S.W. ex rel. Marquis-Abrams v. City of N.Y.

Decision Date17 January 2014
Docket NumberNo. 09–CV–01777 ENV MDG.,09–CV–01777 ENV MDG.
Citation46 F.Supp.3d 176
PartiesS.W., by and through his guardian, Renee MARQUIS–ABRAMS; T.G. and J.L., by and through their next friend, Mildred Del Grosso; S.B. and R.E. by and through their guardian, Patricia Baldwin; L.J. and J.G., by and through their guardian, Kevin Hendrickson; J.B., C.B., and T.L., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, a municipal corporation; Administration for Children's Services, f/k/a Child Welfare Administration; St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc., f/k/a Catholic Child Care Society of the Diocese of Brooklyn, Inc., a New York corporation; Heartshare Human Services, f/k/a Catholic Guardian Society of the Diocese of Brooklyn, Inc., a New York corporation; SCO Family of Services, f/k/a St. Christopher–Ottilie, a New York corporation, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

Ami Romanelli, Theodore Babbitt, Stephan A. Le Clainche, Babbitt, Johnson, Osborne & Le Clainche, PA, West Palm Beach, FL, Howard M. Talenfeld, Colodny, Fass, Talenfeld, Karlinsky & Abate, P.A., John Walsh, Fort Lauderdale, FL, William A. Kapell, Children's Rights, Marcia Lowry, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Bruce Michael Strikowsky, Carl Judah Schaerf, Matthew James Kelly, Allison Naomi Fihma, Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP, New York, NY, Jeremy S. Rosof, Timothy Robert Capowski, William G. Spratt, Adam S. Covitt, Ralph Vincent Morales, Robert Ortiz, Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin & Spratt, LLP, Lake Success, NY, Judd Cohen, Robert Boccio, Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin & Spratt, LLP, New Hyde Park, NY, Marc J. Citrin, Steven J. Ahmuty, Jr., Craig Garrett Bienstock, John D. Paterniti, Juan C. Gonzalez, Steven I. Rubin, Shaub Ahmuty Citrin & Spratt LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

VITALIANO, District Judge.

Between 1986 and 1996, plaintiffs, ten individuals who were at the time special needs children, were placed in foster care with, and were subsequently adopted by, Judith Leekin, who abused, neglected, imprisoned, and denied them any education or medical care. Plaintiffs bring this action against the City of New York (the City) and the private foster care agencies that placed them with Leekin, namely, St. Joseph Services for Children, Inc. (SJSC), Heartshare Human Services (HHS), and SCO Family of Services (SCO) (together, the “agency defendants).1 They seek damages for alleged violations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights and for negligence, based on alleged failures that allowed Leekin to fraudulently obtain foster care custody of them and then, later, to adopt them. The agency defendants now move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons that follow, that motion is denied in part and granted in part.

Background

The following facts are drawn from the complaint and the submissions of the parties on the motion, including their statements of undisputed material fact filed pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1. The facts are construed, as they must be in the summary judgment context, in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, as the nonmoving parties. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hamilton Beach/Proctor Silex, Inc., 473 F.3d 450, 456 (2d Cir.2007) (citation omitted). Any factual disputes are noted.

The story is undisputedly sad and tragic. From 1986 to 1994, plaintiffs were all classified as special needs children, and were removed from their homes and placed in the custody of the City. (Compl. ¶ 2.) The agency defendants were private child care agencies that provide foster care placement and other services for children in the custody of the City, pursuant to contracts with the City. (Compl. ¶¶ 47, 49, 51.) During this time, Leekin, using at least four false identities, obtained foster care custody of plaintiffs and numerous other special needs children from the City and the agency defendants. She subsequently adopted each plaintiff.2 (Compl. ¶ 56.) As was later revealed, Leekin launched this scheme in order to collect subsidies provided by the City for the fostering and adoption of special needs children, which she used for her own purposes while neglecting to care for plaintiffs.3 In 1998, Leekin transported plaintiffs from New York to Florida, where she relocated them in various houses over the following years. (See Def.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 118–142). With the exception of J.B., who left the house in which they lived sometime between May 2004 and May 2005,4 plaintiffs remained with Leekin until July 2007, when Florida authorities searched the house in which they were then residing, discovered and removed plaintiffs, and arrested Leekin. (See Def.'s 56.1 Stmt ¶¶ 149, 243.)

