Sackett v. Wyatt

Citation108 Cal.Rptr. 219,32 Cal.App.3d 592
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
Decision Date23 May 1973
Parties, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2107, 71 Lab.Cas. P 13,772 W. H. SACKETT, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jack D. WYATT et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 12338.

R. R. Campagna, San Bernardino, for plaintiff and appellant.

Richman & Garrett and Lionel Richman, Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents.

OPINION

TAMURA, Associate Justice.

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of dismissal following an order sustaining a demurrer to his first amended complaint without leave to amend. Review of the court's ruling requires an analysis not only of the first amended complaint, out of the original as well. We, therefore, briefly summarize both pleadings.

The original complaint named as defendants Jack D. Wyatt, General Truck Drivers Union Local 467 and Joint Western Area Committee (Joint Committee). Plaintiff alleged two causes of action. In the first, he alleged he was engaged in business as a radial highway common carrier solely in intrastate commerce in California with his principal place of business in Riverside County; that Local 467 was a duly authorized and accredited labor union representing employees and union members in the trucking industry in Riverside County; that Wyatt and certain Doe defendants were members of the executive board of the local and officers and agents thereof; that the Joint Committee is a body comprised of labor and management representatives to hear and decide grievances; that under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between plaintiff and Local 467 which was in force and effect, the parties agreed to submit all disputes arising thereunder to arbitration; that the Joint Committee rendered a decision against plaintiff with respect to certain union grievances and a dispute has arisen concerning the interpretation of that decision; that the Joint Committee decision was 'incomplete, indefinite and incapable of compliance without further elaboration'; that plaintiff requested further clarification to no avail; and that the union has threatened 'strike sanctions' unless plaintiff complies with the Joint Committee decision as interpreted by the union.

In the second cause of action, plaintiff alleged that Wyatt orally agreed with plaintiff that the grievances filed by the union would be withdrawn provided plaintiff agreed to withdraw pending disciplinary charges against certain of his employees who were union members; that plaintiff withdrew his charges but, contrary to the oral agreement, Wyatt 'and other defendants' prosecuted the union grievances before the Joint Committee; that plaintiff relied upon the agreement and was therefore unprepared for the Joint Committee hearings and thereby suffered an adverse decision; that Wyatt 'performed said acts, conduct or omissions with no valid or legitimate labor-management purpose in mind but solely to vex, harass and annoy plaintiff.'

Plaintiff prayed for an injunction restraining defendants from striking or picketing, for an order compelling arbitration of the dispute over the interpretation of the Joint Committee decision, for an order staying enforcement of that decision, and for damages.

A year and three days after the filing of the original complaint but before any responsive pleadings were filed, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint for damages naming only Wyatt (and Does) as defendants. The amended complaint also alleged two causes of action:

The first, after repeating the allegations concerning the nature of plaintiff's business, the position of Wyatt with Local 467, and the execution of a collective bargaining agreement, alleges that plaintiff brought disciplinary charges against certain employees pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement; that the union through Wyatt filed employee grievances against plaintiff; that Wyatt orally agreed with plaintiff that if plaintiff would withdraw his charges against his employees Wyatt would dismiss the union grievances; that Plaintiff performed but Wyatt failed to withdraw the union grievances and instead prosecuted them before the Joint Committee; that as a result of Wyatt's breach, plaintiff was damaged to the extent of the Joint Committee's award against plaintiff in the sum of $1,850.

As a second cause of action plaintiff alleged that at the time the oral agreement was entered into, Wyatt never intended to withdraw the union grievances and that his promise to do so was 'false and fraudulent'; that Wyatt acted 'with no valid or legitimate labor-management purpose in mind but solely to vex, harass and annoy plaintiff.' The prayer was for general and special damages according to proof together with exemplary damages.

