Saalfrank v. O'DANIEL

• Decision Date: 27 January 1975
• Docket Number: No. C 71-60.,C 71-60.
• Citation: 390 F. Supp. 45
• Parties: Ned G. SAALFRANK, Plaintiff, v. Melva M. O'DANIEL, Defendant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY et al., Third-Party Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

390 F. Supp. 45

Ned G. SAALFRANK, Plaintiff, v. Melva M. O'DANIEL, Defendant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY et al., Third-Party Defendants.

No. C 71-60.

United States District Court, N. D. Ohio, W. D.

September 27, 1974.

On Motion to Reconsider January 27, 1975.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Warren W. Wyneken, Fort Wayne, Ind., Matt Kolb, Toledo, Ohio, for plaintiff.

Wilbur C. Jacobs, John A. Pietrykowski, Finn, Manahan & Pietrykowski, Richard E. Antonini, M. Donald Carmin, Eastman, Stichter, Smith & Bergman, John M. Curphey, Toledo, Ohio, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM and ORDER

WALINSKI, District Judge.

This cause is before the Court once again on plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint so as to assert, pursuant to Rule 14(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim directly against the third-party defendant Parkview Memorial Hospital hereinafter Parkview. This time he asks the Court to reconsider its rulings of October 6, 1972, and June 26, 1974, in which the Court denied plaintiff the opportunity to assert such a claim because of the lack of diversity of citizenship between plaintiff and Parkview. In the June 26th order, this Court said that since "* * * nothing had been cited to convince the Court that its earlier reasoning was invalid * * *", the Court would deny the motion. However, at that time the Court did not fully review all of the earlier briefs on the question and the authorities cited therein because plaintiff did not appear to state any good reason in its motion why the Court should reconsider the issue. But plaintiff persists in advocating the view that this Court has wrongly decided the matter, and once more he asks for reconsideration. His persistence has therefore made this an issue that will not go away. The Court is thus moved to re-read the briefs, consult again the authorities, and to study anew the literature in the field.

Before discussing the issues raised by the motion, it is necessary to indicate the current procedural setting. The complaint was filed in February, 1971. Defendant O'Daniel filed a third-party complaint against Parkview in January, 1972. Also named as third-party defendants were the Ford Motor Company and Don Kremer Ford Sales. In March 1972, plaintiff was permitted to amend his complaint to assert a claim directly against Parkview. However, after extensive briefing, the Court granted Parkview's motion to dismiss in October, 1972. The parties then engaged in discovery and other pretrial procedures. Jury trial was waived, and the case was tried to the Court beginning May 28, 1974, and ending after six days of testimony on June 3, 1974. At the close of the trial, the Court entered an order in which all parties were requested to submit suggested findings of fact and conclusions of law. The order further indicated that, based on the evidence, the claims against Ford Motor Company and Don Kremer Ford Sales would be dismissed; that a verdict for plaintiff will be entered against defendant O'Daniel with damages being under advisement; and that the third-party complaint of O'Daniel against Parkview was taken under advisement. These briefs are now before the Court, and a decision on the entire case will soon be forthcoming.

Plaintiff is, for the purposes of this case, an Indiana resident. He claims that while traveling from his parents' home in Indiana to his job in Toledo, his car was struck by defendant O'Daniel's car at the intersection of U. S. Highway 24 and State Road 6 near Napoleon, Ohio. At the time of the accident plaintiff's car was being operated by Patricia Creighton and he was a passenger in the front seat. Sometime after the collision, plaintiff was taken to the Parkview Memorial Hospital in Fort Wayne, Indiana, where, shortly thereafter, he fell from his hospital bed, thereby further aggravating his already serious injuries. It is said that the fall was proximately caused by the hospital's negligence in failing to provide any restraints for plaintiff and in failing to supervise him adequately.

Parkview has taken the position all along that a direct claim by a plaintiff against a third-party defendant under Rule 14(a) requires new independent grounds for jurisdiction, especially where, as here, the principal jurisdiction granting claim is based on diversity of citizenship. Indeed, since the great majority of cases which have decided the issue have adopted that view, this Court decided the issue in favor of Parkview after consulting the authorities cited. Given the weight of these authorities, especially McPherson v. Hoffman, 275 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1960), the Court did not feel constrained to make a study of the literature in the subject area.

