Sacramento County v. Hickman

Decision Date15 June 1967
Citation66 Cal.2d 841,59 Cal.Rptr. 609
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 428 P.2d 593 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO et al., Petitioners, v. Irene HICKMAN, as Assessor, etc., Respondent. Sac. 7803. In Bank

John B. Heinrich, County Counsel, and Felix S. Wahrhaftig, Sacramento, for petitioners.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Ernest P. Goodman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward P. Hollingshead and Philip W. Marking, Deputy Attys. Gen., amici curiae on behalf of petitioners.

Desmond, Miller & Desmond, Bill W. West, Carol Miller, Wilkins & Mix and Brian D. Flynn, Sacramento, for respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

This is an original petition for writ of mandate filed by the County of Sacramento, its board of supervisors, and several school districts, to compel respondent county assessor to comply with Revenue and Taxation Code section 401, which requires the assessment of all taxable property at an announced fraction of its full cash value. The sole question presented is whether that statute is in conflict with the Constitution. We have concluded that the measure is valid, and hence that a peremptory writ should issue.

As part of an extensive property tax reform in 1966 (Stats.1966, First Ex.Sess., ch. 147, § 34), Revenue and Taxation Code section 401 was rewritten to provide that 'Every assessor shall assess all property subject to general property taxation from the lien date for the 1967--68 fiscal year through the 1970--71 fiscal year at a publicly announced ratio of his own choosing which shall be between 20 percent and 25 percent of full cash value. Beginning with the lien date for the 1971--72 fiscal year, he shall assess all property subject to general property taxation at 25 percent of its full cash value.' 1 In implementation of this statute (see Gov.Code, § 15606) the State Board of Equalization promulgated a regulation requiring each county assessor to announce his chosen assessment ratio on or before the third Monday in January each year. (Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 18, § 251.)

On Monday, January 16, 1967, respondent announced that taxable property in Sacramento County would be assessed at 100 percent of full cash value for the 1967--68 fiscal year. 2 Petitioners thereafter filed this application for a writ of mandate to compel respondent to comply with section 401 and 'reduce the assessed valuations on the local roll to a uniform ratio of full cash value at a percentage between 20 percent and 25 percent, inclusive. * * *' We issued an alternative writ.

In her return, respondent first demurred to the petition on the grounds that section 401 is unconstitutional and that the petitioning school districts are not beneficially interested parties. She then answered by various admissions and denials, and as an affirmative defense again alleged the unconstitutionality of section 401.

As a preliminary matter, we note that the absence of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law was determined by the granting of the alternative writ. (Corona Unified Hospital Dist. v. Superior Court (1964) 61 Cal.2d 846, 850, 40 Cal.Rptr. 745, 395 P.2d 817.) And in making the writ returnable before this court, we also necessarily determined that the case is a proper one for the exercise of our original jurisdiction. (See Cal.Rules of Court, rule 56(a).) Indeed, the issues presented are of great public importance and must be resolved promptly. The assessment of all taxable property in Sacramento County is currently being undertaken, and the local assessment roll must be completed on or before July 1 (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 616); unsecured property taxes became due on March 6 (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 2901) and, if unpaid, will become delinquent and subject to penalty on August 31 (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 2922). Petitioners list a number of administrative tasks relative to the equalizing, levying, collecting, and protesting of property taxes which must also be performed in the forthcoming months, and sufficiently show that the delay attendant upon first submitting this matter to a lower court would result in confusion in the administration of the tax laws and hardship and expense to the general public.