Defendant Wyatt demurred to the first amended complaint and each cause of action therein for failure to state a cause of action and on the further ground that the action was barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (4), in that it was not 'commenced within one (1) year.' In support of the demurrer defendant requested the court to take judicial notice of a decision of the National Labor Relations Board certifying Local 467 as the bargaining representative for plaintiff's employees. The court sustained the demurrer as to both causes of action without leave to amend. 1

I

As to the first cause of action on the amended complaint, plaintiff contends the court erred in basing its ruling on the theory that an agent could not be held liable for damages for breach of contract when acting for a disclosed principal. It is urged the amended complaint merely alleged Wyatt's affiliation with the union but did not allege he was acting within the course and scope of his agency. Plaintiff's contention is without merit.

In ruling upon the demurrer the trial court was not confined to the allegations of the first amended complaint; it was entitled to consider the verified allegations of the earlier complaint. (Lesperance v. North American Aviation, Inc., 217 Cal.App.2d 336, 340--341, fn. 1, 31 Cal.Rptr. 873; Hinman v. Wagnon, 172 Cal.App.2d 24, 28, 341 P.2d 749.) Allegations of fact made under oath may not ordinarily be dropped without adequate explanation merely for the purpose of avoiding their harmful effect in a subsequent pleading. (Wennerholm v. Stanford Univ. Sch. of Med., 20 Cal.2d 713, 716, 128 P.2d 522; Callahan v. City and County of San Francisco, 249 Cal.App.2d 696, 699, 57 Cal.Rptr. 639; Chadbourne, Grossman, Van Alystine, California Practice, § 1167, pp. 393--394.)

The gravamen of the first cause of action of the amended complaint is a claim for damages for breach of an oral agreement between plaintiff and Wyatt wherein the latter allegedly promised to withdraw union grievances in consideration of plaintiff's promise to withdraw disciplinary charges against certain of his employees. The original complaint contains factual allegations showing that Wyatt was an officer and agent of Local 467; that the parties had entered into a collective bargaining agreement regulating the terms and conditions of employment and specifying the union and its officers and agents as the negotiating representatives of member employees; and that contrary to the alleged oral agreement, Wyatt and the union prosecuted the employees' grievances to a favorable Joint Committee decision. In the amended complaint plaintiff attempts to state a cause of action against Wyatt individually without any reference to the union's participation in negotiating the alleged oral agreement or the prosecution of the employees' grievances before the Joint Committee in violation of the agreement. However, the allegations of the original complaint clearly reveal that Wyatt was acting as a union representative in agreeing to withdraw union grievances and in subsequently prosecuting them before the Joint Committee. Those factual allegations may not be avoided by omitting them in the amended complaint without explanation. Indeed, in his opening brief appellant concedes that Wyatt was 'ostensibly acting in his official capacity' in entering into the oral agreement.

In the foregoing circumstances, the demurrer to the first cause of action was properly sustained on the basis of applicable state law. Under California law it is settled that a personal judgment for damages for breach of contract may not be obtained against a known agent of a disclosed principal. (Automatic Poultry Feeder Co. v. Wedel, 213 Cal.App.2d 509, 518, 28 Cal.Rptr. 795; Hayman v. Shoemake, 203 Cal.App.2d 140, 159, 21 Cal.Rptr. 519; Oppenheimer v. General Cable Corp., 143 Cal.App.2d 293, 297, 300 P.2d 151; see Carranza v. Noroian, 240 Cal.App.2d 481, 483, 49 Cal.Rptr. 629.)

Moreover, though not specified by the trial judge as a ground for its order sustaining the demurrer, a personal judgment against defendant for damages for breach of contract is precluded by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (L.M.R.A.). (29 U.S.C.A. § 185.) 2 Subsection (a) provides that suits for 'violation of contracts' between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in the act may be brought in any federal district court having jurisdiction of the parties. 3 Subsection (b) provides: 'Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose activities affect commerce as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. 4 Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.' The United States Supreme Court has viewed section...

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