Saccuzzo v. Krystal Co.

Decision Date12 August 1994
PartiesBobbie Lee SACCUZZO, as administratrix of the Estate of Christopher Dale Saccuzzo, deceased v. The KRYSTAL COMPANY, d/b/a Krystal # 2. 1930721.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Harvey B. Morris and Maureen G. Kelly of Morris, Cloud & Conchin, P.C., Huntsville, for appellant.

Donna S. Pate and Jeffrey T. Kelly of Lanier, Ford, Shaver & Payne, P.C., Huntsville, for appellee.

INGRAM, Justice.

The plaintiff, Bobbie Lee Saccuzzo, as administratrix of the estate of Christopher Dale Saccuzzo, appeals from a summary judgment for the defendant, the Krystal Company, on her wrongful death claim. Christopher Saccuzzo died of a gunshot wound that he received while standing in the parking lot of a business known as the Cotton Club. The shot was fired by a person standing in the parking lot of the defendant's Krystal fast food restaurant located on the property adjacent to the Cotton Club. In the 18 months preceding the shooting of Christopher Saccuzzo, the police had been called to the Krystal restaurant more than 160 times. Saccuzzo contends that the attack on Christopher was foreseeable, and, therefore, that Krystal had a duty to protect Christopher Saccuzzo from the criminal acts of a third party.

One moving for a summary judgment has the initial burden to make a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact (i.e., that there is no dispute as to any material fact) and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Ala.R.Civ.P.; see also Willingham v. United Insurance Co. of America, 642 So.2d 428 (Ala.1994), and the cases cited therein. " 'The burden does not shift to the opposing party to establish a genuine issue of material fact until the moving party has made a prima facie showing that there is no such issue of material fact.' " Willingham, 642 So.2d 428, quoting earlier cases.

Rule 56 must be read in conjunction with the "substantial evidence rule," § 12-21-12, Ala.Code 1975, for actions filed after June 11, 1987. See Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794, 797-98 (Ala.1989). In order to defeat a defendant's properly supported motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must present substantial evidence, i.e., "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989).

The general rule in Alabama is that "absent special relationships or circumstances, a person has no duty to protect another from criminal acts of a third person." Moye v. A.G. Gaston Motels, Inc., 499 So.2d 1368, 1370 (Ala.1986). "Special circumstances" exist only when the defendant "knew or had reason to know of a probability of conduct by third persons that would endanger the plaintiff." Nail v. Jefferson County Truck Growers Association, Inc., 542 So.2d 1208, 1211 (Ala.1988). For the "special relationship" exception to apply, there must be a relationship either between the premises owner and the third party or between the premises owner and the plaintiff. Young v. Huntsville Hospital, 595 So.2d 1386 (Ala.1992), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965). Prior criminal incidents can indicate knowledge on the part of the owner, but such incidents are by no means conclusive on the question of knowledge. Williams v. First Alabama Bank, 545 So.2d 26, 27 (Ala.1989).

The past rulings of this Court indicate that it is difficult for the plaintiff to overcome the defendant's properly supported motion for summary judgment in an action alleging liability on the part of a premises owner for the criminal acts of a third party. One of the few Alabama cases in which the plaintiff has overcome a properly supported summary judgment motion in a situation involving such premises liability is Thetford v. City of Clanton, 605 So.2d 835 (Ala.1992), where this Court sent the issue of premises liability in an innkeeper-guest situation to a jury. Thetford and her child checked into a hotel in order to get away from Thetford's abusive husband. Thetford registered under an assumed name and specifically told the hotel employees not to tell her husband that she was staying there. When the husband later arrived at the hotel, hotel employees, despite Thetford's earlier instructions, let him into her room, even though she had the door locked. The husband removed Thetford and the child from the premises. Thetford was subsequently murdered by her husband at a different location. The administrator of Thetford's estate sued the hotel. The...

To continue reading

Request your trial
27 cases
  • Scott v. Universal Sales, Inc.
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • August 5, 2015
    ...(2000) ; Natrona County. v. Blake, 81 P.3d 948, 957–58 (Wyo.2003).44 Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 319 (1965).45 See Saccuzzo v. Krystal Co., 646 So.2d 595, 596 (Ala.1994) ; Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal.3d 741, 167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728, 738 (1980) ; Faile v. S.C. Dep't of Ju......
  • Hail v. Regency Terrace Owners Ass'n
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • December 22, 1999
    ..."knew or had reason to know of a probability of conduct by [a third person] that would endanger the plaintiff." Saccuzzo v. Krystal Co., 646 So.2d 595, 596 (Ala.1994), quoting Nail v. Jefferson County Truck Growers Ass'n, Inc., 542 So.2d 1208, 1211 (Ala.1988). Knowledge on the part of a pre......
  • Krier v. Safeway Stores 46, Inc.
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • July 31, 1997
    ...of a probability of conduct by third persons that would endanger the plaintiff. Broadus, 677 So.2d at 202 (quoting Saccuzzo v. Krystal Co., 646 So.2d 595, 596-97 (Ala.1994)). Other jurisdictions espouse a "prior similar incidents" test, under which the court considers the proximity, time, n......
  • Finley v. Patterson
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • June 13, 1997
    ...two exceptions to this rule: (1) the "special relationship" exception; and (2) the "special circumstances" exception. Saccuzzo v. Krystal Co., 646 So.2d 595, 596 (Ala.1994) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 1. "Special Relationship" Exception The "special relationship" exception i......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT