Sacalaris v. Eureka & P.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 November 1883
• Parties: CHARLES SACALARIS v. EUREKA & P. R. Co.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

1 P. 835

18 Nev. 155

CHARLES SACALARIS v. EUREKA & P. R. Co.

Supreme Court of Nevada

November 24, 1883

It is ordinarily the duty of parties who deal with agents to ascertain the extent of their authority; but when a principal puts the agent forward as a general agent, or places him in a position where others are justified in the belief that his powers are general, the restrictions privately imposed on the agent are immaterial, except as between him and the principal. A railroad superintendent may be presumed to have authority to determine an ordinary matter, such as the receipt of fuel for the company.

Where a purchaser has notice that the goods about to be sold to him are not the property of the vendor, the owners after the sale may recover the goods or their value.

The findings of fact of the jury will not be disturbed, where there is evidence to sustain them, though the evidence be conflicting.

Appeal from the Sixth Judicial district court, Eureka county.

Wren & Cheney, for appellant.

G. W Baker and R. M. Beatty, for respondent.

BELKNAP J.

Plaintiff was the owner of a quantity of cord-wood in the vicinity of the town of Eureka. He contracted with one Paquin to haul the wood to the town, and agreed to pay him one-half of the wood he should haul for his services. Accordingly, Paquin hauled 464 cords of wood. Fifty cords of this wood were deposited in the immediate neighborhood of the depot of defendant, 85 cords at a point in the town called "the Chinese wash-house," and the remainder (with which we are not concerned) at other places. These two lots of wood were the property of the plaintiff; but defendant contends that it purchased these from Paquin under circumstances creating an equitable estoppel against further claim of ownership upon the part of plaintiff. This contention is resisted as to the 85 cords, upon the ground that defendant had notice of plaintiff's claim of ownership to this lot before it accepted it.

The only evidence tending to show that defendant had not accepted the wood, were the declarations of Evarts,--its superintendent,--alleged to have been made after the time when this lot of wood had been depostied at "the Chinese wash-house," upon a demand therefor by plaintiff, before the commencement of this action. There was no evidence of authority in the superintendent to make the declaration except such as the title to his office implies. Railway corporations enter so largely into the business transactions of the country that courts should take judicial notice of the authority of their managing officers, upon the same principle that judicial notice is taken of the duties of officers of banks and other agents, whose authority is so generally understood as not to be the subject of inquiry. It is a matter of common knowledge that the superintendent of a railroad corporation is empowered to conduct its ordinary business transactions. The use of cord-wood is convenient, and, we may fairly say indispensable, to the operation of railroads within this state. To receive such wood, and declare whether it has been received, is, consequently, incident to the business of a railroad corporation, and the authority to determine matters of this nature must rest with some of its agents or officers. We assume that the officer charged with the conduct of defendant's ordinary business has the authority to determine so common-place a matter as the receipt of cord-wood. It is customary with railroad corporations to confer upon their officers and agents titles indicating and suggesting in general terms their authority to persons having business with the corporation. When an agent is clothed with a title implying general powers, as superintendent, the business public and courts may fairly presume he is what the corporation holds him out as being. Webster says, a superintendent is "one who has the oversight and charge of something, with the power of direction." An agent having the oversight and charge, with the power to direct has a general and discretionary power within the scope of his agency.

The law touching the liability of corporations arising from the acts of their agents has been greatly modified, as will be seen by reference to recent decisions.

In Adams M. Co. v. Senter, 26 Mich 73, the court said: "The next question refers to the extent of True's authority, independent of specific and expressly granted powers. We are not satisfied that any testimony would be needed to show the extent of the ordinary powers of an agent in charge of such a mine. The authority of such officers must, within the usual range of business, at least be recognized judicially, like that of bank cashiers, vessel captains, and and other known agents. The mining law recognizes agents by name, as known representatives upon whom process may be served. They are the persons who have the charge, personally, of the local business at the mines, and are necessarily to be treated, in law, as general agents, to do all that is fairly within the scope of corporate business in conducting the operations in that locality. The testimony of Mr. Palmer, which shows the usual range of such agencies, indicates no more than should be inferred. The business could not be conducted at all without a very wide discretionary power. There is no reason, and can be no legal principle, which will put the agent of a corporation on any different footing than the agent of an individual in regard to the same business. A general agent needs no...