From the point when Leekin obtained custody of plaintiffs until they were released in July 2007, Leekin abused, tortured, neglected, and held plaintiffs in captivity, first in New York and then in Florida. It would be impossible here to describe in detail the brutality plaintiffs were subjected to over the course of their captivity, some for more than 15 years, but the following examples provide a glimpse of life in Leekin's house of horrors: Leekin routinely and for lengthy periods denied the children access to food and a toilet; handcuffed and restrained them for hours, including all night restraint with zip ties; trapped them in cribs held shut with boards and heavy objects; beat them with a belt, nightstick, and other objects; forced them to stand for hours on end, sometimes with their hands above their heads, as punishment; failed to protect them from sexual abuse; and repeatedly threatened them with a gun or with being beaten to death. (See Aff. of Dr. Peg McCart Hess, May 2, 2013, Ex. A (“Hess Report”) at 3, 38–39, 62–64.) In New York, plaintiffs were often confined to the basement, where they were forced to sleep uncovered on the floor; in Florida, they generally slept on the floor of the garage. Id. If anyone came to the house where they were kept, plaintiffs were placed in a room and told to be quiet, and were threatened that if they did not remain quiet, they would be beaten.5 Pl.'s Statement of Additional Disputed Material Facts (“Pl.'s Stmt. of Add'l Facts”) ¶ 321; Hess Report at 63.) When removed from Leekin's Florida home in 2007, the ages of the named plaintiffs ranged from 15 to 27. None had completed elementary school; only three could read, and even then only at a third grade level. None had had any contact with a member of their biological families. Six were declared either “totally incapacitated” or “vulnerable adults.” (Hess Report at 4.)

Plaintiffs commenced this action on April 29, 2009. Plaintiffs allege that the agency defendants failed to properly screen Leekin as a potential foster parent, monitor plaintiffs while they were in Leekin's care, or undertake their duties in connection with investigating Leekin prior to plaintiffs' adoptions, and that the defendants' reckless indifference to their duties and to plaintiffs led to plaintiffs' fraudulent adoption and abuse by Leekin. Plaintiffs bring claims against the agency defendants for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as for common law negligence.6 The agency defendants seek summary judgment on a host of grounds.

Preliminarily, there are factual disputes surrounding how Leekin came to obtain custody of plaintiffs so long ago. Bluntly, the aged and incomplete nature of the agency defendants' records makes it difficult at times to piece together the relevant events. It is undisputed, though, that in applying to be a foster parent under her various false identities, Leekin provided the agency defendants with false names, and at least in the case of SJSC and HHS, with one or more falsified documents such as birth certificates, W–2s, written references, and Social Security cards.7 (See, e.g., Def.'s 56.1 Stmt ¶ ¶ 67, 69 (SJSC); 106(HHS).) Plaintiffs, correspondingly, acknowledge that Leekin provided false information to the agency defendants, but, relying on the agency defendants' records and their employees' testimony, assert that the agency defendants failed to take certain reasonable—and at times statutorily required—steps which would have uncovered the phony nature of Leekin's background information. For example, it is uncontradicted that none of the agency defendants requested or obtained photo identification from Leekin. (See Pl.'s Stmt of Add'l Facts ¶ 7.) Further, none sought to verify the Social Security numbers Leekin gave them, which did not match the aliases she provided (and SCO's records do not reflect Leekin being asked for a Social Security number at all).8 (See id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiffs also assert that the agency defendants failed to obtain from Leekin the number of references required by state regulation, or to conduct mandatory in-person interviews with the references she did provide. (See Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt ¶ 34(c); Pl.'s Stmt of Add'l Facts ¶ 56, 59–61, 88, 110–11, 146.) Nor did the agency defendants question references that, plaintiffs allege, were obviously lacking, such as an employment reference that, although appearing to be on New York Life Insurance Company letterhead, contained no phone number, address, or contact information for the reference.9 (Pl.'s Stmt. of Add'l Facts ¶ 54).

Each of the agency defendants also visited Leekin's home in Queens and conducted inspections in connection with approving and annually recertifying Leekin as a foster parent, and later as an adoptive parent. The parties dispute, however, what occurred during the inspections and home visits and whether they were sufficiently thorough. (Compare id. at ¶¶ 68, 88 with Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. at ¶¶ 68, 88). In particular, plaintiffs point out that, as reflected by their records, none of the agency defendants inspected the basement, where Leekin hid plaintiffs. (Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 22, 108; Pl.'s Stmt. of Add'l Facts ¶¶ 22, 24.) Leekin falsely told at least SCO that its employees could not inspect the basement because it was being rented by a third party, a claim that SCO apparently...

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    • United States
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    ...a breach of that duty, and that such breach was a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff." S.W. ex rel. Marquis-Abrams v. City of New York, 46 F. Supp. 3d 176, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Nappi v. Inc. Vill. of Lynbrook, 796 N.Y.S.2d 537, 537 (App. Div. 2005)). Although "a duty of care......
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    ...a substantial factor leading to the denial' of their [constitutional] right[s] . . . .” S.W. ex rel. Marquis-Abrams v. City of New York, 46 F.Supp.3d 176, 200 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Doe v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1981)). Defendants argue that “Plaint......
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    ...City of New York, 15-CV-7186, 2018 WL 1605982, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2018) (collecting cases); S.W. ex rel. Marquis-Abrams v. City of New York, 46 F. Supp. 3d 176, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (collecting cases); Phelan ex rel. Phelan v. Torres, 843 F. Supp. 2d 259, 268-74 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (discu......
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