S.W. ex rel. S.W. v. Clayton Cnty. Pub. Sch.

• Decision Date: 12 May 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION FILE No. 1:16–cv–0126–TCB
• Citation: 185 F.Supp.3d 1366
• Parties: S.W., and Giavonia Hood as parent of S.W., a minor, Plaintiffs, v. Clayton County Public Schools, Luvenia Jackson, in her individual and official capacity, Gary G. Townsend, in his individual and official capacity, and Roderick W. Arrington, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

185 F.Supp.3d 1366

S.W., and Giavonia Hood as parent of S.W., a minor, Plaintiffs,

v.Clayton County Public Schools, Luvenia Jackson, in her individual and official capacity, Gary G. Townsend, in his individual and official capacity, and Roderick W. Arrington, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION FILE No. 1:16–cv–0126–TCB

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

Signed May 12, 2016

Bret Thomas Thrasher, William James Shaughnessy, Thompson O'Brien Kemp & Nasuti, P.C., Norcross, GA, Kevin Chandler Ford, Law Offices of Kevin C. Ford, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.

Michael James Walker, Office Of General Counsel-Atlanta Public Schools, Assistant General Counsel, Dwight Lowell Thomas, Office of Dwight L. Thomas, Atlanta, GA, Randall C. Farmer, Gregory, Doyle, Calhoun & Rogers, LLC, Marietta, GA, for Defendant.

ORDER

Timothy C. Batten, Senior United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of Defendants Clayton County Public Schools ("CCPS"), Luvenia Jackson, and Gary Townsend (collectively, "the CCPS Defendants") for judgment on the pleadings [14]. Also before the Court is Defendant Roderick Arrington's motion to stay all proceedings [15].

I. Background¹

On January 5, 2014, Plaintiff S.W., then seventeen years old, enrolled at Charles Drew High School in Clayton County, Georgia. At that time, Arrington was her science teacher. From February 2014 through April 2014, Arrington sexually harassed, abused and assaulted S.W. Arrington repeatedly asked S.W. to have sex with him as part of her duties as a teaching assistant, and as repayment for his help in paying for a math class that S.W. was enrolled in. She rejected Arrington's advances, but feared he would give her a failing grade if she did not comply.

At the end of the school day on March 10, Arrington locked S.W. in a closet adjacent to his classroom for approximately 25–30 minutes while he searched the school to determine if other teachers or administrators were present. Arrington then returned to the closet and forced S.W. to perform oral sex on him.

S.W. did not report the assault at the time. In late April, S.W.'s step-father discovered text messages from Arrington on S.W.'s phone that evinced an inappropriate sexual relationship. On April 21, he alerted Townsend, the principal at the high school, and notified the Clayton County Police. Townsend alerted CCPS,² who began an investigation into Arrington. That same day, April 21, Arrington resigned from CCPS, and was arrested. S.W. withdrew from Charles Drew High School shortly thereafter.

During CCPS's investigation, Arrington admitted to making sexual advances towards S.W., and admitted that she had performed oral sex on him. He also admitted to making inappropriate sexual comments to several other students. Arrington's arrest received immediate public attention. The criminal charges against him—including charges of sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a minor—are pending, and he is currently released on bond.

S.W. and her mother, Plaintiff Giavonia Hood, allege that the CCPS Defendants knew or should have known of Arrington's sexual harassment and assault of S.W., but that they failed to take preventative measures to protect S.W. They also allege that the CCPS Defendants knew that Arrington had been fired from another school district in 2012 because of allegations of sexual harassment and abuse. Thus, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants are liable for sexual harassment under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, and for violating her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They plead state law claims of negligence, negligent hiring, negligent supervision, intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, and punitive damages. Additionally, Plaintiffs state claims for false imprisonment and assault and battery against Arrington.

II. Motion to Stay

A district court "has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket." Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706–07, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997) (citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254, 57 S.Ct. 163, 81 L.Ed. 153 (1936) ). "[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance." Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55, 57 S.Ct. 163.

