Sabre Int'l Sec. v. Torres Advanced Enter. Solutions, Inc.
Decision Date | 27 October 2011 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 11–806 (GK). |
Citation | 820 F.Supp.2d 62 |
Parties | SABRE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Plaintiff, v. TORRES ADVANCED ENTERPRISE SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Tennant David Magee, Maggs & McDermott, LLC, Brielle, NJ, Timothy B. Mills, Maggs & McDermott, LLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Alain J. Ifrah, David B. Deitch, Ifrah PLLC, Jeffrey R. Hamlin, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
Plaintiff, Sabre International Security (“Sabre”), a private Iraqi security company, brings this action against Defendant, Torres Advanced Enterprise Solutions, Inc. (“Torres”), a Virginia limited liability company, for equitable relief, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary and trust obligations, unjust enrichment, and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage and business relations. This matter is presently before the Court on Torres' Motion for Dismissal of the Complaint and for Partial Summary Judgment (“Torres MTD”) (May 27, 2011) [Dkt. No. 21]. Upon consideration of the Motion, Oppositions, Reply, and the entire record herein, and for the reasons set forth below, Torres' Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Sabre is a private security contractor providing security services around the world to various entities, including the U.S. Government. Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶ 1. On September 27, 2007, Sabre won one of several U.S. Government Theater-wide Internal Security Services Multiple Task Order Contracts, number W91GDW–07–D–4026 (“TWISS I Contract”) to provide security services to U.S. military installations in Iraq. Id. ¶ 6. On November 8, 2007, in connection with this Contract, Sabre entered into a subcontractor agreement with Torres (“2007 Subcontractor Agreement”). Id. ¶ 7. Pursuant to this Agreement, Torres agreed to provide personnel holding valid U.S. Government security clearances to work on Sabre's TWISS I projects. Id.
In 2009, the U.S. Government amended its policies for TWISS I contracts by requiring that prime contractors, like Sabre, possess a U.S. Defense Department Industrial Security Program Facility Security Clearance at the Secret Level (“Secret FCL”). Id. ¶ 11. Sabre, as a non-U.S. company, was not eligible for a Secret FCL. Id. Accordingly, to avoid termination of the TWISS I Contract, Sabre and Torres entered into a novation of the TWISS I Contract on December 30, 2009. Id. ¶¶ 12–13. Pursuant to the novation, known as the Asset Purchase Agreement (“APA”), Torres became the prime contractor and Sabre the subcontractor. Id.
According to Sabre, the APA included two additional agreements as annexes (or addendums): (1) “[a] form of subcontract between Torres and Sabre for TWISS I security services that was to take effect upon the U.S. Government's approval of the novation” (the “APA Sabre Services Subcontract”); and (2) “[a] form of equipment lease agreement between Sabre and Torres for lease from Sabre to Torres of all equipment necessary for performance of the TWISS I Task Orders that was to take effect upon the U.S. Government's approval of the novation” (the “APA Sabre Lease Agreement”). Id. ¶ 13.
Sabre alleges that, under these three “agreements,” Sabre was entitled to payment of pre-novation rates and that Torres was obligated to “issue priced [ ] TWISS I Subtask Orders to Sabre promptly after the TWISS I Novation that would give effect to [this] understanding[ ].” Id. ¶¶ 41–42. On February 5, 2010, the U.S. Government approved the novation. Id. ¶ 3. According to Sabre, after the novation, Torres breached its contractual obligations by failing to pay Sabre's TWISS I invoices at the rates established under the APA and its accompanying annexes, and by failing to put the TWISS I Subtask Orders in place. Id. ¶¶ 228–29.
On August 6, 2009, Sabre and Torres entered into a Teaming Agreement to bid on one of several Government Theater-wide Internal Security Services Multiple Task Order Contracts, number W91DGW–09–D–4030 (“TWISS II Contract”), which would replace existing TWISS I contracts. Id. ¶¶ 53, 61. To be eligible for a TWISS II Contract, the prime contractor was required to hold a Secret FCL as well as a Private Security Company (“PSC”) License from the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. Id. ¶¶ 58–59. Under the Teaming Agreement, Torres, which held a Secret FCL, was designated as the prime contractor and Sabre, which held a PSC License, but did not hold a Secret FCL License, was designated as the subcontractor. Id. ¶ 61.