The writ of mandate lies to compel the performance of a clear, present, and ministerial duty 'which the law specially enjoins.' (Code Civ.Proc. § 1085.) It is settled that taxing authorities may be compelled by this writ to levy taxes or make assessments to provide funds required by law. (See, e.g., May v. Board of Directors (1949) 34 Cal.2d 125, 128--129, 208 P.2d 661; McAlpine v. Baumgartner (1937) 10 Cal.2d 409, 413--414, 74 P.2d 753.) There can be no doubt that respondent's duty to assess in accordance with law, for violation of which she may be civilly or criminally liable (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 1361--1366), is equally mandatory. Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitution declares in relevant part that 'All property in the State * * * shall be taxed in proportion to its value, To be ascertained as provided by law' (italics added). This value, of course, is ascertained by assessment, and the duty to do so is laid upon the county assessor. Revenue and Taxation Code section 405 provides that 'Annually, the assessor Shall assess all the taxable property in his county, except state-assessed property, to the persons owning, claiming, possessing, or controlling it on the lien date.' (Italics added.) The duty must be performed in compliance with the several statutes prescribing the method by which property is to be assessed. (E.g., Rev. & Tax. Code, div. 1, pt. 2, ch. 3.) Among those statutes is Revenue and Taxation Code section 401, quoted above, which commands that until the 1971--72 fiscal year 'Every assessor Shall assess' the taxable property in the county at a publicly announced ratio of his own choosing 'which Shall be between 20 percent and 25 percent of full cash value' (italics added). 'Full cash value' is elsewhere defined to mean 'the amount at which property would be taken in payment of a just debt from a solvent debtor' (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 110); this value, we have explained, 'might be called the market value of property for use in its present condition' (De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego (1955) 45 Cal.2d 546, 562, 290 P.2d 544, 554).

Under the foregoing principles, petitioners have made out a prima facie case for a peremptory writ of mandate to compel respondent to comply with section 401. 3 Respondent's sole defense, accordingly, is the asserted unconstitutionality of that statute.

Respondent's position is premised upon a literal reading or article XI, section 12, of the Constitution, which declares in relevant portion that 'All property subject to taxation shall be assessed at its full cash value.' That language was added in 1933, as part of a substantial revision of our constitutional and statutory tax laws. (Sen.Const.Amend. 30, Stats.1933, pp. 3072--3078.) It was, however, virtually identical to former Political Code section 3627, enacted in 1872, which provided that 'All taxable property must be assessed at its full cash value.' 4

Respondent contends that article XI, section 12, is clear and unambiguous, and hence is not subject to interpretation; rather, the courts must give effect to the plain meaning of its words. Respondent further contends that article XI, section 12, is mandatory and binding on all departments of the state government, and that no assessor has discretion to disobey its command. Conceding that at the time of its adoption in 1933 there was a long-standing administrative practice of assessment at a fraction of full cash value, sanctioned by the State Board of Equalization, respondent contends that the practice was illegal and may not be used as an interpretative aid because the constitutional provision is not ambiguous. Acknowledging also that the Legislature has long been aware of the practice, respondent contends that the continuing enactment of statutes using the phrase 'full cash value' does not constitute legislative acquiescence in this meaning. Conceding, finally, that by 1933 this court and the Courts of Appeal had given repeated judicial recognition to this practice without any intimation of disapproval, respondent contends that such expressions may be disregarded as dicta because the decisions involved problems of equalization rather than the legality of the method of assessment.

These contention are not new to us. The points they raise, and others that could be urged, have all been adjudicated adversely to respondent's present position in the cases of Michels v. Watson (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 404, 40 Cal.Rptr. 464, and Hanks v. State Board of Equalization (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 427, 40 Cal.Rptr. 478. In Michels, a taxpayer sought to compel a county assessor to assess at full cash value rather than the 25 percent ratio he had announced; after an exhaustive review of the administrative, legislative, and judicial history of assessment in California, it was held that article XI, section 12, does not prohibit assessment at a uniform fraction of full cash value. In Hanks, a taxpayer sought to compel the State Board of Equalization to increase the assessment rolls of all counties to full cash value; upon a detailed examination of the constitutional powers and duties of the board, it was held that article XIII, section 9, permits that agency to equalize on the basis of uniform fractions of full cash value.

The taxpayers thereupon petitioned this court for further review, but we denied a hearing in each case. In the proceeding at bar we have again considered these arguments on their merits, and conclude that they were properly resolved in Michels and Hanks. As the latter are published opinions and are readily available, they need not be reproduced in detail here. However, we allude briefly to their general rationale.

The 1933 amendment of article XI, section 12, must be viewed in its historical context. As noted above, section 3627 of the Political Code, enacted in 1872, declared...

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