Sacksell v. Barrett
| Decision Date | 18 July 1945 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | SACKSELL v. BARRETT et al. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Murphy, Judge.
Proceeding by John H. Sacksell against Gurnee H. Barrett and others, executors of the estate of Vivien M. Sacksell. From a judgment and a supplemental judgment entered in the superior court sustaining the defendants' plea to the jurisdiction and in abatement to an appeal taken by plaintiff from an order of the probate court admitting a will to probate, the plaintiff appeals.
No error.
Herman M. Levy and William L. Hadden, both of New Haven, for appellant.
Richard J. Cronan, of New York City, and J. Gerald Hannon, of Greenwich, for appellees.
Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS, and DICKENSON, JJ.
On May 24, 1941, the plaintiff and Vivien Maxwell, in contemplation of their approaching marriage, executed a written contract under seal. It recited that each desired to retain full ownership and possession of any property he or she then owned or might subsequently acquire and that upon his or her death the survivor should have no claim to it. By its terms each was to have to his or her sole and separate use, free from interference and control of the other, the property of which he or she was seized or possessed at the time of the marriage or which he or she might thereafter acquire. It further provided that she agreed with him ‘to accept his promises and covenants herein contained in place and satisfaction of any and all claims which she might have against the property and estate’ belonging to him, and it contained a similar agreement on his part to accept her promises in satisfaction of any claim he might have against her property. Each also agreed to release and convey to the other or to his or her estate all right and interest he or she might have had in said property if this agreement had not been made, upon request by the other or by his or her representative. Both were of full age and the agreement was fairly made for adequate consideration. On May 26, 1941, the parties intermarried. On October 24, 1942, she died domiciled in Greenwich, leaving him as her sole heir. On December 14, 1942, the Greenwich Probate Court admitted to probate an instrument dated September 16, 1942, as her last will and testament. The plaintiff took an appeal to the Superior Court in which he claimed an interest as widower and heir-at-law of the deceased. He is not a legatee under the will. At the time he executed the contract above recited, his estate consisted of some $300. The estate of the testatrix showed an inventory value in excess of $100,000. These facts are undisputed.
The defendants are entitled to have the finding corrected so that, instead of stating that neither party to the contract received from the other what was intended as a provision in lieu of the statutory share of the surviving husband or wife as provided in § 5156 of the General Statutes, it will set forth that by the execution of the contract and the exchange of covenants therein the plaintiff intended to receive, and did receive, what was intended as a provision in lieu of his statutory share of the decedent's estate, and intended to and did waive, abandon and surrender any and all interests in the estate of his prospective wife either as a widower or an heir-at-law. This result necessarily follows from the undisputed evidence consisting of the plaintiff's letter, Exhibit 1, his testimony concerning it, and the terms of the contract, in view of our determination, discussed below, as to the effect of § 5156 of the General Statutes.
On January 7, 1943, the plaintiff, alleging that he was the ‘widower, an heir at law of the deceased,’ and that he ‘is aggrieved’ by the Probate Court's decree admitting the will to probate, took an appeal to the Superior Court. The defendants filed a plea in abatement on the ground that by the contract of May 24, 1941, the plaintiff ‘received from Vivien Maxwell Sacksell what was intended as a provision in lieu of the statutory share of John Henry Sacksell in the estate of Vivien Maxwell Sacksell,’ and that he ‘is not aggrieved.’ The court sustained the plea and rendered judgment for the defendants. Subsequently, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for a new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence. The plaintiff thereafter filed a substituted answer to the plea consisting of a denial and of three special defenses: (1) the plaintiff is the widower, the only heir-at-law of the deceased and, therefore, a party aggrieved; (2) the contract is invalid and of no effect because it does not provide that the plaintiff receive ‘what was intended as a provision in lieu of’ his statutory share in the deceased's estate as provided for in § 5156, and at no time did he receive such a provision; (3) on August 7, 1941, the deceased executed a last will naming the plaintiff as a substantial beneficiary, and she subsequently executed the will made the subject of this appeal in which the plaintiff is not named a beneficiary, with the result that the plaintiff, as a legatee under the first will and cut off as such under the second, is a party aggrieved. The court concluded that the contract of May 24, 1941, was ‘an antenuptial agreement as distinguished from a statutory agreement contemplated by Section 5156’; that it divested the plaintiff of his statutory rights in his wife's estate; that the plaintiff had no appealable interest; that the third special defense constituted ‘an attempt to amend and enlarge an appeal in this Court whereas the motion for appeal must be made in the Probate Court’; and that the defendants' plea in abatement should be sustained. It rendered judgment for the defendants and the plaintiff has appealed.
The first question for decision is whether the contract of May 24, 1941, was effective, under § 5156, which defines the property rights of a surviving spouse, to terminate the plaintiff's rights as surviving husband. This involves a determination of the effect of this sentence in the statute: ‘The provisions of this section with regard to the statutory share of the surviving husband or wife in the property of the other shall not apply to any case in which, by written contract made before or after marriage, either party has received from the other what was intended as a provision in lieu of such statutory share.’ The plaintiff's contention as we understand it, is that either the actual delivery to and receipt by him of an existing physical consideration, such as money or other tangible property, transferred in execution of the agreement, or a promise of such a transfer to be made at or before his wife's death should he survive her was essential to constitute ‘a provision in lieu’ of his statutory share under the statute. The consideration which he received by the terms of the contract did not fall within this restricted category. In addition to that of the marriage itself, it consisted rather of the release by her to him of all her claim or right to all property owned by him at the time of the marriage or which he might thereafter acquire. Obviously, a consideration might well be of the nature which the plaintiff claims essential and yet have far less value than consideration of the kind specified in the contract. To construe the sentence as claimed by the plaintiff would by no means insure the better carrying out of ‘the purpose of the statute to provide for the protection of the surviving spouse in making suitable provision for his maintenance and support.’ Bankers Trust Co. v. Greims, 110 Conn. 36, 48, 147 A. 290, 294, 66 A.L.R. 726.
The significant words of the sentence are ‘what was intended as a provision in lieu of such statutory share.’ There is nothing in these words to connote that the ‘provision’ referred to must consist of consideration in the restricted sense claimed by the plaintiff. They suggest rather the fullest freedom in the parties to contract for a consideration of the sort and kind which they decide will best afford the ‘provision’ referred to. The plaintiff has suggested no convincing reason for holding otherwise. None of the authorities which he cites bear out...
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