Sade C., In re

• Decision Date: 26 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. S048796,S048796
• Citation: 920 P.2d 716,13 Cal.4th 952,55 Cal.Rptr.2d 771
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 920 P.2d 716, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6346, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,401 In re SADE C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN'S SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GREGORY C., Defendant and Appellant. In re VANESSA R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN'S SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDWARD R. et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Page 771

55 Cal.Rptr.2d 771

13 Cal.4th 952, 920 P.2d 716, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6346,

96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,401

In re SADE C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN'S SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GREGORY C., Defendant and Appellant.

In re VANESSA R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN'S SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDWARD R. et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. S048796.

Supreme Court of California.

Aug. 26, 1996.

Paula C. Mendell, Del Mar, Ellen M. Matsumoto, Gardena, and Judy Weissberg-Ortiz, Costa Mesa, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendants and Appellants.

Jonathan B. Steiner, Los Angeles, Stephanie G. Miller, Washington, DC, Bradley A. Bristow, Sacramento, and Caremla F. Simoncini, San Diego, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

We granted review in this cause to address the question whether Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (hereafter sometimes Anders ), which has been considered in decisions including People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 158 Cal.Rptr. 839, 600 P.2d 1071 (hereafter sometimes Wende ), applies, or must or should be extended, to an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting his custody of a child or his status as the child's parent. As will appear, our answer is no.

I

In the Juvenile Court of the Los Angeles County Superior Court (hereafter the juvenile court or simply the court), the Los Angeles County Department of Children's Services (hereafter DCS) filed two separate petitions in two separate proceedings under the juvenile court law (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 200 et seq.), as detailed below. ¹

In No. LK00851, DCS filed a petition requesting the juvenile court to adjudge a minor referred to as Sade C. to be within its jurisdiction and to declare her a dependent child. As subsequently amended, the petition alleged, inter alia, that Sade had suffered, or faced a substantial risk that she would suffer, serious physical harm or illness as a result of her parents' failure or inability to furnish adequate supervision or protection, or their inability to provide regular care, because of substance abuse. Facts to the following effect were subsequently established Sade was born premature, weighed less than four pounds, suffered the effects of intrauterine cocaine ingestion, and was taken into DCS custody at four days old; her mother was Lakeisha C., then seventeen years old, who had a history of significant criminal activity and substantial drug use; her father was Gregory C., then twenty-four years old, who also had a history of significant criminal activity and substantial drug use.

In the course of the proceedings, the juvenile court appointed separate counsel for Lakeisha and Gregory.

When Sade was somewhat more than four months old, the juvenile court conducted what was in substance a hearing on jurisdiction and disposition. As to jurisdiction, it impliedly sustained the petition, effectively finding true the allegation of serious physical harm or illness. It found by clear and convincing evidence that, in the physical custody of Lakeisha and Gregory, Sade faced a substantial danger to her physical health that could not be avoided by any reasonable means short of removal. As to disposition, it made various orders. So far as pertinent here, it ordered Sade declared a dependent child. It also ordered her formally removed from the physical custody of Lakeisha and Gregory and transferred to that of DCS for suitable placement. In addition, it ordered DCS to provide family reunification services.

In anticipation of one of the juvenile court's orders, DCS had placed Sade with Lakeisha's aunt Bernice White. In compliance with another, it offered family reunification services. Lakeisha and Gregory, however, effectively rejected what was made available. Lakeisha had minimal contact or attempted contact with Sade; she continued to engage in crime and to use drugs, moving into and out of custody. For his part, Gregory had even less contact or attempted contact with Sade, disclaiming paternity both before and after a court-ordered tissue analysis showed a 99.5 percent probability that he was in fact her father; apparently, he also continued to engage in crime and to use drugs, moving into and out of custody.

When Sade was about one year and five months old, the juvenile court impliedly ordered DCS to terminate family reunification services; at the same time, it expressly ordered it to provide permanent placement services and to initiate proceedings to appoint White as guardian.

