Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co. v. Parker

• Decision Date: 17 December 1929
• Docket Number: No. 5680.,5680.
• Parties: SACRAMENTO SUBURBAN FRUIT LANDS CO. v. PARKER et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

36 F.2d 926 (1929)

SACRAMENTO SUBURBAN FRUIT LANDS CO. v. PARKER et al.

No. 5680.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

December 17, 1929.

Butler, Van Dyke & Desmond, of Sacramento, Cal., and Arthur C. Huston, of Woodland, Cal., for appellant.

Ralph H. Lewis and George E. McCutchen, both of Sacramento, Cal., for appellees.

Before RUDKIN, DIETRICH, and WILBUR, Circuit Judges.

RUDKIN, Circuit Judge.

This case belongs to the same general class as Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co. v. Melin, 36 F. (2d) 907, just decided.

In the charge to the jury, concerning knowledge on the part of the defendant that the representations made were false, that the defendant intended that the plaintiff should rely and act upon them, and that the plaintiff did rely and act upon them, the court said:

"It must appear by the greater weight of the evidence that the defendant knew that one or the other, or both of those representations were false, or you cannot hold it liable, or if you find that it ought to have known it, or did it make this assertion positively which is equivalent of knowledge in the eyes of the law. If it did not know it, why shouldn't it have known it? It had handled these lands and dealt with them for twelve or fifteen years before. They had all the knowledge of those years in that subdivision. They had experts in their employ, horticulturists as well as others. Why didn't they know? They knew what was in the soil, or could have known. They knew what the land would produce, or could have known. Should not they have known before they go and sell it to people away down East, who knew nothing about the land? Moreover, they made the assertion positively. The witnesses for the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs themselves, say that this agent said the land is well adapted to commercial orcharding. When you make positive statements, not qualified, the law holds you liable, if they are false. So if you believe from the greater weight of the evidence that the defendant knew those representations were false, or should have known it, or made them positively, as I have said, the plaintiffs' case is thus far made out, and you proceed to the next step.

"Did the defendant make them with the intent that the plaintiff should rely on them? What did they make them for? What does a merchant issue advertising for? What does he send an agent out for, except to persuade prospects that what he is telling them is true, and that he is telling it to them for the purpose of bringing them in as prospects? That is only common sense. The law is common sense. Of course, the defendant intended whatever it said in this book, and whatever was said by its agent was intended to influence and persuade the plaintiffs to believe it and to induce them to enter into the bargain. There could be no other more reasonable conclusion than that.

"If you find that to be true, then the plaintiffs' case is made out so far, and then you proceed to the next step: Did the plaintiffs believe it? They say they did. Why shouldn't they? They were dealing with a corporation having a great deal of land. You can assume that it was a large corporation selling it, representing it to be of value for certain things. California, a great state, magnificent resources; they were living down in Iowa. They were made to be believed by the Reverend Swenk, and by the book. Why shouldn't they believe it? Why shouldn't we believe that plaintiffs believed it? They say they did believe it. They say they relied on it and were induced by it to make the bargain. They sent out their husbands to see the land. They were coming under the influence of the...