Sabo v. Township of Monroe

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: LEVIN; WILLIAMS; COLEMAN
• Citation: Sabo v. Township of Monroe, 394 Mich. 531, 232 N.W.2d 584 (Mich. 1974)
• Decision Date: 01 March 1974
• Docket Number: No. 16,16
• Parties: Arthur E. SABO et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. TOWNSHIP OF MONROE, Defendant-Appellant. ,

Page 584

232 N.W.2d 584

394 Mich. 531

Arthur E. SABO et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. TOWNSHIP OF MONROE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16, March Term, 1974.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Aug. 19, 1975.

Ready, Sullivan & Ready, Monroe, by John J. Sullivan, Monroe, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Harry A. Lockwood, Monroe, for defendant-appellant.

Schlussel, Lifton, Simon, Rands & Kaufman, Detroit, by Mark E. Schlussel, Joseph F. Galvin, Detroit, for the Mobile Home Communities Council.

Before the Entire Bench except SWAINSON and LINDEMER, JJ.

LEVIN, Justice.

In each of the three cases which, although separately submitted, are being decided today, the plaintiffs seek to use land zoned single family residence (Sabo and Nickola) or agricultural (Smookler) to construct a mobile-home park.

I write separately because I do not agree, in Nickola ¹ and Smookler, ² that on proof that a community has excluded a legitimate use, here mobile-home parks, it necessarily becomes obliged to grant a request for rezoning to permit that use. The land sought to be rezoned may not be suitable for development for the excluded use. In Sabo I do not agree that the failure of a planning commission to adopt a master plan per se invalidates all zoning ordinances. ³

I

Even if present zoning is not unreasonable ⁴ or confiscatory, ⁵ a proposed use should be permitted if reasonable under all the circumstances. Kropf v. Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 164 ff., 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974) (concurring opinion).

We would require that the proofs now adduced in circuit court be presented administratively and restrict judicial review to whether the record evidence supports the administrative finding on the issue whether the proposed use is reasonable. Kropf v. Sterling Heights, supra (concurring opinion). However, it is the present practice to present the proofs in circuit court and for a reviewing court to make its own independent examination and analysis of the record. Kropf v. Sterling Heights, supra (majority opinion).

In each of these cases the Court of Appeals held that the proposed use should be allowed. The record in each establishes that the proposed use (which happens to be a partially or totally excluded use) is reasonable. ⁶ On that ground we join in affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals.

II

In this case of Sabo, my colleague would hold the Monroe Township Zoning Ordinance invalid because the 'community has neither adopted such a (master) plan, nor even taken the first steps to produce one.'

The Township Rural Zoning Act does require that 'provisions of the zoning ordinance shall be based upon a plan.' M.C.L.A. § 125.273; M.S.A. § 5.2963(3). The Township Planning Act provides that the township 'planning commission shall make and adopt a basic plan as a guide for the development of unincorporated portions of the township.' M.C.L.A. § 125.326; M.S.A. § 5.2963(106).

While most zoning enabling acts require that zoning be in accordance with a 'plan' or more commonly 'in accordance with a comprehensive plan' (from the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act), 'the 'comprehensive plan' with which zoning was to accord has hardly ever been identified with the 'master plan' established by the Planning Act.' Hagman, Urban Planning and Land Development Control Law, § 24, p. 55.

'It is thus clear that the 'comprehensive plan' of the zoning statute is not identical with the 'master plan' of the Planning Act and need not meet the formal requirements of a master plan.' Kozesnik v. Montgomery Twp., 24 N.J. 154, 166, 131 A.2d 1, 7 (1957).

The 'plan' limitation in the zoning enabling act requires that the community zone in a pre-established and comprehensive manner rather than on an ad hoc basis. The 'plan' required for zoning purposes is not dependent on the adoption of a master plan and may properly emanate from the zoning ordinance or map itself. ⁷ In Michigan, and generally elsewhere, zoning enabling acts and zoning ordinances were enacted before legislation authorizing planning commissions and adoption of master plans.

'As a result, there appears to have been a judicial tendency to interpret the statutory directive that zoning ordinances shall be 'in accordance with a comprehensive plan' as meaning nothing more than that zoning ordinances shall be comprehensive--that is to say, uniform and broad in scope of coverage. The lack of a master plan is deemed irrelevant to the validity of zoning measures. And this is hardly surprising. For when one considers the usual chronology of the legislative enactment of zoning and planning enabling legislation in any state, the indefinite statutory language, and the far greater prevalence of zoning than planning at the municipal level, it Would strain judicial reasoning to the breaking point to imply a legislative intent that zoning ordinances be considered authorized only if drafted in accordance with a previously enunciated master plan.' Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 Harv.L.Rev. 1154, 1157 (1955). (Emphasis supplied.)

