Sacramento County Employees Organization, Local 2 etc. Union v. County of Sacramento

• Decision Date: 30 October 1972
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO
• Citation: 28 Cal.App.3d 424,104 Cal.Rptr. 619
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 81 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2841, 69 Lab.Cas. P 52,939 SACRAMENTO COUNTY EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, LOCAL 22 SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION,, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. The COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, the Board of Supervisors of the County of Sacramento, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents, AFSCME, Sacramento County Employees Local 146,, et al., Intervenors. Civ. 13389.

Page 619

104 Cal.Rptr. 619

28 Cal.App.3d 424, 81 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2841,

69 Lab.Cas. P 52,939

SACRAMENTO COUNTY EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, LOCAL 22 SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. The COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, the Board of Supervisors of the County of Sacramento, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents AFSCME, Sacramento County Employees Local 146, AFL-CIO, et al., Intervenors.

Civ. 13389.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Oct. 30, 1972.

Robert H. Sharpe, Sacramento, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Warren Adell & Miller, Los Angeles, and Romines, Wolpman, Tooby, Eichner, Sorensen, Constantinides & Cohen, Menlo Park, for intervenors-respondents.

John B. Heinrich, County Counsel, by Robert Galgani, Deputy County Counsel, Sacramento, for defendants and respondents.

BYRNE, ^* Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from an order denying a preliminary injunction in an action brought by plaintiffs to enjoin defendant county and its officers from deducting dues Only from the salaries and wages Of members of recognized employee organizations, and to require defendants to deduct dues for All employees upon request.

Plaintiffs and intervenors are employee organizations representing various groups of Sacramento County employees. Defendants are the County of Sacramento and various named officers of the county. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), Sacramento County Employees Local 146, AFL--CIO, hereafter referred to as 'intervenor,' intervened on behalf of defendants and is a respondent herein. ¹

Pursuant to section 3507 of the Government Code, ² the County of Sacramento in April of 1970 adopted an employee relations ordinance. That ordinance sets forth a procedure for employee organizations to seek the determination of representation units ³ to qualify as the recognized employee organization with respect to a unit and thereby become the exclusive representative for Meeting and conferring with the county on behalf of the employees in that unit.

After the units were determined, representation elections were held under the supervision of the State Conciliation Service as provided by the ordinance. On June 21, 1971, the Sacramento County Board of Supervisors certified as 'recognized' the employee organization for each of the units receiving a majority of the votes cast at the election.

Plaintiffs prevailed in two units, while intervenor prevailed in three units.

Section 2.79.040 of the ordinance, relating to employee organization rights, provides in pertinent part as follows:

'(f) Within a unit, dues deductions shall be permitted only for members of the recognized employee organization.'

Following certification of the election results, administrative steps were taken to assure that dues were deducted from the pay of employees within a unit only in respect to membership in an organization certified as recognized for that unit.

The reasons for limiting dues deductions to the members of a recognized employee organization were set forth by Gerald M. Pauly, Sacramento County Employee Relations Officer, prior to the adoption of the ordinance:

'After very careful consideration, we have concluded that it is in the best interest of the county and employee organizations to include in the ordinance a provision restricting dues deductions within a representation unit to the employee organization recognized as representing that unit. The major purpose of the ordinance is to provide county employees with an opportunity to designate one employee organization as the recognized negotiating agent for a particular group of employees. Permitting other employee organizations to continue dues deductions in the representation unit would promote and encourage continued strife between organizations within the unit. After a recognized organization had been selected by secret ballot majority vote of employees in a unit, it should be the only organization eligible for dues deductions within that unit. The Legislature in adopting Sections 3500 through 3511 of the Government Code stated that one of its purposes is to promote the improvement of employer-employee relations and to strengthen employer-employee relations. We believe that restricting dues deductions to the organization selected by a majority vote of employees in a unit is consistent with Legislative intent.'

Before the administrative steps could be fully implemented, plaintiffs obtained a temporary restraining order staying action by defendants. That order was subsequently vacated and a preliminary injunction was denied. This appeal followed.

Plaintiffs first contend that this is a proper case for injunctive relief. This, of course, begs the question and is not of assistance in determining whether the court erred in denying the preliminary injunction based upon the facts and law presented to it.

