Sacks v. Gandhi Eng'g, Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 11 Civ. 5778(DAB)(DCF).,11 Civ. 5778(DAB)(DCF). |
| Citation | 999 F.Supp.2d 629 |
| Parties | Farrell SACKS, Plaintiff, v. GANDHI ENGINEERING, INC., Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Motion granted in part and denied in part.
Farrell Sacks, Flushing, NY, pro se.
Keith J. Frank, Perez, Furey & Varvaro, Uniondale, NY, for Respondent.
ADOPTION OF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On August 23, 2013, United States Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman issued a Report and Recommendation (“Report”), recommending that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted in part and denied in part. (Report at 1, 26.) Defendant filed timely Objections to the Report. Pro se Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant's Objections.
For the reasons set forth below, after conducting the appropriate levels of review following Defendant's Objections, the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Freeman dated August 23, 2013 shall be ADOPTED in its entirety. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's claims of discrimination based on age and religion but DENIES Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's claim that Defendant discriminated against him in violation of the Americans with Disability Act of 1990 (“ADA”).
I. BACKGROUND
The Report sets forth the factual background in great detail in the Report. Parties' familiarity with the Report and underlying facts is assumed, and this Order recounts the facts only to the extent necessary for the resolution of Defendant's Objections thereto.
The City of New York Department of Transportation (“DOT”) hired Defendant to oversee bridge construction projects. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 8.) Defendant employed Plaintiff from September 7, 2010 to October 22, 2010 as a Senior Inspector for one of DOT's bridge construction projects. ( Id. ¶ 7.) Among his Inspector duties, Plaintiff submitted daily work reports, measured “Quantities,” climbed ladders, measured and photographed installations, walked on rebar mat, and performed various concrete tests. ( Id. ¶ 24; Pl. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 24.) The Parties dispute whether Plaintiff sufficiently performed his duties. (Def. 56.1. Stmt. ¶ 25; Pl. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 25.) Defendant claims that Kirti Gandhi (“Gandhi”), the owner of Gandhi Engineering Inc., and DOT engineers witnessed Plaintiff not performing adequately his job duties. (Frank Decl. Ex. E ¶¶ 6–7.) Therefore, Defendant asserts, he was “terminated due to performance.” Plaintiff, however, claims that his supervisor, Godfrey Passaro (“Passaro”), told him he was fired because DOT was unhappy with his “agility.” (Pl.'s Add'l Points ¶ 5.) He claims that, although Gandhi told Plaintiff that he was “unable to perform his duties as Inspector,” nothing in his personnel record indicates poor performance. (Pl.'s Add'l Points ¶¶ 6, 8.)
Plaintiff does not have a disability, nor has he been told by a medical provider that he has one or that he has any problems with his agility. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. 19, 21; Sacks Dep. 75:6–9.) He also never informed Defendant that he had a disability or needed an accommodation. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. 18, 20.) While Defendant has seen a medical practitioner since the beginning of this action, it was unrelated to any mobility or agility concerns. (Sacks Dep. 130:22–131:15.)
II. DISCUSSIONA. Standard of Review for a Report and Recommendation
“Within fourteen days after being served with a copy [of a Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation], a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2); accord 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The court may adopt those portions of the report to which no timely objection has been made, as long as there is no clear error on the face of the record. Wilds v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 262 F.Supp.2d 163, 169 (S.D.N.Y.2003). A district court must review de novo “those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). “To the extent, however, that the party makes only conclusory or general arguments, or simply reiterates the original arguments, the Court will review the Report strictly for clear error.” IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. v. Nat'l Settlement Agency, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 6865, 2008 WL 4810043, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2008). After conducting the appropriate levels of review, the Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). B. Legal Standard for Disability Discrimination
Disability discrimination claims alleged under the ADA are examined using the three-step burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Ben–Levy v. Bloomberg, 518 Fed.Appx 17, 19 (2d Cir.2013). To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
(1) the defendant is covered by the ADA; (2) plaintiff suffers from or is regarded as suffering from a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (3) plaintiff was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability or perceived disability.
Capobianco v. City of New York, 422 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir.2005). A plaintiff's burden to establish a prima facie case is de minimis. Katz v. Adecco USA, Inc., 845 F.Supp.2d 539, 548 (S.D.N.Y.2012).
When a plaintiff brings a claim on the basis of that his employer regarded him as disabled, “the decisive issue is the employer's perception of his or her employee's alleged impairment.” Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 748 (2d Cir.2001). A plaintiff therefore must “show not only that the defendants ‘regarded [him] as somehow disabled,’ but that they ‘regarded [him] as disabled within the meaning of the ADA.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). When Congress passed the ADA Amendment Act (“ADAAA”) of 2008, it created a more lenient definition of “regarded as” disabled or perceived disability:
An individual meets the requirement of “being regarded as having such an impairment” if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2( l )(1).1 Accordingly, to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff is required to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer “regarded him as having a mental or physical impairment.” Hilton, 673 F.3d at 128. A physical impairment includes, inter alia, a “physiological disorder or condition ... affecting ... [the] musculoskeletal” system. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). The impairment only constitutes a disability under the ADA
if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.2
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). Major life activities include walking and bending. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i).
After a plaintiff sustains the prima facie burden, a defendant must then “proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the complained of action.” Ben–Levy, 518 Fed.Appx. at 19 (citing Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir.2000)). If the employer meets that burden, “[t]his rebuts the presumption raised by the prima facie case, at which point ‘the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the real reason for the adverse employment decision was discrimination.’ ” Kemp v. Metro–North R.R., 316 Fed.Appx. 25, 27 (2d Cir.2009) (citation omitted).
C. Defendant's Objections
Magistrate Judge Freeman recommended that this Court dismiss Plaintiff's religion and age discrimination claims because he could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework. (Report 14–20.) However, the Report recommended to deny Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's disability discrimination claims because he made out his prima facie case of disability discrimination and there was a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendant's explanation for his termination was pretextual. (Report 20–26.)
Defendant objects to the Report's findings that (1) agility is a physiological condition that can be perceived as a disability under the ADA, (2) there was an inference of discrimination based upon perceived disability, (3) Defendant did not put forth a legitimate non-discriminatory basis for its termination decision, and (4) Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate pretext. The Court has reviewed for clear error the portions of the Report to which no objections have been made and finds none.
Defendant's first Objection relates to the Report's finding that Plaintiff set forth sufficient evidence to establish the second part of Plaintiff's prima facie case. The Report explained that the statements that Plaintiff was terminated due to his lack of agility and his inability to perform his job tasks, where his job involved walking, climbing, and bending, “give rise to an inference that Defendant believed that Plaintiff had a physiological condition, most likely involving the musculoskeletal system.” (Report 23.) Defendant contends that, even under the ADAAA standard, agility cannot constitute a disability. Defendant also asserts the Report erred in finding that Defendant believed Plaintiff had a disability.
As an initial matter, the Report correctly determined that the ADAAA “regarded as” standard and not the pre–2008 Amendment stan...
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