Saacks v. Mohawk Carpet Corp.

• Decision Date: 20 August 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2003-CA-0386.,2003-CA-0386.
• Citation: 855 So.2d 359
• Parties: Kim SAACKS v. MOHAWK CARPET CORPORATION.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

855 So.2d 359

Kim SAACKS v. MOHAWK CARPET CORPORATION.

No. 2003-CA-0386.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

August 20, 2003.

Robert G. Harvey, Sr., Maria Del Carmen Calvo, Harvey Jacobson & Glago, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee.

Jeffrey A. Schwartz, Audrey N. Browne, Watkins Ludlam Winter & Stennis, P.A., New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.

(Court composed of Chief Judge WILLIAM H. BYRNES, III, Judge CHARLES R. JONES, and Judge TERRI F. LOVE).

WILLIAM H. BYRNES, III, Chief Judge.

In this employment contract case, Mohawk Carpet Corporation ("Mohawk") appeals the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff Kim Saacks that held that the contract was a defined fixed-term employment agreement. We affirm.

Statement of Facts and Procedural History

Mohawk accepted Kim Saacks for a territorial manager position with the corporation. Mohawk's June 19, 2000, letter confirmed the offer of employment. Ms. Saacks's effective date of hire was July 3, 2000. In June 2001, Mohawk notified Ms. Saacks that her position was being eliminated, and her job was terminated.

Ms. Saacks filed this lawsuit, contending that the June 19, 2000, letter constituted a contract for employment for a specific term (eighteen months) and obligated Mohawk to pay Ms. Saacks's salary for the remaining portion of that term from June 2001 to December 2001. Ms. Saacks also sought penalties and attorney fees in connection with her demand for past wages. The disputed clause in the June 19, 2000, letter, which forms the basis of Ms. Saacks's claim, states as follows:

COMPENSATION, You will receive a guaranteed salary of $54,000/year through December 2001. At the end of 2001, if you have hit your territory's quota, you will receive a 10% bonus based on your salary amount. At any point during the first seventeen months, you may convert your salary to a draw advance against commissions. In doing so, you will automatically become eligible to participate in the Bonus Incentive Program.

After a trial on October 7, 2002, the trial court found that the employment agreement was a fixed-term contract. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Ms. Saacks for past wages in the amount of $10,306 and penalty wages in the amount of $18,692, together with interest and costs.

On October 15, 2002, Ms. Saacks filed a motion to amend judgment to correct errors in calculation of past wages. Ms. Saacks argued that the $10,306 awarded in wages represented the amount that had accrued as of September 18, 2001 (the date that Ms. Saacks brought a rule to show cause). Ms. Saacks submitted that by December 2001, the end of the fixed term contract, the past wages had accrued to the amount of $29,700.

On October 15, 2002, Ms. Saacks also filed a motion for new trial, seeking attorney's fees in connection with the award for past wages. The trial court held a hearing on the motions on November 22, 2002, and rendered judgment on December 9, 2002. The amended judgment awarded Ms. Saacks past wages in the amount of $29,700 and penalty wages in the amount of $18,692, together with interest and costs. Additionally, pursuant to the motion for new trial, the amended judgment granted Ms. Saacks attorney's fees in the amount of $9,625. Mohawk's appeal followed.

On appeal, Mohawk contends that the trial court erred in: (1) concluding that Ms. Saacks carried her burden of proof in providing sufficient evidence that the contract was for fixed-term employment; (2) and (3) assessing penalties against Mohawk based on a finding of bad faith; and (4) amending the original judgment. The plaintiff claims she is entitled to an increase in the attorney's fees for the appeal.

Standard of Review

The reviewing court may not overturn the judgment of the lower court absent an error of law or finding of fact that is manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Stobart v. State Through Department of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993). Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). A lower court's factual findings can be reversed only when: (1) the record reflects that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court; and (2) the record establishes that the trial court's finding is clearly wrong. Russell v. Noullet, 98-0816 (La.12/1/98), 721 So.2d 868, 872. The reviewing court is to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Id. If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the appellate court may not reverse it even though it is convinced that if it had been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Anderson v. Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985); Hennegan v. Cooper/T.Smith Stevedoring Co., Inc., XXXX-XXXX (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/30/02), 837 So.2d 96, writ denied XXXX-XXXX (La.4/21/03), 841 So.2d 794. Where there is a conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review. Virgil v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 507 So.2d 825 (La.1987).

