, pp. 1126, 1129) requires: 'In the event said child is not in detention then the court shall fix a time for hearing thereon which shall not be later than 60 days from the date of the filing of said petition.' This was a change in the law, effective March 28, 1974, setting for the first time a maximum number of days within which the case must be called for hearing. The motion to vacate the judgment of delinquency contends that the court was without jursdiction for the reason that, whether the first or second 'amended' complaint be considered, more than 60 days had passed and the juvenile should have been automatically discharged.

By way of comparison, our Code § 27-1901 requires from the criminal adult defendant a demand for trial, and specifies when the demand is not met 'he shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted.' That Code section is indeed jurisdictional. Bishop v. State, 11 Ga.App. 296, 75 S.E. 165. The statutes of other states setting maximum trial delays which we have examined all appear to have attached a sanction requiring the release of the accused when not observed. Cf. People v. Markword, 108 Ill.App.2d 468, 247 N.E.2d 914. In considering the righ to speedy trial in a juvenile case, it was held in State of New Mexico v. Henry, 78 N.M. 573, 434 P.2d 692 that 'In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, clearly indicates the same constitutional standards apply to juveniles as to adults.' The importance of observing these constitutional and statutory guarantees in juvenile cases is clearly pointed out in 'A Balancing Approach to the Grant of Procedural Rights in Juvenile Court.' Northwestern Univ.L.Rev., Vol. 64, pp. 87, 110 et seq. 'If the disposition is to be meaningful to the offender, he must be able to connect it with the acts which gave rise to it. With a long period of time between the offense and disposition, the child may not recognize the vital causal connection between his act and his responsibility as a member of society for that act.'

Nevertheless, where the statute does not require dismissal as a matter of law regardless of...