Sackrider v. Saginaw County Sup'rs
| Decision Date | 28 December 1889 |
| Citation | 79 Mich. 59,44 N.W. 165 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | SACKRIDER v. SUPERVISORS OF SAGINAW COUNTY et al. |
Appeal from circuit court, Saginaw county; CHAUNCEY H. GAGE, Judge.
Jas. H. Davitt and F. E. Emerick for appellants.
Lawson C. Holden and Byron A. Snow, for appellee.
The legislature of this state, at its session of 1889, passed an act entitled "An act to provide for the construction and maintenance of stone, gravel, macadamized, and dirt roads in the county of Saginaw, and to raise one hundred thousand dollars therefor by issuing bonds." See Local Acts 1889 No. 341, p. 380. The act provided that the question of raising this sum of money by issuing the bonds of the county should be submitted to the electors of said county; and, if a majority of the electors of the county voting upon the question should vote in favor of issuing said bonds, the board of supervisors at its next meeting thereafter might issue the same, under the terms and conditions of said act. This act was approved March 21, 1889. The question of raising the loan was submitted to the people at the annual spring election of 1889, and carried,-yeas, 7,906; nays, 3,633; a total vote of 11,539. The total vote for justice of the supreme court at this election in Saginaw county was 10,997. The complainant, a large land-owner and heavy tax-payer in said county, residing in the city of Saginaw, filed his bill of complaint in this case, praying for a perpetual injunction against the board of supervisors, and Creen and King, who are, respectively, chairman and clerk of said board, to restrain and enjoin them from taking any steps or doing any act looking towards the issuing of bonds, or from taking any proceedings under said act. He alleges in said bill that this act is void, and not a law of this state because it was not introduced or offered in the legislature within the first 50 days of the session. That it was a substitute for a bill known as "House Bill No. 214," entitled "A bill to discontinue that portion of the midland and St Clair state road in the township of Midland, Midland county, Michigan, from the point where it now commences, at a point near the center of section 28, in said township, to where it intersects the section line between sections 27 and 34, in said township," and not reported or given to said legislature under and by any other than that title within the first 50 days of the session. That the subject-matter and title to the bill as introduced was not germane to the bill as passed, but was and is wholly foreign thereto, and not for the same or a like purpose. That said act, as passed, was not read three times in each house before its final passage. Because the title of said act does not express all the objects of the bill, in this, to-wit: ( a) By its title the only object expressed is to provide for the construction and maintenance of stone, gravel, macadamized, and dirt roads in the county of Saginaw, and to raise $100,000 therefor by issuing bonds, while in the body of the act the objects expressed allow the building of plank-roads and other roads not mentioned or expressed in the title. (b) The body of the bill designates certain roads named as the ones to be improved, constructed, etc., while the title does not. (c) The body of the act creates and establishes certain "state roads" which were not such before, while the title expresses no such object. (d) The body of the act permits by its terms the delegation of certain powers therein enumerated to the board of Saginaw road commissioners, namely, the letting of contracts and the expenditure of money, and acceptance of work, not expressed in the title. ( e) The body of the act purports to permit the board of supervisors of said county to change the stone-road districts fixed by said act, and not expressed in its title. That the act is multifarious in its objects and provisions, by embracing more than one object. The title of the act embraces more than one object. The notice of election required by said act to be given is insufficient in length of time, and also, by making the notice given under another and differently entitled and void act, notice of election in part under the act complained of. That the act is also unconstitutional and void for the reasons above set forth. That no sufficient notice of the election was given in fact. That neither he nor his property will receive any benefit from the construction or maintenance of the roads, but that the same will be of damage to him and his property, and he will be assessed and compelled to pay large sums of money because of the issuing and negotiation of said bonds, if the same are permitted to be issued and negotiated.
The defendants answered, admitting that the act was reported by the committee on roads and bridges in the house of representatives as a substitute for a bill entitled as set forth by complainant in his bill of complaint, but averring that the subject-matter of said bill, as first introduced under such title, was germane to the act as passed. That the body of said house bill No. 214 contained provisions of the same general nature and purpose as those contained in the body of the substitute,-the act as passed,-and that it was lawful and proper to amend the title at the time said substitute was reported and passed. They allege that said act contains but one object, which is expressed in its title; and deny that the said act is unconstitutional and void for any of the reasons stated in said bill of complaint; and allege, on the contrary, that the same is valid, and was constitutionally passed. That it was read three times in each house before its passage. That it passed the house by a vote of 63 to 2. That it passed the senate unanimously. That it passed as "House Bill No. 214." That said bill was introduced within the first 50 days of the present session. That it was duly signed and certified by the presiding officers of each house of the legislature under the rules and practice of such houses. That it was duly approved by the governor of this state, and deposited in the office of the secretary of state of this state with the other duly-enacted laws of Michigan, and that the secretary of state sent to the sheriff of Saginaw county a certified copy of said act before the notice of election mentioned in said bill was given by said sheriff. They aver, also, that the notice of election was sufficient, and that more votes were cast upon this question than upon any other submitted to the electors of said county at said spring election. They admit the amount of complainant's property as stated by him, but deny that the issuing of the bonds will be of damage to him or his property, but allege that he will be benefited thereby. They admit their purpose and intent to issue the bonds and to proceed under the act.
Under these pleadings testimony was taken and a hearing had. The circuit judge entered a decree as prayed by complainant, holding that it could fairly be presumed from the title of house bill No. 214 that its object, as stated in the body of the bill as introduced, was to vacate a state road, or a part of a state road, in the county of Midland. That the title to a bill could be amended, but not so as to change the nature of both the bill and the title, and have the bill, when finally passed, embrace an entirely different object and purpose from that originally intended. The substitute-the act as passed-was not introduced within the 50 days, the constitutional limit. That the substance of said substitute not being at all germane to the original bill, but entirely foreign to it, the legislative committee could not present it to the house for the first time after the 50 days had expired. That it was an evasion and violation of the provision of the constitution (article 4, � 28) that "no new bill shall be introduced into either house of the legislature after the first fifty days of the session shall have expired."
This case presents a question not yet passed upon by this court and one of grave import. It presents facts as to methods of legislation not covered by the facts in Attorney General v. Rice, 64 Mich. 388, 31 N.W. 203, or People v. McElroy, 40 N.W. 750. If the constitutional provision can ever be evaded or violated by the reporting and passing of a substitute for an original bill, it certainly has been evaded and violated in this case. And if this legislation can be upheld it would seem that the constitutional provision above quoted is worthless to prevent the evil against which it is manifestly directed. If a new bill can be reported as a substitute for a bill, the subject-matter of which has no connection with or relation in the remotest degree to the subject-matter of such new bill under the guise of a substitute, then it is difficult to perceive the use or value of this constitutional provision. No one will admit for a moment that the framers of the constitution ever intended that this provision should be rendered nugatory in this way. Courts have gone a great ways to uphold legislation that apparently trenched on this or similar provisions in constitutions, and have sometimes, it seems to me, strained the constitution almost to breaking, to sustain laws that in their passage came close to, if not within, the line of the prohibition of the fundamental law. I, for one, have gone as far in this direction as my conscience and duty will permit me. Let the consequences as to laws already on our statute-books be what they may, it is time to call a halt in this direction. If the constitutional provision is in the way of legislation, and the people desire that new bills may be introduced at any time during the session, there is a constitutional way to get rid of this provision. But it is the...
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