Sadat v. American Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 19 October 1984
• Docket Number: No. 58663,58663
• Citation: 83 Ill.Dec. 577,104 Ill.2d 105,470 N.E.2d 997
• Parties: , 83 Ill.Dec. 577, 53 USLW 2228, 1984-2 Trade Cases P 66,245 Roxanne SADAT, Appellant, v. AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 997

470 N.E.2d 997

104 Ill.2d 105, 83 Ill.Dec. 577, 53

USLW 2228,

1984-2 Trade Cases P 66,245

Roxanne SADAT, Appellant, v. AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellee.

No. 58663.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 19, 1984.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 30, 1984.

Randall D. Schmidt and Will Montgomery, law student, Chicago, for appellant.

Baker & McKenzie, Chicago (Francis D. Morrissey and Paul B. O'Flaherty, Jr., Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

THOMAS J. MORAN, Justice:

Plaintiff, Roxanne Sadat, filed a complaint for injunction against defendant, American Motors Corporation (AMC), in the circuit court of Cook County. Plaintiff alleged a breach of her automobile's full AMC warranty and sought a mandatory injunction, compelling AMC to replace her automobile and pay attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (commonly known as the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act) (Act) (15 U.S.C. sec. 2301 et seq. (1976)). The circuit court dismissed plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a cause of action for injunction. The appellate court upheld the circuit court's dismissal of the complaint. (114 Ill.App.3d 376, 70 Ill.Dec. 22, 448 N.E.2d 900.) We allowed plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal. 87 Ill.2d R. 315(a).

This appeal presents one question: Must a complaint for injunctive relief, seeking to obtain remedies authorized by the Act, include allegations of irreparable harm and an inadequate remedy at law?

Plaintiff's complaint for injunction indicates that she entered into a retail installment contract with an AMC dealer for the purchase of a new 1979 Concord, manufactured by the defendant. A written "1979 Full 12-Month/12,000 Mile New Car Warranty" was issued to the plaintiff at the time of purchase. The complaint reveals that while the car was under warranty it was plagued with a number of serious mechanical defects. The engine leaked oil. The steering column vibrated excessively. The transmission would slip from park to reverse while the car was stopped. The engine dieseled when the ignition was turned off. The brakes would intermittently fade or were difficult to engage. An exhaust-like odor was apparent in the automobile.

Although the plaintiff took her automobile to an AMC dealer seven times, mechanics, authorized by the defendant to make repairs under its warranty, were unable to remedy the defects. At this point, plaintiff requested a replacement automobile, without charge, pursuant to section 104(a)(4) of the Act (15 U.S.C. sec. 2304(a)(4) (1976)). When the defendant refused to honor this request, plaintiff filed the complaint for injunction, without alleging that her remedy at law was inadequate and she would suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief were not granted. The prayer for relief specifically requested the court to order the "Defendant to replace Plaintiff's automobile with a new, 1979, 2-door, Concord automobile, or a comparable or superior automobile, or its cash equivalent."

The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint and order the action transferred to the law division. In support of its motion, the defendant argued that Federal courts have consistently found that questions regarding remedies under the Act are governed by State law. Thus, to state a cause of action for injunctive relief under Illinois law, a plaintiff must plead and prove, in addition to other allegations, that he will suffer irreparable harm and is without an adequate remedy at law. Further, the defendant maintained that plaintiff's complaint conceded the adequacy of her remedy at law by requesting a refund of the purchase price of the car as an alternative to replacement.

In response, the plaintiff contends that her complaint stated a cause of action for injunctive relief under sections 104(a)(4) and 110(d) of the Act (15 U.S.C. secs. 2304(a)(4), 2310(d)(1) (1976)). Section 104(a)(4) of the act provides in relevant part:

"(a) In order for a warrantor warranting a consumer product by means of a written warranty to meet the Federal minimum standards for warranty--[he must do the following:]

* * *

* * *

(4) if the product (or component part thereof) contains a defect or malfunction after a reasonable number of attempts by the warrantor to remedy defects or malfunctions in such product, such warrantor must permit the consumer to elect either a refund for, or replacement without charge of, such product or part (as the case may be). * * * " (15 U.S.C. sec. 2304(a)(4) (1976).)