In McPherson, the district court entered a judgment in favor of plaintiff against a third-party defendant who was a co-citizen of the plaintiff. The principal claim was based on the FELA. In reversing the decision, the Sixth Circuit said:

"under the FELA the plaintiff could bring his action against the Railroad in Federal Court without diversity of citizenship 45 U.S.C., § 56. He could not have sued the McPhersons in Federal Court separately, nor could he have joined them with Chesapeake and Ohio because there was no diversity between them and the McPhersons. 28 U.S.C., § 1332. What he could not do directly could not be done indirectly. The court did not have jurisdiction to enter a judgment against third-parties defendant in favor of plaintiff Hoffman. Jurisdiction cannot be waived." Id. at 470.

Parkview thus argues that the Court has no discretion in the matter because the issue is one of jurisdiction and not of discretion. Moreover, the argument is made in at least two of the cases cited by Parkview, McPherson v. Hoffman, supra; and Hoskie v. Prudential Ins. Co., 39 F.Supp. 305 (E.D.N.Y.1941), that since this kind of situation presents manifest opportunity for collusion, the courts should require new and independent jurisdictional grounds for Rule 14 claims by plaintiffs against third-parties defendant. Parkview also argues that plaintiff's case against it in the state courts of Indiana is now ready for the second trial, the first having ended in a hung jury, and thus plaintiff cannot be prejudiced by dismissal of his third-party claim. Finally, Parkview argues that the matter of any inconvenience to plaintiff in trying the same facts in two or more different proceedings is not a proper consideration for this Court, and is not a good reason to extend the established boundaries of federal court jurisdiction.

Plaintiff argues that most of the cases on which Parkview relies are somewhat dated and that the modern trend is not to dismiss merely because the plaintiff and third-party defendant share a common residence. In support of this, inter alia, he cites Buresch v. American LaFrance, 290 F.Supp. 265 (W.D.Pa. 1968); and Olson v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 489 (D.Neb.1965), both of which were the mirror of the procedural arrangement here. To these cases, the Court would also add Davis v. United States, 350 F.Supp. 206 (E.D.Mich. 1972). The theory underlying plaintiff's position is grounded in ancillary jurisdiction, his position being that the claim he seeks to assert is within the ancillary jurisdiction of the Court. See, e. g., Sklar v. Hayes, 1 F.R.D. 594, 596 (E.D. Pa.1941).

The mere passage of time, however, does not make a rule suspect; indeed it may only serve to illustrate its felicity. Yet a rule of law may be undermined by subsequent developments over a period of time. A new rule in a related area may be established, and it may take time for the courts to decide its effect on issues which stand at the edge of its parameters. And so it is the case here.

The Supreme Court decision in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), significantly affected judicial thinking about federal court subject matter jurisdiction. In Gibbs the Court held that a federal court has the power to consider a claim bottomed purely in state law which it ordinarily would not hear because of lack of diversity if the state claim grew out of the same operative facts as the jurisdiction giving federal claim. The basic premise of Gibbs is that the power to consider cases and controversies which is granted by Article III of the Constitution is the power to consider the entire case, including all of the claims which arise from a "common nucleus of operative fact." The Court also said in a footnote that:

"While it is commonplace that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expand the jurisdiction of federal courts, they do embody `the whole tendency of our decisions * * * to require a plaintiff to try his * * * whole case at one time'." Id. at 725, n. 13, 86 S.Ct. at 1138. Emphasis added.

This premise again appeared in State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1199, 18 L.Ed.2d 270 (1967), where the Court said:

"Article III poses no obstacle to the legislative extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens." Id. at 531, 87 S.Ct. at 1204.

Since Gibbs was decided, the lower federal courts have been more sensitive to the existence of power to consider an entire case while also holding, as did Gibbs, that the decision to exercise the power is a matter of discretion for the trial judge. In F. C. Stiles Cont. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 431 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1970), the plaintiff sued three insurers for losses incurred in a fire, and jurisdiction was based on diversity. Two of the defendants, however, were liable only for less than the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement. The Sixth Circuit, in affirming the trial judge's consideration of the two claims, found the Gibbs rationale to be applicable, saying:

This would allow a plaintiff to adjudicate sic in a single forum a claim against a diverse defendant which does not meet the necessary jurisdictional amount if it is properly joined with a claim against another defendant

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