Saber v. Dan Angelone Chevrolet, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 December 2002
• Docket Number: No. 2000-361-Appeal.,2000-361-Appeal.
• Citation: 811 A.2d 644
• Parties: George SABER v. DAN ANGELONE CHEVROLET, INC.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

811 A.2d 644

George SABER v. DAN ANGELONE CHEVROLET, INC.

No. 2000-361-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

December 17, 2002.

Before WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

Jeffrey D. Sowa, Providence, Sarah McConnell Dubois, for Plaintiff.

Joseph C. Salvadore, for Defendant.

OPINION

WILLIAMS, Chief Justice.

In this case, the defendant, Dan Angelone Chevrolet, Inc. (defendant), appeals from a Superior Court judgment, challenging several rulings made by the trial justice. Before closing arguments, the trial justice determined as a matter of law that the defendant, a Rhode Island corporation, breached the warranty of title of a car sold to the plaintiff, George Saber (plaintiff), a resident of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The jury found that the plaintiff provided the defendant with sufficient notice of the breach and awarded the plaintiff damages in the amount of $14,900. On appeal, the defendant alleges that the trial justice committed a variety of errors. For the reasons set out below, we deny and dismiss the defendant's appeal and affirm the trial justice's rulings.

I Facts and Travel

On February 7, 1990, plaintiff bought a used 1985 Chevrolet Corvette (Corvette or car), from defendant for $14,900. The Corvette was red, had an automatictransmission, and its odometer said 34,744 miles. At that time plaintiff also purchased an extended warranty to cover certain problems that might arise with the car. Between March 1990 and April 1992, plaintiff experienced several mechanical problems with the car and brought it to defendant for service. Because of the series of problems he was experiencing, plaintiff decided to research the car's history. In conducting a title search on the car, he discovered that a title application for the Corvette described it as black and equipped with a manual transmission. In light of his discovery, plaintiff, through an attorney, contacted the Massachusetts State Police (state police).

In response to plaintiff's call, state police Lieutenant Joseph Costa (Lt. Costa) examined the Corvette and discovered some discrepancies with respect to its vehicle identification number (VIN) and major components. The plate located on the window downpost, which contained the VIN, was blistered and painted over. Additionally, derivative identification numbers on the car's frame, engine and transmission did not correspond to the VIN on the window downpost. Further, a Mylar sticker, which is typically located on the door of the car and also has the same VIN as the window downpost, was missing. Finally, the Corvette was equipped with a third brake light, which was manufactured one year after the car supposedly was manufactured. Based on those observations, Lt. Costa believed that some of the car parts were stolen.

After the inspection, plaintiff drove the Corvette home. The next day, plaintiff drove the car to the North Dartmouth barracks of the state police. There, he voluntarily left the car in the parking lot, dropped off the keys and took a ride home from an employee. Lieutenant Costa testified that the car was impounded and that plaintiff could not have it back.

Later, the Corvette was delivered to Danny's Autobody, a privately owned business located in New Bedford, Massachusetts, that the state police used as an impound facility. A subsequent investigation revealed that the Corvette was neither stolen nor composed of stolen parts. Rather, according to defendant's brief, the Corvette was destroyed in a fire and subsequently rebuilt using parts from various other cars. The frame was replaced with one from an "identical type" car, the motor was replaced, the engine block was taken from a Chevrolet Camaro and the car was painted red. According to defendant, it received the Corvette in its current, refurbished condition as a trade-in and later sold it to plaintiff. None of those facts were disclosed to plaintiff when he purchased the car, and it is not clear whether defendant was aware of them when it sold the Corvette to plaintiff.

In 1992, plaintiff filed a lawsuit against defendant in Massachusetts District Court, which later was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In 1995, plaintiff filed the instant action in Superior Court seeking damages for negligence and breach of contract. The plaintiff's amended complaint added counts for deceptive trade practices, misrepresentation, revocation of acceptance, and violations of the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312, but did not expressly allege breach of warranty of title. To support his claim for negligence, however, plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was not given good title to the car.