With the exception of states where the zoning enabling act specifically provides that zoning shall be 'in accordance with the master plan for land use,' ⁸ no case has been found requiring adoption of a master plan as a precondition to the enactment of a valid zoning ordinance. The authorities are uniformly to the contrary. ⁹

There is no statutory requirement that a township establish a planning commission; the statute authorizing the creation of township planning commissions is permissive. M.C.L.A. § 125.323; M.S.A. § 5.2963(103). Requiring that any township that does establish a planning commission immediately adopt a master plan or otherwise face invalidation of its previously enacted zoning ordinances would serve as a strong deterrent to taking the initial step toward long-range planning--the creation of a planning commission.

Substantial time may be required to develop and adopt a sound master plan. 'If no zoning regulation were possible until the master plan was completed and adopted, in counties where fast growth was occurring, it might do so in an incongruous and uncontrolled manner which the planning commission would find it difficult or perhaps impossible to keep abreast of, or to devise a master plan that would be of much benefit; and thus the whole purpose of effective zoning might be frustrated.' Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 310, 358 P.2d 633, 635 (1961).

Invalidation of otherwise valid zoning regulations solely because they were enacted in the period between creation of a planning commission and actual adoption of a master plan would result in wholesale invalidation of zoning regulations leaving an absolute void of any land use regulation.

We concur in affirmance.

WILLIAMS, Justice (to reverse the trial court).

This is yet another zoning case, but with some aspects not developed in Kropf v. Sterling Heights. ¹

Three issues are raised: absence of a legislative adopted master plan and of any preliminary planning looking to a master plan, confiscation, and spot zoning.

The statutes of this state clearly contemplate and require that a township base its zoning ordinance on a legally adopted master or basic plan. Where a community has neither adopted such a plan, nor even taken the first steps to produce one, we will, in the future, go beyond the rule we adopted in Biske v. City of Troy, ² and find the zoning ordinance invalid per se. However, as this ruling is prospective only, it does not affect the validity of the Monroe Township Zoning Ordinance.

As to confiscation, the Kropf rule, 'The ordinance comes to us clothed with every presumption of validity' 'that . . . (a) reasonable governmental interest (is) being advanced by the present zoning classification . . .' is here recognized but is not here applicable. Rather the second Kropf rule 'that an ordinance may be unreasonable because of its purely arbitrary, capricious and unfounded exclusion of other types of legitimate land use in the area in question' governs the issue of confiscation. We hold that 'it is the burden of the party attacking to prove . . .' 'that if the ordinance is enforced the consequent restrictions on his property preclude its use for any purposes to which it is reasonably adapted.' 391 Mich. 139, 162--163, 215 N.W.2d 179, 186--189. On review of the opinions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we find a close question of fact exists when we resolve in plaintiffs' favor.

As to spot zoning, the zoning ordinance provided for mobile home parks within districts zoned commercial but only on approval of the Board of Appeals. Plaintiffs, however, not being owners in an area zoned commercial, lack standing to challenge the validity of such an ordinance.

I--FACTS

Plaintiffs' property, an irregular, but mainly rectangular parcel of approximately 86 acres in Monroe Township, is currently zoned for residential uses. Although having a basically interior location, at two different points it abuts the main roads of Hull and Dunbar.

On the north, across Dunbar Road is a stone quarry in which heavy machinery is used and where blasting occurs frequently. Testimony at trial indicated that occasionally pieces of rock have been hurled by this blasting into a neighboring business area. ³

On the east, part of the parcel bounds on Hull Road. Directly east of that is an auto salvage yard. Still further east are the southbound tracks of the New York Central Railroad.

Most of the southern portion of the area is currently farm land, except for the southwest corner, which contains housing subdivisions.

On the west, the general area is bounded by South Dixie Highway where, in strips not exceeding 600 feet deep on both sides, is commercial development such as restaurants and auto dealerships.

About 75% Of the whole area, including plaintiffs' parcel is zoned RB, a classification permitting single-family and multiple residential units. Most remaining land is zoned...