Sabin v. Miller, 4:04 CV 40526 CFB.
| Decision Date | 07 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:04 CV 40526 CFB.,4:04 CV 40526 CFB. |
| Citation | 423 F.Supp.2d 943 |
| Parties | Carla SABIN, Plaintiff, v. Scott MILLER and Mary Chavez, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa |
Jeffrey M. Lipman, Lipman Law Firm, PC, Clive, IA, for Plaintiff.
Forrest A. Guddall, Department of Justice, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants.
RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Court has before it the Motion for Summary Judgment (Clerk's No. 12) filed under seal by Defendants on December 30, 2005, seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs claims against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At the hearing on February 15, 2006, Jeffery Lipman represented Plaintiff, and Assistant Attorney General Forrest Guddall represented Defendants.
Plaintiff, an employee of the Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC), alleges that Defendants, IDOC investigators, violated her constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, when they entered her home and seized her private property. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants assert that no genuine issues of material fact are in dispute and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendants also assert the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Plaintiff filed a Response on January 12, 2006, and Defendants filed a Reply on January 20.
The case was referred on February 14, 2005, to a United States Magistrate Judge for the conduct of all further proceedings and the entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and the parties' consent. This matter is fully submitted.
After carefully considering the evidence in the record and the memoranda presented by the parties, the Court finds and holds as follows on the issues presented.
A court shall grant a motion for summary judgment only if there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Laughlin v. Schriro, 430 F.3d 927, 928 (8th Cir. 2005). The "evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [his] favor." Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 562, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004) (alteration revised) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Laughlin, 430 F.3d at 928.
To preclude entry of summary judgment, the nonmovant must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of every element essential to his case, and on which he has the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Laughlin, 430 F.3d at 928.
When a motion is made and supported as required in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), the adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in his pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is sufficient to persuade a jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. At the summary judgment stage, a court may not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility. Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
The following facts are either undisputed or viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Carla Sabin, the nonmoving party.
In September 2002, Sabin was working for IDOC's Iowa Prison Industries as a canteen supervisor at the Newton (Iowa) Correctional Facility (NCF). When her employer did not provide her a computer at the office, Sabin's supervisor, Roger Baysden, allowed her to use her personal laptop computer for work, both at the office and at home as needed. Baysden also arranged to have messages that were sent to Sabin's work e-mail address forwarded to her personal e-mail address. No evidence indicates the IDOC had any employee policy regarding employer access to employee-owned computers used both for work and personal purposes, and used both at the office and at home as needed.
On approximately Monday, September 30, 2002, IDOC and Iowa Prison Industries began investigating Sabin for allegedly improper employee conduct, including the following: blurring the boundaries of professionalism in her interaction with inmates; engaging in unauthorized communication with inmates and inappropriate communication with staff members; intermingling personal and business use of her computer and/or electronic mail; compromising the integrity of the canteen's computer security by entrusting computer access to inmates; and compromising security within the canteen and prison system by routinely violating institutional directives and IDOC policies regarding granting various responsibilities and privileges to inmates. Two IDOC employees, Defendants Scott Miller and Mary Chavez, investigated the allegations against Sabin.
Baysden called Sabin on Wednesday, October 2, 2002, to tell her that Chavez was going to talk with her. Sabin stated in her affidavit that Baysden told her to "cooperate completely" with the investigator, and "[e]verything will be all right, as long as you do what they tell you to do." (Sabin Aff. at 2 (alteration added).) After questioning Sabin concerning her use of her laptop computer for work, Chavez and Miller told Sabin that they would have to examine her computer as part of their investigation. Sabin said her laptop computer was at her house. Sabin drove the investigators in her car to her house. Miller and Chavez followed Sabin from the car to her front door.
According to Sabin, she "opened the door and stated that I would go into the home, retrieve the laptop and bring it out." (Sabin Aff. at 2.) Chavez told Sabin, "this would not be acceptable and that they needed to come in with [Sabin]." Id. (alteration added). To Sabin, it "was clear [the investigators] did not trust me at all." Id. (alteration added). Sabin testified that Miller and Chavez entered her house without permission and stood inside the doorway.
In contrast to Sabin's account, Defendants deny they entered Sabin's house without her permission. Defendants contend Sabin let them enter her house; she never protested or resisted when the investigators accompanied her into the house. Chavez stated that she and Miller entered the house, in part, to ensure that Sabin did not delete any files from the computer. (Chavez Aff. at 1.)
Standing inside the house, the investigators saw Sabin's laptop computer in the dining room, approximately 4 or 5 feet from the dining room entryway. Miller and Chavez also saw Sabin's desktop computer, which was switched on and sitting inside a computer cabinet in the dining room. Defendants contend that in response to their questioning, Sabin told them she had work-related files saved on her desktop computer. Chavez said, "we need that [desktop] computer too." (Sabin Aff. at 3 (alteration added)).1 Sabin stated she protested and told Defendants they could not take her family's desktop computer. Sabin stated, and Defendants deny, that Miller said he and Chavez would not leave the house without taking both the desktop and laptop computers. (Sabin Aff. at 3; Defs.' App. at 6.)
Sabin testified she told Miller and Chavez two or three more times that the desktop computer belonged to her, that the computer had never been at NCF, and that the computer contained her personal information. (Sabin Aff. at 3.) When Miller and Chavez, "insisted that they were going to confiscate the [desktop] computer and ordered m[e] to turn it over to them," Sabin realized that Miller and Chavez would not leave her house without the desktop computer. Id. (alteration added). Sabin stated that Miller and Chavez were upsetting her daughter and infant granddaughter.
Sabin stated that Miller walked into the dining room and turned off the desktop computer, but Sabin refused to allow him to disconnect the computer from the cabinet, because she feared he would damage the woodwork and cords. Sabin stated that Miller allowed her to disconnect the computer. Miller then carried the desktop computer out of the house and put it into Sabin's car. Sabin drove the investigators back to the prison with her two computers.
Sabin's employer suspended her for two weeks during the investigation.
Sabin claims that Miller and Chavez violated her Fourth Amendment rights during their search of her home and their seizure of her two computers. Defendants argue that their conduct did not violate Sabin's Fourth Amendment rights.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998); see United States of America v. Cortez-Palomino, 438 F.3d 910 (Feb. 28, 2006) ). The extent to which the Fourth Amendment protects a person may depend upon where he or she is. Minnesota, 525 U.S. at 88, 119 S.Ct. 469. The test for a person's "capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment" depends on whether the person "has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." Id. (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978)).
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