Section 110(d)(1) of the Act provides in relevant part:

"(1) Subject to subsections (a)(3) and (e) of this section, a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this chapter [15 U.S.C. sec. 2301 et seq.], or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract, may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief--* * *." 15 U.S.C. sec. 2310(d)(1) (1976).

It is plaintiff's position that her case involves a statutory injunction rather than a common law injunction. As such, she maintains that she has fulfilled the statutory requirements necessary to state a prima facie violation of 15 U.S.C. section 2304(a)(4) entitling her to equitable relief pursuant to 15 U.S.C. section 2310(d)(1) by alleging the following: the existence of a "full warranty"; defects occurring during the warranty period and continuing to the present; a reasonable number of attempts by the warrantor to repair the defects; her demand for a replacement or refund; and defendant's refusal to provide either remedy.

Defendant argues that statutes which authorize injunctive relief must do so explicitly. To illustrate, it refers to the section of the Act which specifically sets forth the conditions under which the Attorney General may obtain injunctive relief to prevent violations of the Act. (15 U.S.C. sec. 2310(c)(1) (1976).) In addition, defendant contends that case authority which recognizes the right to a statutory injunction involves public authorities rather than private parties.

Following a hearing, the motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint was granted. A review of the report of proceedings reveals that the court found the complaint insufficient for failure to allege irreparable injury and an inadequate remedy at law. The court distinguished the situation involved in the instant case from cases which have held that the common law pleading requirements of irreparable injury and an inadequate remedy at law did not have to be followed because an injunction was authorized by statute. In those cases, the court reasoned, the term "injunction" was expressly authorized and the legislative intent did not have to be inferred from the term "equitable relief," as in the instant case. In dismissing the complaint, the court suggested that the cause be transferred to the law division. The plaintiff requested that the action not be transferred and appealed the order of the circuit court.

The appellate court decision (114 Ill.App.3d 376, 70 Ill.Dec. 22, 448 N.E.2d 900) held that the Act's provision for equitable relief in private actions did not eliminate the need for establishing the traditional allegations of irreparable harm and an inadequate remedy at law. Rather, the court viewed the remedy of replacement or refund as the contractual right of a consumer in possession of a defective product covered by a full warranty. As such, an action for equitable relief to enforce the contractual right would be subject to the traditional common law prerequisites. The court found that its interpretation of the Act did not undermine the Act's remedial purpose since the consumer could maintain an action for damages (15 U.S.C. sec. 2310(d)(1) (1976)), and if successful would also be entitled to costs and attorney fees. 15 U.S.C. sec. 2310(d)(2) (1976).

Plaintiff correctly states the general rule regarding statutory remedies set forth in Mullarky v. Trautvetter (1916), 276 Ill. 409, 411-12, 114 N.E. 920, that "[w]hen pleading according to a form prescribed by a statute it is not necessary, in order to obtain relief authorized by the act, to state more than the act requires." Accordingly, plaintiff's application to register title to real estate, in Mullarky, was found to sufficiently conform to the statutory provision for the registration of title. The plaintiff had stated what the statute required but had not alleged the invalidity of an adverse claim. Since this substantive requirement was not required by the statute, however, the court found that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to include it in his pleading. The plaintiff, in the instant case, relies on the general rule of Mullarky, in support of the position that traditional equitable pleading requirements are waived when a consumer seeks an injunction to enforce remedies allowed by the Magnuson-Moss Act. This reliance is misplaced.

It is clear that under section 104(a)(4) of the Act a warrantor who has extended a full warranty to a consumer must permit the consumer to elect a refund or a replacement of the warranted product if the warrantor is unable to remedy the product defects within a reasonable number of attempts. (15 U.S.C. sec. 2304(a)(4) (1976).) Thus, following the rule set forth in Mullarky, a consumer in possession of a defective product covered by a full warranty states a cause of action against the warrantor if she alleges the preconditions for recovery set forth in section 104(a)(4) of the Act (15 U.S.C. sec. 2304(a)(4) (1976)). Plaintiff, in the instant case, attempts to extend the rule of Mullarky one step farther. She maintains that, because section 110(d)(1) of the Act affords an injured consumer the right to bring suit for both legal and equitable relief, these same allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action for injunctive relief. We disagree and, for the reasons to follow, hold that a complaint for injunctive relief under section 110(d)(1)...