Plaintiffs next contend that the denial of the relief requested appears to be based on the erroneous premise that the rules and concepts of industrial collective bargaining apply to California's public employees. They contend the memorandum of the trial court is 'permeated' with this misconception. The memorandum states, in part, as follows:

'Under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act of 1968, Sacramento County has formally acknowledged that certain employee organizations are 'recognized employee organizations.' Gov.C. § 3501(a). These 'recognized employee organizations' have the right to represent their members in their employment relations with the county, Gov.C. § 3503; and the county is required to meet and confer with them in good faith regarding wages, hours and conditions of employment, Gov.C. § 3505. Nothing in the Act prevents the county from meeting with other employee organizations. But apart from the right of individuals to represent themselves, Gov.C. §§ 3502, 3503, The county may act as if the 'recognized employee arganizations' were the exclusive bargaining agents or representatives.' (Emphasis added.)

Plaintiffs seize on the emphasized language to argue that the court's concept expresses the theory of industrial collective bargaining which is completely foreign to the representation program designed by the Legislature for public employees. ⁴ (Gov.Code, § 3500 et seq.) They cite section 3509 of the Government Code which provides that section 923 of the Labor Code shall not be applicable to public employees. This section delineates the right of the worker in the private sector to bargain collectively. (See, Nutter v. City of Santa Monica (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 292, 168 P.2d 741.) Plaintiffs also argue that the concept of Exclusiveness does not exist in the statute. (See, Gov.Code, § 3507.) ⁵

It is settled in California that public employees have no right to bargain collectively. (Almond v. County of Sacramento (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 32, 36, 80 Cal.Rptr. 518; City of San Diego v. American Federation of State etc. Employees (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 308, 310, 87 Cal.Rptr. 258.) Under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act the public employer must 'meet and confer in good faith regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with representatives of . . . recognized employee organizations, . . .' (See, Gov.Code, § 3505.)

A careful reading of the trial court's memorandum convinces us that it was not based on an erroneous premise. The main thrust of the decision is that the validity of and the authority for the county's action must be found under the pertinent code sections. The court states: 'Its (dues deduction provision of ordinance) validity depends on the authority of the county under Gov.C. §§ 1157.1 and 1157.3. If, like §§ 1156, 1157.4 and 1157.5, they give the employees the right to have the deductions made, the restriction in the ordinance would be invalid. Cf. Cal. State Employees' Assn. v. Regents of University of California, 267 Cal.App.2d 667, 668--69, 73 Cal.Rptr. 449 (1968). But if §§ 1157.1 and 1157.3 are merely permissive and not obligatory on the county, the restriction is valid. Bauch v. City of New York, supra (21 N.Y.2d 599, 289 N.Y.S.2d 951 at 953), 237 N.E.2d (211) at 213.'

We think this approach was the proper one. Thus, plaintiffs' arguments with regard to industrial collective bargaining are largely irrelevant. The court was merely noting a practice in private industry and analogizing it to the problems in public employment. ⁶

As a practical matter, realizing that in order to establish and prevent a two-party adversary relationship from becoming a multi-party scramble following the adoption of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, the following counties adopted a program of exclusive representation for recognized employee organizations: Alameda, Contra Costa, Orange, San Diego and Santa Clara.

Plaintiffs contend that there is no provision in Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (and particularly Government Code section 3507) authorizing payroll deduction of dues.

However, section 3507 ⁷ does provide that a public agency May adopt reasonable rules and regulations after good faith consultation with representatives of employee organizations. The statute then sets forth seven broad areas in which a public agency may adopt rules. Finally, section 3507 provides that such rules and regulations may include provisions for 'such other matters as are reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter.'

As we read the statute we are convinced that it provides only broad guidelines for the public agency. We find no restrictive intent upon the part of the Legislature. And when read with other applicable statutes (discussed infra), we find no lack of authority for the county to restrict payroll deduction of dues to recognized employee organizations.

The Legislature did not provide in specific terms what rules and regulations the local agency should or must adopt in extending exclusive recognition; rather, it left to local agencies themselves the right to ascertain...