Sacilor, Acieries et Laminoirs de Lorraine v. US

• Decision Date: 02 June 1982
• Docket Number: Court No. 82-5-00683.
• Citation: 3 CIT 191,542 F. Supp. 1020
• Parties: SACILOR, ACIERIES ET LAMINOIRS de LORRAINE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES, et al., Defendants, U. S. Steel Corporation, et al., Intervenors.
• Court: U.S. Court of International Trade

542 F. Supp. 1020

3 CIT 191

SACILOR, ACIERIES ET LAMINOIRS de LORRAINE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES, et al., Defendants U. S. Steel Corporation, et al., Intervenors.

Court No. 82-5-00683.

United States Court of International Trade.

June 2, 1982.

Windels, Marx, Davies & Ives, New York City (Pierre F. deRavel d'Esclapon, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiffs, Sacilor, Acieries et Laminoirs de Lorraine; Societe Lorraine de Laminage Continu; Societe Lorraine et Meridionale de Laminage Continu; and Aktiengesellschaft der Dillinger Huettenwerke.

Graubard, Moskovitz, McGoldrick, Dannett & Horowitz, New York City (Michael H. Greenberg, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiffs Arbed S.A., et al.

Graubard, Moskovitz & McCauley, Washington, D. C. (Alfred R. McCauley, Washington, D. C., of counsel), for plaintiff Thyssen A. G.

Coudert Brothers, New York City (Milo G. Coerper, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiffs Krupp Stahl A. G., et al.

Sharretts, Paley, Carter & Blauvelt, Washington, D. C. (Peter O. Suchman, Washington, D. C., of counsel), for plaintiff ESTEL Hoogovens, B. V.

Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Washington, D. C. (Stephen L. Gibson, Washington, D. C., of counsel), for plaintiff Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter A. G.

J. Paul McGrath, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C. (David M. Cohen, Branch Director, Commercial Litigation Branch and Sheila N. Ziff, Commercial Litigation Branch, New York City, on the brief), for defendants, U. S., et al.

J. J. Mangan, Pittsburgh, Pa., of counsel, for intervenor U. S. Steel Corp.

Eugene L. Stewart, Washington, D. C., for intervenors Bethlehem Steel Corp. and Armco, Inc.

Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York City (Joseph R. Sahid, New York City, of counsel), for amicus curiae Republic Steel Corp., et al.

FINAL JUDGMENT

WATSON, Judge.

This action was started on May 17, 1982 by foreign steel producers seeking to enjoin the Department of Commerce from disclosing confidential information which the producers had submitted in response to questionnaires in antidumping investigations of carbon steel. They alleged that the Department of Commerce had decided to release the confidential information in response to requests made by attorneys for domestic steel producers, which requests were general requests made prior to the submission of the confidential information and lacked the particularity and supporting reasons and other safeguards required by law and regulation. On that date, the Court issued a temporary restraining order. On the following day, the Court clarified the order to make certain that it applied only to pending antidumping proceedings and it granted another temporary restraining order in a similar action commenced by another foreign steel producer. It then consolidated the actions and ordered the trial on the merits advanced and consolidated with the hearing on the preliminary injunction, which thereafter took place on June 2, 1982. At that time, the Court granted motions to intervene by Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Armco Incorporated, and United States Steel Corporation. It also granted the application of counsel for Republic Steel Corporation, Inland Steel Company, Jones & Laughlin Steel Incorporated, National Steel Corporation and Cyclops Corporation to appear as amicus curiae.

The Court then heard argument from all parties relative to the claim by plaintiffs that the proposed release of confidential information was in violation of the law and regulations, specifically, section 777(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(c), and 19 C.F.R. 353.30. It also heard argument on the question of whether the Court had jurisdiction of the action.

In recognition of the speedy resolution of these matters which the law requires on both the administrative and judicial level, the Court resolved to decide the action immediately. At the conclusion of the hearing and based upon the arguments made, and all the papers filed, including the affidavits, memoranda and supporting documents, the Court issued the following final decision and order:

The Court considers 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)¹ to be an unmistakable expression of legislative intent that this Court be the exclusive forum for actions against the United States which arise from the laws mentioned therein, which for convenience we refer to as the laws of international trade.