The Sabre–Torres team (“Team”) then bid for a TWISS II Contract, which they won on August 25, 2009. Id. ¶¶ 62, 86. In accordance with TWISS II Contract procedures, the Team then competed for several TWISS II Task Order Requests (“TWISS II TORs”), which the Government issued for each military base that required security services. Id. ¶¶ 90, 106. The Team competed for these TWISS II TORs by submitting Task Order Proposals (“TWISS II Task Order Proposals”) to the U.S. Government, and was ultimately successful in obtaining several TWISS II TORs. Id. ¶¶ 91, 106, 108.
On April 29, 2011, Sabre filed its Complaint. On May 27, 2011, Torres filed its Motion for Dismissal of the Complaint and for Partial Summary Judgment. On July 25, 2011, Sabre filed its Opposition to Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (“Sabre Opp'n to MTD”) [Dkt. No. 30]. On July 26, 2011, Sabre filed its Opposition to Defendant's Rule 56 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Sabre Opp'n to SMJ”) [Dkt. No. 32]. On August 19, 2011, Torres filed its Reply in Support of its Motion for Dismissal of the Complaint and for Partial Summary Judgment (“Torres Reply”) [Dkt. No. 34].
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and to “nudge[ ] [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “[A] complaint [does not] suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Instead, the complaint must plead facts that are more than “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability; “the pleaded factual content [must] allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1940 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider any documents attached to or incorporated into the complaint, matters of which the court may take judicial notice, and matters of public record. EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C.Cir.1997).
“[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Under the standard set forth in Twombly, a “court deciding a motion to dismiss must ... assume all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) ... [and] must give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from the facts alleged.” Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C.Cir.2008) (citations and internal quotations omitted). See also Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1007 (D.C.Cir.2009) ( ).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment may be granted “only if” the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), as amended Dec. 1, 2007; Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 329, 333 (D.C.Cir.2006). In other words, the moving party must satisfy two requirements: first, that there is no “genuine” factual dispute and, second, if there is, that it is “material” to the case. “A dispute over a material fact is ‘genuine’ if ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.’ ” Arrington, 473 F.3d at 333 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the case under the substantive governing law. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
As the Supreme Court stated in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, “the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The Supreme Court has further explained,
[a]s we have emphasized, Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (footnote omitted). “ ‘[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.’ ”
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (quoting ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Uzoukwu v. Metro. Wash. Council of Governments
...that prospective business advantage must be one that is “commercially reasonable to expect.” Sabre Int'l. Sec. v. Torres Advanced Enterprise Solutions, Inc., 820 F.Supp.2d 62, 77 (D.D.C.2011) (citing Democratic State Comm. of the District of Columbia v. Bebchick, 706 A.2d 569, 572 (D.C.1998......
-
Millennium Square Residential Ass'n v. 2200 M St. LLC
...the benefit; and (3) under the circumstances, the defendant's retention of the benefit is unjust.” Sabre Int'l Sec. v. Torres Advanced Enter. Solutions, 820 F.Supp.2d 62, 76 (D.D.C.2011) (citing News World Communications v. Thompsen, 878 A.2d 1218, 1222 (D.C.2005)). Here, the counterclaim d......
-
Quizinsight.com P'ship v. Tabak
...20 (D.C. Cir. 2014), that is "commercially reasonable" will create a valid business expectancy, Sabre Int'l Sec. v. Torres Advanced Enter. Sols., Inc., 820 F. Supp. 2d 62, 77 (D.D.C. 2011). The plaintiffs allege that Tabak tortiously interfered with the relationships between the plaintiffs ......
-
Hill v. U.S. Dep't of Def.
...Such detail is not required. At this stage, Hill must only plausibly allege proximate causation. Sabre Int'l Sec. v. Torres Advanced Enter. Solutions, Inc., 820 F.Supp.2d 62, 75 (D.D.C.2011) (quoting Brewer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 664 F.Supp.2d 43, 54 (D.D.C.2009) ) (holding that “[t]o......