Fixed-Term Contract

Mohawk argues that the trial court erred in finding that Ms. Saacks presented sufficient evidence to establish that her employment was a fixed-term rather than an "at-will" contract.

Initially at issue in the present case is whether the parties entered into a contract for hire that was a limited duration contract, or a terminable "at-will" contract. Under a limited duration contract the parties have agreed to be bound for a certain period during which the employee is not free to depart without assigning cause nor is the employer at liberty to dismiss the employee without assigning any reason for so doing. La. C.C. arts. 2746-2750; Terrebonne v. Louisiana Ass'n of Educators, 444 So.2d 206 (La.App. 1 Cir.1983), writ denied 445 So.2d 1232 (La.1984).

La. C.C. art. 2747 provides:

Art. 2747. Contract of servant terminable at will of parties

A man is at liberty to dismiss a hired servant attached to his person or family, without assigning any reason for so doing. The servant is also free to depart without assigning any cause.

Employees hired without a fixed term are subject to dismissal by their employers at any time, for any reason, without the employers' incurring liability for wrongful discharge. Copeland v. Gordon Jewelry Corp., 288 So.2d 404 (La.App. 4 Cir.1974).

La. C.C. art. 2749 states:

Art. 2749. liability for dismissal of laborer without cause

If, without any serious ground of complaint, a man should send away a laborer whose services he has hired for a certain time, before that time has expired, he shall be bound to pay to such laborer the whole of the salaries which he would have been entitled to receive, had the full term of his services arrived.

As a prerequisite for claiming unpaid salaries for work that would have been performed in the future, employees must show that they have been hired for definite time periods. Jackson v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 393 So.2d 243, 245 (La.App. 1 Cir.1980). The party relying on an alleged contract of employment for a set duration of time has the burden of proof that there was a meeting of the minds on the length of time of the employment. Brodhead v. Board of Trustees for State Colleges and Universities, 588 So.2d 748, 752 (La.App. 1 Cir.1992).

Mohawk asserts that absent a contract for a fixed period of time, an employee is terminable "at will," at any time for any cause, or for no cause. Pechon v. National Corp. Service, Inc., 234 La. 397, 100 So.2d 213, 216 (1958). Because of the presumption that employment is "at will," the party alleging a fixed term contract has the burden of proof. Brodhead, supra.

Mohawk claims that its letter of June 19, 2000, confirmed the details of her employment. Citing Weaver v. Purple Shield Life Insurance Co., 356 So.2d 519 (La.App. 1 Cir.1977), and Daybrook Fisheries v. Ketnor, 01-0388 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/22/03), 839 So.2d 223, Mohawk maintains that the mere expression of an annual salary is insufficient to rebut the presumption that the employment contract was "at-will." Mohawk contends that there was no evidence that the parties intended to be bound for a certain period of time. Mohawk points out that the plaintiff testified at trial that she did not believe that the June 19, 2000, letter prohibited her from quitting her job during the 18-month period. Ms. Dawn Day testified that when she authored the June 19, 2000, letter, Mohawk did not intend to contract with the plaintiff for a specified time. Ms. Day stated that the letter's expression of a stated salary was meant only to convey to the plaintiff that she would be guaranteed that rate of pay for as long as she was employed by Mohawk.

Mohawk relies on the application for employment executed on July 3, 2000. Page three of the application states the following:

I understand that I have the right to terminate my employment at any time with or without notice, with or without cause, and that the Company has the similar right. I understand my employment by this Company does not guarantee that any position be continued for any length of time or that any job assignment or shift be permanent. I understand that no one other than the President of the Company has authority to make any other agreement.

Mohawk submits that the employment application establishes that the plaintiff's employment was "at will" and Ms. Day did not have the authority to hire the plaintiff.

The plaintiff argues that she presented sufficient evidence to show that her employment contract was for a fixed-term based on the June 19, 2000, letter. The plaintiff testified at trial that she thought she was guaranteed a job for eighteen months.

The plaintiff shows and Ms....