The specificity which is displayed in the preceding jurisdictional subsections,² is simply a combination of a repetition of details of the former jurisdiction of the Court, together with specific mention of newer actions which have been specially provided for. Unless these preceding jurisdictional subsections express or contain in their manifest legislative history, a limitation on jurisdiction of other related actions, they do not operate to diminish the broad grant of jurisdiction contained in section 1581(i) or to nullify causes of action which originate elsewhere.

For this reason, the specific grant in section 1581(c) of jurisdiction over actions commenced under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, that is to say, those reviews specially provided for at various stages of the administration of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, does not preclude jurisdiction over other actions which can arise from those laws, of which this is just one example. This result was clearly anticipated by Congress when it stated that, "the Court is not prohibited from entertaining a civil action relating to an antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding so long as the action does not involve a determination specified in section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930." H.R.Rep.No.96-1235, 96th Cong.2d Sess., at 47-48 (1980), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1980, pp. 3729, 3760. See also, Royal Business Machines, Inc. v. United States, 69 C.C.P.A. ___, 669 F.2d 692 (1982).

It is also apparent that the Congressional caution against the creation of new causes of action, at page 48 of the above-mentioned House Report, is directed to the fashioning of actions which were previously unknown to the law, and not to the assertion of jurisdiction by this Court over actions which formerly would have been cognizable in the district courts.

In the same vein, the grant of jurisdiction in section 1581(f) over actions to force disclosure under section 777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677f, does not operate to bar jurisdiction over an action to block disclosure, which action has its origin elsewhere. See for example 28 U.S.C. § 2640(d).

The Court finds the case of Haarman & Reimer Corp. v. United States, 1 C.I.T. ___, (1981), 509 F.Supp. 1276 (1981) of questionable import and clearly distinguishable in that the action sought to be brought in that case was a reverse facet of one of the specific determinations made reviewable under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, so that the congressional intent expressed at page 48 of House Report 96-1235 may apply, in that any determination which will be directly or by implication incorporated in, or superseded by, a specific later reviewable determination, will not be independently reviewable. The same cannot be said of the decision under dispute here. It is final and it is independent, factually and legally, from the later determinations that will be made. The correctness of this decision cannot be reviewed in a meaningful way in a judicial review at a later stage of the administrative proceedings.

The Court views this action as a conventional challenge to final agency action by an aggrieved party, within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. It places the action in the context of prevailing law in which there is a strong tendency, if not a presumption, towards reviewability of agency actions which are final and have an adverse effect on a party. Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). The Court finds no express or even implied preclusion of this action from any source. On the contrary, the maintenance of this action is in harmony with the best principles of administrative law. Suwannee Steamship Co. v. U. S., 79 Cust.Ct. 19, C.D. 4708, 435 F.Supp. 389, (1977). See e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2631(i).

Turning to the merits, the Court finds that plaintiffs have demonstrated that the International Trade Administration of the Commerce Department has proceeded here in direct violation of the statute. The statute displays an extreme sensitivity in the handling of confidential information, with meticulous care shown in providing first, for the maintenance of confidentiality; second, for the determination of unwarranted designations of confidentiality; and third, for limited disclosure. See section 777(c)(1) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677F(c)(1).³ The provision requiring a party to describe the information requested, with particularity and to provide reasons for the request must be viewed with the utmost seriousness. It is among the most delicate and important provisions in the statute and touches on some of the most sensitive decisions that have to be made in the administrative process. In recognition, the relevant regulations contain a requirement that the applicant for disclosure demonstrate "good cause" for the release of the information and the regulations further require that the Secretary of Commerce "shall weigh whether the need of the person requesting the information outweighs the need of the person submitting it for continued confidential treatment." 19 C.F.R. § 353.30.⁴

It is clear to the Court that neither the statute nor the regulations have been honored in this case. It is not necessary at this point for the Court to elaborate on what would be the proper standards to apply in deciding whether to disclose, since it is plain that not even token consideration was given to the proper procedures here. It suffices to say, at this time, that the release of confidential information must be the result of a...