When Sade was about one year and eight months old, the juvenile court took the guardianship proceedings off calendar and selected long-term foster care by White as the appropriate permanent plan.

When Sade was about two and one-half years old, the juvenile court found that she could or would be adopted by White and ordered DCS to initiate planning therefor.

Finally, when Sade was about three and one-half years old, the juvenile court conducted a hearing on termination of parental rights, among other matters. Gregory appeared, having been transported from prison; Lakeisha did not. The court ordered that the parental rights of Lakeisha and Gregory be terminated, finding by clear and convincing evidence that Sade would likely be adopted by White. It also ordered that a petition submitted by Gregory to change the placement of Sade from White's home to his mother's be denied.

Gregory subsequently filed in the juvenile court a notice of appeal from the orders terminating his parental rights and denying his change-of-placement petition. Lakeisha filed no such notice of any kind.

Gregory's appeal was docketed in the Second Appellate District of the Court of Appeal under No. B082230, and was assigned to Division Three thereof. On his application declaring indigency, the court appointed counsel to represent him on appeal. Counsel filed a brief that contained a statement of appealability, a statement of the case, a statement of the facts, and the following "argument," which relied impliedly on Anders and expressly on Wende and also, apparently, on the per curiam opinion of Division One of the Fourth Appellate District of the Court of Appeal in In re Joyleaf W. (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 865, 198 Cal.Rptr. 114 (hereafter sometimes Joyleaf W.), overruled by that same court in In re Angelica V. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1012, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 295 (hereafter sometimes Angelica V.), which purported to extend Anders and Wende to appeals from the termination of parental rights under the juvenile court law: ² "[C]ounsel for appellant requests that this court independently review the entire record on appeal for any arguable issues. [p] Present counsel has advised appellant that appellant may file a supplemental brief with the court within 30 days and may request the court to relieve present counsel. Present counsel remains available to brief any issue(s) upon invitation of the court." Gregory did not file a brief pro se. DCS did not appear.

In No. CK09428, DCS filed a petition requesting the juvenile court to adjudge a minor referred to as Vanessa R. to be within its jurisdiction and to declare her a dependent child. The petition alleged, inter alia, that Vanessa had suffered, or faced a substantial risk that she would suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally by her parents; that she had suffered, or faced a substantial risk that she would suffer, serious physical harm or illness as a result of her parents' failure or inability to furnish adequate supervision or protection; that she was suffering, or was facing a substantial risk that she would suffer, serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior against herself or others, because of the conduct of her parents and their inability to provide appropriate care; that she was under five years old and had suffered severe physical abuse at her parents' hands; and that she had been subjected to one or more acts of cruelty by her parents. Facts to the following effect were subsequently established: Vanessa was taken into DCS custody at four months old after she was delivered to a hospital emergency room for treatment of injuries including a fractured clavicle, fractured right arm, and bruises on both knees and (apparently) under her right eye; an emergency room physician was of the opinion that the injuries resulted from abuse and reported the matter; an associate of the child's pediatrician subsequently concurred in that view; the child's mother was Kris M., an "adult teenager[ ]" and high school graduate, who received Aid to Families With Dependent Children and had normally resided in the home of her mother and stepfather--her place of abode at the time of the injuries in question--but later moved; the child's father was Edward R., also an "adult teenager[ ]" and high school graduate, who worked at a grocery store and normally resided in the home of his mother and father.

During the proceedings, the juvenile court appointed separate counsel for Vanessa, Kris, and Edward.

Following mediation, Vanessa (through counsel), Kris, Edward, and DCS agreed in pertinent part as follows: they would submit to the juvenile court for determination on the basis of a DCS social study the petition's allegations of nonaccidental infliction of serious physical harm, severe physical abuse, and cruelty; they would move the court to dismiss those of serious physical harm or illness and serious emotional damage; Vanessa would be suitably placed with Kris's mother and stepfather (Kris herself having apparently moved from their home by this time); Kris and Edward would participate in individual counseling and in...