The trial began in April 2000. At the close of plaintiff's case, defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that there could be no breach of the warranty of title because the car was not stolen. The trial justice, however, denied defendant's motion, stating that the warranty of title may be breached by law enforcementimpoundment. Before closing arguments, both parties moved for judgment as a matter of law. The trial justice determined that, based on Lt. Costa's testimony, the car was impounded and because of that impoundment, defendant breached the warranty of title owed to plaintiff. The trial justice granted plaintiff's motion on that issue. The trial justice, however, charged the jury with the task of determining whether plaintiff provided defendant with sufficient notice of the breach as required under G.L. 1956 § 6A-2-607. The jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor. The defendant later renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law and moved for a new trial. Both motions were denied. The defendant timely appealed.

II Judgment as a Matter of Law

Under Rule 50(a)(1) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial justice presiding over a jury trial may grant a party's motion for judgment as a matter of law if "a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." When ruling on a Rule 50 motion the trial justice:

"`considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, without weighing the evidence or evaluating the credibility of witnesses, and draws from the record all reasonable inferences that support the position of the nonmoving party. * * * If, after such a review, there remain factual issues upon which reasonable persons might draw different conclusions, the motion for [judgment as a matter of law] must be denied, and the issues must be submitted to the jury for determination.' DeChristofaro v. Machala, 685 A.2d 258, 262 (R.I.1996).

"In reviewing a trial justice's decision on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, this Court `is bound by the same rules and [standards] as the trial justice.' Hoffman v.McLaughlin Corp., 675 A.2d 404, 405 (R.I.1996)." Mellor v. O'Connor, 712 A.2d 375, 377 (R.I.1998).

The defendant argues that the trial justice erred in granting plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law for three reasons. First, defendant claims that the trial justice unfairly allowed plaintiff to amend his complaint to establish liability for breach of warranty of title based on the fact that the Corvette was impounded. Second, defendant challenges the trial justice's finding that the car was indeed impounded. Finally, according to defendant, even if the car was impounded, the trial justice erred in finding that the impoundment constituted a breach of warranty of title. We conclude that each of defendant's claims are without merit and address each seriatim.

A

"Amendment" of Plaintiff's Complaint

The defendant argues that the trial justice erred in granting plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law¹ because the trial justice predicated his decision on a theory that was not properly raised in plaintiff's complaint. According to defendant, allowing plaintiff to proceed on the "new" theory constituted an unfair amendment of plaintiff's complaint.²

We begin by noting that it is undisputed that plaintiff never specifically included a separate count for breach of warranty of title in his amended complaint. Further, plaintiffnever formally asked to amend his complaint to include a separate count for breach of warranty of title and, accordingly, the trial justice never granted plaintiff permission to so amend his complaint. In any event, we need not consider whether an amendment was either necessary or proper in this situation because the record reveals that defendant did not object to plaintiff's theory of the case, that impoundment constitutes a breach of the warranty of title, until after the jury was charged and returned its verdict. Under Rule 15(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, "[w]hen issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings." Failure to amend the pleadings to conform to litigated issues that were not properly pleaded "does not affect the result of the trial of these issues." Id.

The defendant did not lodge an objection on these grounds during plaintiff's case, its own case or after the trial justice's rulings on the parties' Rule 50 motions.³ When the trial justice denied defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of plaintiff's case, he specifically held that "the warranty of title of the Uniform Commercial Code subsumes a quiet enjoyment which can be disturbed by law enforcement impoundment." By failing to object, defendant impliedly consented to litigation of that issue at trial. See Fram Corp. v. Davis, 121 R.I. 583, 591, 401 A.2d 1269, 1274 (1979).

B Impoundment

Next, defendant argues that the trial justice erred in finding that the Corvette was impounded. A car is impounded if it is placed "in the custody of the police or the court." Black's...