A.S v. State Of Ind.
Decision Date | 30 June 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 10A01-0908-JV-423.,10A01-0908-JV-423. |
Citation | 929 N.E.2d 881 |
Parties | A.S., Appellant-Respondent,v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Bart M. Betteau, Betteau Law Office, LLC, New Albany, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Zachary J. Stock, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
A.S. was taken into custody after she hit a fellow high school student. At her detention hearing, the court deprived A.S. of her rights to be represented by counsel, to present evidence, and to confront witnesses against her. Counsel thereafter was appointed for A.S., and a hearing on whether she was a delinquent occurred three months later.1 The court found her to be a delinquent and extended the probation she was serving for a prior adjudication.
A.S. appeals her detention because she was denied certain rights at her initial detention hearing, and argues she should not subsequently have been adjudicated a delinquent because her hearing did not take place within sixty days and she was not tried by a jury. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
On October 6, 2008, A.S. was detained on suspicion of battery. She was in ninth grade and fourteen years old. At a detention hearing the next day, no witnesses were sworn and no evidence was heard. The court found probable cause A.S. was a delinquent and in need of further detention, but gave no reason for her continued detention. Before the hearing, A.S. and her mother were presented with, and they signed, a document the trial court appears to have treated as a waiver of a number of rights including A.S.'s right to counsel.
On October 10, 2008, the State filed a delinquency petition, and A.S. asked the court to set a hearing to review its detention order.3 Counsel appeared for A.S. that day. A previously scheduled prehearing conference was held on October 14. Afterward the court noted in the docket that a “Pre-hearing Conference/Agreement of Admission Notice,” (App. at 2), had been filed, and the court set an Admission Hearing for October 29.
The record does not reflect notice of the October 29 hearing was provided to A.S. or her counsel, and they did not appear. Later counsel moved to continue the hearing to November 5. The court reset the admission hearing as requested, but on November 3, A.S. moved to vacate the admission hearing and set a factfinding hearing. The court set a factfinding hearing for November 19.
After a number of continuances, the factfinding hearing was held January 7, 2009. On February 20, the court found A.S. a delinquent, and on May 19, it extended for six months the probation she was already serving for a prior adjudication.
The State violated A.S.'s right to counsel at her detention hearing. In a companion case arising out of proceedings involving A.S. in the same court and before the same magistrate as in the case before us, we recently found A.S.'s alleged waiver of counsel was invalid:
A.S. v. State, 923 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). Both A.S. and Mother signed that Advisement, which is the same form A.S. and Mother signed in the case before us. In both cases, the trial court confirmed at the initial hearing that A.S. and Mother had signed the Advisement, but did not ask A.S. if she wanted legal representation, inquire as to whether she desired appointed counsel, or advise her as to the burdens of proceeding pro se. In both cases, the trial court stated in the initial hearing entry in the Chronological Case Summary (CCS): “Witnesses sworn, testimony heard,” (App. at 2), 923 N.E.2d at 488, but in fact no witnesses were sworn and no testimony was heard at either hearing.
In A.S., an out-of-court pre-hearing conference was conducted with the deputy prosecutor, A.S., and Mother. At some point, all three signed an “Agreement of Admission” that called for A.S. to admit all of the allegations, be placed on probation, and receive a suspended sentence. At a subsequent hearing, during which the trial court did not confirm A.S. had knowingly waived her right to counsel, A.S. admitted all the allegations. The trial court then found A.S. to be delinquent and ordered her to comply with the terms of the Agreement. 923 N.E.2d at 488.
A.S. moved for relief from judgment, alleging her right to counsel and due process had been violated because she was adjudicated a delinquent without counsel and without waiving her right to counsel. Her motion was denied, and on appeal we reversed because:
Id. at 490-91 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
In that situation virtually identical to the case before us, we determined A.S. and Mother did not knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to counsel guaranteed by the Indiana and United States Constitutions. Id. at 491. The trial court made no inquiry into the ostensible decision of A.S. and Mother to proceed pro se. The advisement they signed explained A.S.'s rights, including the right to be represented by an attorney, but nowhere in the record did they state affirmatively that they intended and wished to proceed without representation. There was no evidence in the record that A.S. and Mother understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. A.S. was not advised that an attorney could investigate and present her self-defense claim. There was no evidence in the record establishing the background and experience of either A.S. or Mother, and the conversation Mother had with the trial court at the initial hearing suggested she was confused about the procedures to be followed. Id.
On that record, we could not find Id. at 492-93. We accordingly found A.S.'s adjudications were void and she was entitled to relief from judgment.
As A.S. was subjected to exactly the same procedures and constitutional violation in the case before us, we conclude A.S.'s purported waiver of her right to counsel did not comport with constitutional requirements. See Id.
The State does not dispute that A.S. was subjected to the constitutional violation she alleges, but urges us not to address the merits of the violation because: 1) she waived the claim by not raising it below; and 2) the claim is moot because she is no longer being detained.
A.S.'s claim is not waived, as the constitutional violation was fundamental error.4 Generally, a claim of error must be raised during trial in order...
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