As Plaintiffs note, "[a]bsent special circumstances, the mere existence of parallel criminal and civil proceedings does not compel stay of the latter." Doe 1 v. City of Demopolis, No. CIV A 09–0329–WS–N, 2009 WL 2059311, at *2 (S.D.Ala. July 10, 2009). Instead, "a court must stay a civil proceeding pending resolution of a related criminal prosecution only when ‘special circumstances' so require in the ‘interests of justice.’ " United States v. Lot 5, Fox Grove, Alachua County, Fla., 23 F.3d 359, 364 (11th Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12 & n. 27, 90 S.Ct. 763, 25 L.Ed.2d 1 (1970) ). District courts in this circuit typically consider some variation of the following factors when determining whether a civil action should be stayed in light of criminal proceedings:

1) the extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap with those presented in the civil case; 2) the status of the case, including whether the defendants have been indicted; 3) the private interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously weighed against the prejudice to plaintiffs caused by the delay; 4) the private interests of and burden on the defendants; 5) the interests of the courts; and 6) the public interest.

City of Demopolis , 2009 WL 2059311, at *3. The overlap between the issues in the criminal and civil cases is of paramount importance because absent overlap, there is no need for a stay. See id. ("[T]he similarity of issues in the underlying civil and criminal actions is considered the most important threshold issue in determining whether to grant a stay." (quoting Dominguez v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc. , 530 F.Supp.2d 902, 906–07 (S.D.Tex.2008) )).

Here, there is clear overlap between the claims against Arrington and the criminal charges he faces.³ Arrington's sexual harassment of S.W., culminating in the alleged March 10 sexual assault, forms the basis for all of Plaintiff's claims against him. That same misconduct is also the basis for most of the criminal charges against Arrington, including charges for sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a minor.⁴ In short, this case and the pending criminal case will turn on the same questions concerning Arrington's misconduct toward S.W. from February through April 2014. Plaintiffs contend that the presence of other Defendants, and claims that don't include Arrington, mean that there is insufficient overlap between the civil and criminal cases. Yet for the reasons detailed in Part IV, ante, Arrington is situated differently from the other Defendants, and resolution of the claims against him will overlap substantially with his criminal case.

The Court now turns to the remaining factors. Unfortunately, Plaintiffs and Arrington appear to have strong, opposing interests when it comes to the question of when and how to proceed with this case. The Court acknowledges that Plaintiffs have an interest in proceeding with their claims, and the passage of time could make it more difficult to collect evidence due to fading memories or the relocation of witnesses, among other reasons. Further, the Court has no doubt that Plaintiffs are anxious to put this matter behind them, and the public, particularly for parents in Clayton County School District, has an interest in the speedy resolution of cases such as this one.

On the other hand, the Court cannot ignore the potential prejudice to Arrington from allowing the criminal and civil cases to proceed at the same time. Arrington raises significant concerns about the potential effects of his Fifth Amendment rights on the proceedings in this case. "[T]he Fifth Amendment ‘not only protects the individual against being involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.’ " Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S.Ct. 316, 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973) ). Nevertheless, "the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them." Id. at 318, 96 S.Ct. 1551. "The court may deny a stay so long as the privilege's invocation does not compel an adverse judgment against the claimant." Lot 5, 23 F.3d at 364.

The Court is convinced that Arrington's defense in this case will substantially implicate his Fifth Amendment rights, and that Arrington stands to lose this case on summary judgment if he invokes that right. Of paramount importance is the fact that many of the interactions between S.W. and Arrington occurred without other witnesses present. Seemingly, Arrington's only avenue to refute S.W.'s testimony will be to testify in his own defense. Otherwise, the Court will be left with unrefuted testimony from S.W., which would almost certainly lead to judgment against Arrington.

Having considered the parties' arguments, in the interests of justice and judicial economy, the Court concludes that it is appropriate for this case to be stayed with respect to Arrington. However, the Court is not inclined to grant an indefinite stay pending final resolution of the criminal proceedings. No trial date has yet been set for...